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

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An Historical Review

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British Business and Spanish America 1700-1800

The year 1521 marked an important turning point in the mercantile history of Europe. In that year Hernán Cortés completed his conquest of the Aztec capital which became Mexico City. He had gone in quest of a trading people similar to those found by the Portuguese in India and had found people and teeming cities. More important he had written letters glorifying himself and his conquest while presenting a highly glamorous picture of the vast wealth of the newly found empire. Word of wealth quickly spread through European marts among the merchants that the Americas might supply an abundance of the commodities for the increasing number of merchants, the long coveted raw products, the trade outlet, the gold, silver, precious stones, silks and spices.

Spain's good fortune was almost immediately to result in envy on the part of her rivals, which became deeply rooted as the decades passed and developed into a hatred of Spain that far outlives her fall in prestige. The green eyed monster first reared its head when the king of France caught the new implications of the Treaty of Tordesillas which had divided the world between Spain and Portugal. If Portugal had Africa and the Orient and Spain had the New World to say nothing of most of continental Europe, France assuredly had no mercantile future. The irate King Francis, even as Louis XII, forgetting for the moment all his Mediterranean and European intrigues demanded to be shown the will of "our common father Adam" which had made the two countries sole heirs to the world. This denial of Spain's right to take infidel lands overseas was the basis for the subsequent attacks on Spain's colonies by British, French,

Dutch and Portuguese privateers and pirates, not to mention the more recent filibusters from the United States or the proponents of the Spanish-American War.

The British attitude toward Spain's conquest of the Americas was crystalized in the time of Elizabeth when the idea became: Beyond the line of Demarcation—no law. America by this standard was still open to attack and conquest by Britishers. It was aptly rationalized two centuries later by an anonymous British author. This one set out to prove that "the sovereign sole Dominion, claimed by the crown of Spain to the West Indies, is founded upon an unjustifiable possession."[1] He then expounded the British pretensions:

> The *vain* and *boundless* Pretensions of Spain to that great Continent of *America,* whose northern limits are yet unknown, and some of whose vast inland Tracts of the southern Parts have never been visited by any *European,* cannot but be surprising to all those who know upon what Footing her Pretensions are grounded; especially, when she takes upon herself to question the *lawful* Rights and Possessions of the *British* Nation in that Part of the World; and by an arbitrary, and unwarrantable Authority, pretends to set Limits and Boundaries in the greatest of Oceans, whereby to exclude all others from sailing past the same.[2]

The writer then offers proofs for the priority rights of the British, even using the story of Modoc, youngest son of Owen Gwyneth, Prince of Wales, and his legendary coming to America in the year 1170 in support of them. After a tirade against Spanish aggression the writer reached the conclusion which had been reached in the sixteenth century and had been acted upon since that time:

> Upon the whole, this Pretended Right of *Spain,* to that Part of the World, is not to be looked upon in any other Light, than as a Thing which any other *Power* has *equal Right* to attack, and dispossess her of, without any Manner of *Scruple* or Reserve. . . .[3]

Who was there to gainsay the argument of the Sailor or ask to see the will of common father Adam bequeathing the trade of the world to Britain? The British of that time were well on the way to taking over all French colonies. Without taking possession of very much of the Spanish continental holdings in the Americas the British had been enjoying a flourishing trade at Portobelo, at Colonia, and at many of the ports visited by private merchants. It is possible that

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1 Anon., *The British Sailor's Discovery,* London, 1739, sub-title.
2 *Ibid.,* 2–3.
3 *Ibid.,* 31–32.

the anonymous Sailor's words were war talk, since the War of Jenkins' Ear began in the year the book was published.

The steps toward Britain's eighteenth century power on the seas, in commerce, and in business have often been recorded. Beginning with the sale of slaves to the Spaniards in the Americas in mid-sixteenth century the slavers did a highly profitable business for over two centuries in that one human commodity. The slave labor produced unheard of raw products for manufacture and consumption in the British Isles and foreign markets. When the Spanish mines in America began yielding abundant silver pirates scoured the seas for the Spanish bullion ships capturing unknown tons of silver from the 1560's on to the 1700's. The British crown during these times regularly employed outstanding pirates, since it was too costly to control them. Most memorable was Francis Drake, a most notorious scourge and viscious murderer to Spain's colonists, a gentleman adventurer to Elizabeth, the founder of the British navy, the idol of the British youth. Surely, on the principle that Spain had no rights and that a Britisher, slaver, pirate or "fence," could do no wrong, the psychology for empire building was set. The defeat of the Armada not only established a high morale and an increasing lust for seafaring on the part of the British but it threw Spain into a defensive, Spain that in 1588 controlled all of the Portuguese possessions, and therefore ruled the colonies of the world in the Orient, India, Africa and the Americas.

Britain developed manufacturing. Spain did not. Spain had no business sense nor trade inclinations; with plenty of silver and its purchasing possibilities there seemed no need to trade or manufacture or distribute. She did employ innumerable officials, clerks, tax-gatherers, and the elaborate colonial systems so familiar to students of Spanish American history, but she was not a business-minded nation.

In his scholarly work on Elizabethan England Black points out:

> The Englishman of the Tudor period was not by nature or tradition an explorer or a conquistador. The cult of the map and flag was unknown to him: he had no desire to search out the distant places of the earth, or to found a new England beyond the seas . . . In other words, it was trading and buccaneering . . . that gave birth to the greatest period of English exploit on the sea.[4]

Pares explains the British mentality and justification for piracy when he states: "For peoples whose resources in men and especially

[4] J. B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth 1558–1603*, Oxford, 1936, 195.

in money were small, it was easier, no doubt, to fit out a plundering expedition against the galleons than to find capital for the beginning of a plantation."[5]

The Dover Rovers, the Sea Rovers, the Sea Dogs, the Gentlemen Adventurers assuredly made England sea-minded and colony-minded.[6] In the seventeenth century the amazing spectacle of the English swarming to the Americas took place. The conformists were given grants and charters to islands of the West Indies, the non-conformers to the eastern coast of North America. The beach-heads of empire were established. By the middle of the century the British middle class had taken two lessons to heart: the lesson of Spain's failure to develop a diversified economy in the presence of her silver assets, and the lesson of Dutch success.[7] The conclusion was that real wealth lay rather in commerce and industry, which put people to work, aided in population growth, brought in raw materials, procured markets for surplus manufactures, and educated a business class.[8] The Dutch had proved that gold and silver gotten through industry was of greater advantage than that acquired in other ways.[9]

The Cromwell era proved that the King and Lords were not capable of running the business of Empire, that is trade, and that the business heads should do so, but while the country agreed to the principle it was in no wise ready to allow dissenters and nonconformists to take the helm. The Glorious Revolution on its economic side decided the issue that Commoners were the successors to rather than the servants of royal administrators. It would be their enterprise to continue the mercantilist tradition in the Americas, particularly in Spanish America where Spain was failing. The eighteenth century reveals the application of the well digested principles as the literature of the period reveals.

Erasmus Philipps, in his *State of the Nation,* compares money in itself, that is without trade, to "stagnated Water," since it is just about as useful. Spain, he tells us,

is a living Instance of this Truth; the Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico* made that

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5 R. Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739–1763*, Oxford, 1936, 1–2.

6 Black, *Reign of Elizabeth,* 320.

7 It should be remembered here that throughout the sixteenth century men were attempting to analyze the roots and foundations of power, just as on the religious side they were debating the authority of the Scriptures and religious leaders and the Church.

8 E. A. Benians, "Financial Experiments and Colonial Development," in *The Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. VI, Chapter VI, 168.

9 Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies,* 2.

People think themselves above Industry; an Innundation of Gold and Silver swept away all useful Arts, and a total Neglect of Labour and Commerce has made them as it were the Receivers only for the rest of the World.[10]

Philipps then considers Holland as a typical example of what trade can do for a nation. Feeble in origin, small in size, and with few natural resources, she has become the "Seat of Riches and Plenty," and this in spite of her constant battle with the sea, in spite of the great Monarchies that surround her.

Earlier still, Daniel Defoe of Robinson Crusoe fame, writing in his *Review,* looked with scorn on nations like Spain which valued themselves upon abstracted nobility and made it criminal to their characters to mix with the trading part of the people.[11] The following excerpt shows how strongly Defoe felt about the importance of trade to the English nation:

England is a Trading Nation, . . . and the Blood of Trade is mixed and blended with the Blood of Gallantry, so that Trade is the Life of the Nation, the soul of its Felicity, the Spring of its Wealth, the Support of its Greatness, and the Staff on which both King and People lean, and which (if it should sink) the whole Fabrick must fall, the Body Politick would sicken and languish, its Power decline, and the Figure it makes in the World, grow by degrees, most Contemptibly Mean.[12]

Erasmus Philipps, possibly following Defoe's lead, also likens trade to human blood. It diffuses itself by the tiniest arteries into every part of a nation and gives it life and strength. Without trade no nation can expect to be happy. Nor can she defend herself against the attacks of external foes.[13]

If then upon trade the very "riches and grandeur of this nation chiefly depended," as the king himself remarked in 1721,[14] it was evident that a favorable balance must be struck at all costs. What contemporaries understood by a favorable balance of trade is patent from the following citations. Thus William Wood, in his *Survey of Trade,* sets down what he calls the four "Marks of a Beneficial Trade." In substance these are as follows. (1) That is good trade which absorbs superfluous home manufactures. (2) Beneficial too is that which brings in raw products of manufacture especially when

10 Erasmus Philipps, *The State of the Nation In Respect to her Commerce, Debts, and Money,* London, 1725, 2–3.

11 *Defoe's Review,* C. M. Andrews, ed. Publication No. 44 of the Facsimile Text Society, New York, 1938, March 6, 1705, II, No. 3, p. 9.

12 *Ibid.*

13 Philipps, *The State of the Nation,* 1–2.

14 H. W. V. Temperly, "The Age of Walpole and the Pelhams," *The Cambridge Modern History,* VI, Chapter II, 49.

exchanged for finished wares. (3) Advantage is also had when "manufactures [are exchanged] for manufactures, commodities for commodities," Even when money is paid as part of the price this is agreeable to good business if the major part of the wares thus brought in are resold out of the nation. (4) Generally speaking the re-exporting of imports is always advantageous, since in this way the carrying-trade of the nation is furthered.[15] The maxims for testing the value of every trade which Wood then lists, repeat over and over the virtues of a favorable balance of trade.

Similarly the merchant-author of the *Address to Merchants* points out that Britain's imports are bought with her exports,

> and from this Touch-stone, may we not form a good Judgment of our Exports? And when we have every desirable *Criterion* whereby to determine that our *Sales* to Foreigners exceed our *Purchases* of them, this is all that is needful to be considered, either with Regard to the Gain of the Nation, or the Merchant. . . . The Balance is the only Thing that determines the national Profit or Loss.[16]

A few years later Cary in his *Discourse on Trade* set down three general rules warranted to win the approval of all "unbiased persons." The first is that such trade is advantageous which absorbs the produce and manufactures of the land. The second factor to determine an advantageous trade is whether or not it brings in a supply of raw materials and increases gold and silver. Thirdly it must further navigation and beget sailors.[17]

Malachy Postlethwayt following Child adds to the question a somewhat new angle. After assuring his readers that "an advantageous balance is chiefly the fruit of the several mechanic branches of commerce," he sets down four so-called "fundmental points" towards which every single trade operation should tend. The first and third of these boil down to what has already been stated by others. The second would have such operations increase the number of workingmen, and the last would seek to have foreigners "find their account" while trading with Great Britain.[18] These two points are seen to hang together to a certain extent, for, in the introduction to his work, Postlethwayt bewails the high price of British wares.[19] In his first disertation he explains that high prices might be remedied by

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15 William Wood, *Survey of Trade*, London, 1722, 81–82.
16 Anon., *Address to Merchants*, London, [1738], 42.
17 John Cary, *A Discourse on Trade*, London, 1745, 42.
18 Malachy Postlethwayt, *British Commercial Interests explained and improved*, London, 1757, II, 528.
19 *Ibid.*, *Dedication*, I, v–vi.

bringing all available land into cultivation thereby forestalling scarcity of grain. The idea is deflationary, to drive down living costs, therefore costs of labor, therefore costs of wares. In this way foreign merchants will buy Brtish commodities.

The concern over cost of labor was not new in Postlethwayt's time. Already in 1702 Sir Francis Brewster, claiming that the surest way to enrich the nation was "the full Imployment of all Hands in the Nation," would have the poor set to work at home and on the high seas.[20] Philipps was all for erecting work-houses in every parish and putting the poor to work, thereby obliging them to support themselves, especially by spinning and carding,[21] a foreshadowing here by nearly a century of the poor law of 1834. Daniel Defoe was also interested in "setting the Poor to work upon something," but he insisted on this one qualification—that the article had never been made in England before. Rather he held that it should be some foreign product which hitherto had to be bought with money. In this way poor houses would not deprive English workingmen of a livelihood such as they had been enjoying.[22]

John Cary, who is referred to as being "a very considerable Merchant at Bristol," would go farther still to obtain his cherished ideal of a nation in business.[23] Not only would he improve labor conditions by putting the poor to work in houses provided for the purpose, but he would have Justices of the Peace assign youths to artificers, manufacturers, farmers, and the like. Beggars should be forced to serve King or merchant on the sea, the sea being a good cure "fore Legs and Arms, especially such as are Counterfeits." Ale houses, coffee shops and similar places should be cared for only by aged folks, or such as have large families. Young people are to be prevented from "Hawking about the Streets, and from Singing Ballads." If such amusements be allowed at all, Cary said, let them be for the aged. Plays, lotteries, gaming-houses are to be under rigid supervision since they tend towards idleness and love of ease in youths. In this way Parliament may help to beget a "Habit of Virtue," and make many people serviceable who before are useless.

Not merely on the poor did writers on economics concentrate their efforts. If trade and industry meant so much to the nation,

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20 Sir Francis Brewster, *New Essays on Trade*, London, 1702, v.
21 Philipps, *State of the Nation*, 8–9.
22 *Defoe's Review*, March 24, 1705, No. 9, 34.
23 Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 21–22, 109–110.

then *all* loyal Englishmen should strive to further the same. First, however, they must be made aware of the situation, and hence the ever recurring theme-song on the necessity of national solidarity behind the nation's business. A typical example of what is meant may be found in the *Address to Merchants*. There the author quotes a "great Philosopher and Political" as follows:

> If ever, says he, the *English* would attain to the Mastery of Commerce, not only in Discourse, but Reality, they must do it by their Labours as well as by their Swords: Unless this be done they will in vain be victorious; at the End of their Wars they will cool again, and lose all the Fruits of their Valour: The Arts of Peace, and their Improvements in Manufacture and Inventions of every Kind must proceed in equal Steps with the Success of their Arms; The Works of our *Citizens* . . .must be equally advanced with the Triumphs of our *Fleets,* or else their Blood will be shed in vain: they will soon return to the same Poverty and want of Trade which they strove to avoid.[24]

Richard Campbell wrote his *London Tradesman* for the express purpose of informing parents and instructing youths in the various trades, the better to enable them to make a suitable choice of a way of life.[25] One after another, physician, attorney, refiner, carpenter, carver, mercer, packer, founder, and their offices, are dealt with in the course of the work. In how very real a sense the business man had become the hero of the age may be gathered from Campbell's description of the merchant.[26] Campbell first points out that traders, such as those mentioned above, are confined to a specified locality whereas the merchant has the whole world as his domain. Again, while some crafts give employment to several others, the merchant sets them all to work by vending their fruits the world over. Moreover, the various arts of the land operate, as it were, in a closed circle and never add a single sixpence to the wealth of the nation. On the other hand the merchant "draws his honest gain from the distant poles," bringing enormous wealth to the land. Campbell concludes that it is therefore scarcely to be wondered at that Commerce is so courted by the wisest and politest nations.

Even in the eighteenth century it would seem that land-owners were beginning to be wary of industrialism. Hence the land-owners too would have to be educated. This Sir M. Decker attempted to do in an essay published in 1756, whose stated purpose was "to

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24 *Address to Merchants*, 49–50.
25 R. Campbell, *The London Tradesman*, London, 1747, sub-title.
26 *Ibid.*, Chapter lxxi, 284.

prove the strong connexion, in point of interest between land and trade."[27] Wood in his tract had a similar motive when he stated: "The Price of Land, Value of Rents, our Home Commodities and Manufactures *Rise or Fall,* as it goes well or ill with our *Foreign Trade.*"[28]

The writers of the period were ever anxious to keep the support of the monarch. Wood in his dedication to King George II is particularly flattering on the surface, but obviously careful to instruct the king on the principles of business:

> Without being Rich and Populous a Nation can never be Great and Powerful; and since we have a *Prince* on the Throne, who, above all Things, delights and places *his* Glory in *his* People's Happiness . . . this Nation can expect no less . . . than to become the greatest and most flourishing People in the World.[29]

John Cary thought it a wonderful idea that the Prince of Wales should have been Governor of the South Sea Company, since he would thus be allured "into an Early liking of Trade," and informed of the "Advantages that Accrue from it, with the Methods whereby it may be Improved."[30]

By the middle of the seventeenth century trade with Spain and Spanish America had become a primary objective for the merchants of Great Britain. Considering what has already been said the reasons for this are not hard to discover. As Pares remarks: "The Spanish West Indies had for the trader as well as the pirate all the charm of the remote and fabulous. The legend of the great American market superseded the legend of the Golden Man, or rather grew up by its side. It was not impossible to combine plundering the Spaniards and trading with them; but it was not very easy."[31] This latter fact is amply stressed in the politics and wars of the period.

Even in the time of Charles V, Spain had to rely on industrial countries for a large part of the manufactured products she used in trade. The result was that, in spite of efforts to the contrary, Spanish gold and silver flowed into the nations of Europe.[32] One con-

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[27] Sir M. Decker, *An Essay on the Causes of The Decline of Foreign Trade,* Edinburgh, 1756, Preface, vi.
[28] Wood, *Survey of Trade,* Introduction, 4.
[29] *Ibid.,* 10.
[30] Cary, *Discourse on Trade,* Dedication, iii–iv.
[31] Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies,* 5.
[32] Klaus E. Knorr, *English Colonial Theories 1570–1830,* Toronto, 1944, 36.

temporary gives an excellent description of what was actually taking place. He writes:

> The *Spaniards* are a stately People, not much given to Trade or Manufactures themselves; therefore the first they carry on by such chargeable and dilatory Methods both for their Ships and ways of Navigation, that other trading Nations, such as the *English, French, Dutch,* and *Genoese,* take Advantage of them; only their Trade to their West-Indies, hath, on strict Penalties, been reserved to themselves; but having no Manufactures of their own, the Profit thereof comes very much to be reaped by those who furnish them: Nor is it so well guarded and secured, but that the Inhabitants thereof have been plentifully supplied by us with Manufactures, and many other Things from Jamaica. . . .[33]

It is scarcely necessary here to delve at any great length into Spain's peculiar mercantile system as modified in the eighteenth century. With the consolidation of the various European monarchies, it was not merely politics, the military, and even religion that were nationalized. The economic life of the nation was also affected. This was not only true of European nations as such but even more particularly of the colonies held by them. In the case of the Hispanic Americas, as Chapman points out, government and business in the colonies were almost inseparably associated.[34] In the first place the land, soil and subsoil alike, was owned by the crown to be parcelled out by it as by any private owner. Nor could an individual do with his holdings entirely as he pleased.

As a correlary to the current economic theory that wealth lay in bullion, it was held that the colonies existed pretty much for the benefit of the mother country. The colonies were to supply raw products of trade; the mother country would furnish the finished products. Hence the legislation preventing the colones from certain types of manufacture, stopping them from raising certain products, and obliging them to produce others. Hence too the monopolistic control of gold, silver and quicksilver production in Hispanic America. Similar ends were also had in mind when laws were enacted causing traffic between mother and daughter countries to be carried on by natives of one or the other. Direct foreign trade was not only discouraged; it was absolutely prohibited. Furthermore, trade between Spanish merchants and colonists was restricted to designated ports, Cádiz and Seville in the Old World and to Cartagena, Portobelo, Vera Cruz, and a few others in the New. The element of

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[33] Cary, *Discourse on Trade,* 65–66.

[34] Charles E. Chapman, *Colonial Hispanic America,* New York, 1933, 145.

control loomed large in all such regulation. Such conduct was so much a part of European thought that even Daniel Defoe considered it to be just as well as effective to keep the commerce and the land itself in Spanish hands.[35]

Due to her needs Spain was forced to make certain concessions to foreign merchants, principal among them the trade rights at Portobelo by the Asiento of 1713. Besides this there were several alternatives open to such merchants. The simplest of these was to sell their wares outright to the Spaniards, who in turn shipped them to the Indies. The more venturesome were inclined to handle the whole affair themselves, sending their wares directly to the colonies with the help of Spanish "cover-men" just as privateers had been doing in England. Or finally, they might simply act as bankers, lending money to the Spanish merchants and later taking their slice in the profits.[36] The policy employed in each instance would be determined largely by prevalent risks, which in turn were modifed by conditions of war or peace.

Up to about the middle of the eighteenth century at least the position of British merchants in the Spanish trade seems to have been quite advantageous. Postlethwayt, writing in 1757, gives indication of the tremendous volume of this trade when he says that it was not uncommon to see as many as three to five hundred foreign vessels in the various ports of Spain. Seldom were there less than two hundred. In Cádiz alone there were at times gathered as many as two hundred British ships. Many of these latter, Postlethwayt indicates, were there to dispose of fish. Others were engaged in acting as carriers for Spain to and from the nations of all Europe. Indeed, not only Hamburg, Holland, the North Seas, and Italy had seen British sails in this trade, but Turkey and Barbary as well. Hence it was ever worth while for Spain to maintain peace and friendship with Great Britain. Hence too the adage: *"Paz con Angleterra con todos otros la guerra."*[37]

The full nature of the commodities exchanged in the Spanish

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[35] *Defoe's Review*, Saturday, June 30, 1711, VIII, 170. Defoe does not seem to have favored free trade with Spain at this point. Free trade would have favored all nations, while a restricted trade would have enabled the English to make a "deal" with Spain. The British, he felt, could best supply Spain with the products she needed and in turn was able to use what materials she had to sell.

[36] Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXVII, February, 1947, 3.

[37] Postlethwayt, *Britain's Commercial Interest*, II, 462–463.

trade is also indicated by contemporary pamphleteers together with the importance of that trade. Wood, for example, mentions that "beys, says, perpets, cloth, stuffs, cotton, worsted and silk hose, &c." were sent to Spain in addition to the fish mentioned above. In return the British received "wine, oil, wool, cochineal, fruit, iron, &c. . . and the balance in bullion." Wood further mentions that this balance in bullion, though lately diminished, was formerly very great.[38] John Cary, dividing the Spanish trade into three parts, *viz.* Spain, Biscay and Flanders, lists the exports to Spain proper as "all sorts of woolen Manufactures, Lead, Fish, Tin, Silk and Worsted Stockings, Butter, Tobacco, Ginger, Leather, Bees-Wax, and sundry other things." From Spain are had fruits, wines, oil, cochineal, indigo, anata, barilla, "with a great part in Gold and Silver."[39] Imports and exports to and from the remaining two sections mentioned are similar to those of Spain proper though in lesser quantities.[40]

The importance that the British attached to the Spanish-American trade, direct or indirect, cannot be exaggerated. Not merely was there question here of a lucrative market, but England had come to rely greatly on American products, particularly leather, dye-stuffs, and drugs, to say nothing of bullion for her economic needs. England needed American gold and silver to carry on her Asiatic trade; she needed dye-stuffs in her woolen industry, and raw and tanned leather in great quantities to supply a growing European market for leather goods. At the same time American drugs, such for example as Jesuit bark and sarsaparilla among others, seem to have taken on some of the aspects of a fetish being capable as was piously believed of curing the bodily ills of Europe. Thus, concludes Daniel Defoe,

> the Riches of the World, the Valuable Drugs, the useful Dying Stuffs, and Dying Woods, the Sugars, Tobacco, rich Furs, and the Fish, as well as Gold and Silver, are by the wise appointment of the Great Disposer of all things, Dispersed over the whole Country to make the Nations of Europe beholding them obliged to visit them, and consequently to bring to them again in Exchange the things they wanted from Europe . . . of which they would still have remain'd Ignorant and Untaught in, if they had not been able to bribe us with their own Native Stores to come to them. . . .[41]

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38 Wood, *Survey of Trade*, 86–87.
39 Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 64–65.
40 *Ibid.*
41 Daniel Defoe, *A General History of Trade*, London, 1713, 18.

If then there was so great an economic interdependence between Great Britain and Spain, how it is that these two nations were so frequently at war with one another during the two centuries following the Armada? In answer to this query it should be remembered that, in the first place, British "war-mongers" did not always get their way. Among the merchant class there were ever strong protagonists for peace. Thus, in 1738, one merchant-author chides those dissatisfied with the administration because the latter did not want war with Spain. Rather, after twenty-six years of war, it was high time that the nation thought of recouping her losses and gaining back the commerce which had been lost in the interim to the various neutral nations of Europe.[42] This same author then points out that the wise Monarchs of Europe have become "so tender of their Trade . . . that they seem all agreed, as it were, to lay aside the Sword, and instead of conversing by the Thunder of their Cannon, give Preference to Negociation."[43] Once some of the other nations have become as war-torn as England, France, and Holland, they too will act in like manner. The conclusion is then reached that, if the "deluded citizens" really understood the situation, they would call for peace as loudly as they now clamour for war.[44]

Similarly Campbell in his *London Tradesman* bewails the sad state of trade. The Dutch have run off with some of it. King William's and Queen Ann's War meant high taxes. After the latter especially, the French robbed the English of considerable trade. The Danes, Swedes, and Russians were taking the rest, so that there were scarcely a trade in which the balance was not against the British. Even the Negro trade has been wholly engrossed by the French, etc., etc.[45]

That the statesmen of the time saw eye-to-eye with the merchants is indicated by Walpole in a letter to the Duke of Bedford, July 2, 1748.

> All that I shall say at present is, that nothing can be more beneficial to the trade of England than to establish and cultivate a strict friendship with Spain; because the preservation of the peace, and particularly of our commerce, will depend upon a real friendship more than upon the words or stipulation of the treaties: and now there is, I hope, a prince upon that throne that is of a pacific temper, and a true Spaniard, that must therefore

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42 *Address to Merchants*, 5, 15.
43 *Ibid.*, 17–18.
44 *Ibid.*, 34.
45 Campbell, *London Tradesman*, 286–291.

be desirous to free his subjects from the great oppressions and losses that they have suffered by the war.[46]

Similar sentiments were indicated by Sir Charles Whitworth some years later. Quoting a French author, he pointed out that war alone did not determine the superiority of nations. Rather, for more than half a century, the balance of power had come to depend on commerce.[47]

Defoe also had some strong ideas on the question of peace and war, but they seem to have changed with the times. Thus, writing in the *Review* for January 24, 1713, at the end of Queen Ann's War, he held peace to be the foundation of commerce and stated that no nation ever grows rich by war, which of its very nature is a destroyer. Then, some years later, when war again loomed on the horizon, he called to mind the adage that "England may gain by a war with France, but never loses by a war with Spain." Indeed he made it his stated opinion that England would lose nothing if she *never* had peace with Spain, and that she had more to gain from such a continued war than the Spanish had from their prolonged war with Turk and Moor.[48]

Defoe based this opinion on the assumption that the people of Hispanic America were not content with prevailing conditions, and that they would satisfy their need for European goods by dealing with foreigners in case of war. Nor could the Spaniards stop this trade. Furthermore, he asked, "How are the Spaniards sure, that if the Inhabitants of *America* shall at any time come into a free Trade with *Europe,* by Means of a War, they will ever be brought to quit that Commerce again?"[49]

Behind all this lies the key to the difference that led to such constant strife between Great Britain and Spain. For, no matter what the terms of the peace or the advantages gained for British commercial interests, British merchants were wont to go a step farther in their pursuit of business. The Spaniards resented such conduct and acted accordingly. The *Guardas Costas* were perhaps at times a bit over zealous in attempting to stop the more ventur-

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[46] Lord John Russell, ed., *Correspondence of John Fourth Duke of Bedford,* 3 vols., London, 1842–1846, I, 391–392.

[47] Sir Charles Whitworth, *State of Trade of Great Britain,* London, 1776, I, as in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories,* 22.

[48] Daniel Defoe, *Evident Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies from the Approaching War,* London, 1721, 15.

[49] *Ibid.,* 43, 21–22.

some merchants of Great Britain. Differences ensued which periodically grew to proportions sufficient to cause outright war. Not always were the statesmen of either side able to placate their constituents.[50]

The smuggling of contraband goods into the Spanish colonies had been taking place from earliest times. Not only the English, but the Dutch and French had become past masters at the art. It was not difficult for a small ship to slip along an ill-guarded coast, notify the inhabitants of its presence, sell its wares and then quietly sail off once the business was accomplished.[51] Well rewarded complaint officials offered no little help in the matter. Coming into the eighteenth century, the British were able from Juan Fernández to supply large quantities of goods to Chile and Peru. From Nova Colonia to Sacramento the Plata area was supplied, from Jamaica the Islands and shores of the Caribbean.

The Asiento of 1713, which granted to the English South Sea Company the right to bring into Spanish America 4,800 Negroes a year for thirty years, only made matters worse. Centers of distribution were set up not only in English held lands, but at certain strategic points in Hispanic America as well. Among these latter were Buenos Aires, Arequipa, Panama, Portobelo, Cartagena, Santiago de Cuba, Vera Cruz, Campeche, Mexico Cty, Lima, Potosí, and Santiago de Chile.[52]. The original purpose of these establishments was the disposal of Negroes. However they served as admirable covers for all sorts of contraband activity. Similarly the one British ship of 500 tons permitted under the treaty at Portobelo came to be fed by a system of tenders so that the merchandise shipped into the Isthmus came to be almost unlimited.[53] No wonder Cary called the Negro trade "our Silver Mine," not only be-

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50 Ernest H. Hildner, Jr., in "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, August, 1938, shows how in large part the "selfish narrow views" of the Company paved the way for the war of 1739.

51 Salvador de Madariaga, *The Rise of the Spanish American Empire*, New York, 1947, 130. Cf. Captain Nathanial Uring, *A History of the Voyage and Travels of Captain Nathanial Uring*, London, 1726, 164–165, for an interesting description of such a venture.

52 George H. Nelson, "Contraband Trade Under the Asiento, 1730–1739," *American Historical Review*, LI, October, 1945, 57.

53 For interesting material on such activity cf. James Houstoun, *The Works of James Houstoun*, London, 1753, 198–199; Judith Blow Williams, "The Establishment of British Commerce with Argentina," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XV, February, 1934, 44; A. C. Loosely, "The Puerto Bello Fairs," *Ibid.*, XIII, August, 1933, 335.

cause of the sale of Negroes but because it was this together with the Asiento "which first introduced our Manufactures to them."[54]

Spanish officialdom was by no means unaware of what was taking place. In a report presented to Charles III in 1761 it was stated that the English were the worst offenders in the contraband trade in which their share was at least 6,000,000 pesos a year, and this in spite of the most sacred treaties.[55] In view of the above one is somewhat surprised to find Bedford writing to Keene in February, 1751, that neither he

> nor any of his Majesty's servants here are conscious of any illicit trade being carried on from hence, which is in our power to prevent, and all his Majesty's governors abroad have the strongest orders to comply strictly with the forms prescribed in several treaties now subsisting between the two crowns.[56]

Though this letter was marked "most secret," Bedford would have done well to have caused it to fall into the hands of the Spaniards!

As a final step indicating Great Britain's tremendous interest in the Spanish Americas, a word might be said about her colonizing activities in Central and South American waters. It comes as somewhat of a shock to the average citizen of the United States that the thirteen original colonies were frequently considered as being of very secondary importance to the British. Nor was John Cary the first to "look upon *New England* to bring the least Advantage" to the Mother Country.[57] Further indication of this is had in the type of people who settled the two areas. To the North came largely Puritans, Separatists, Quakers, Catholics, Dissenters of all sorts. On the other hand a survey of the Islands to the south shows that they were for the most part under the control of the privileged Anglicans. Again, during the Commonwealth, when the Northern Colonies were largely neglected, a vigorous "Western Campaign" was carried on in the Caribbean. The influence of the Island planters on colonial policy after the monarchy was again established is also significant. The key to this situation is found in the fact that riches through trade were to be had in the West Indies rather than in the Northern Colonies.

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54 Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 53–55.

55 Allan Christelow, "Contraband Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXII, May, 1942, 313.

56 Bedford to Keene, February 11–17, 1750–1751, in Russell, *Correspondence*, II, 72.

57 Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 51.

The importance of the Caribbean area was manifest to the British long before the first permanent settlements were established in the North American sphere. As early as 1584 Hakluyt had suggested in his *Discourse on Western Planting* that

> the plantinge of twoo or three stronge fortes upon some goodd havens (whereof there is great store) betweene Florida and Cape Briton, woulde be a matter in shorte space of greater domage as well to his flete as to his westerne Indies; for wee shoulde not onely often tymes indaunger his flete in returne thereof, but also in fewe yeres put him in hazarde in loosinge some parte of Nova Hispania. . . . And entringe into the consideration of the way how this Phillippe may be abased, I meane firste to begynne with the West Indies, as there to laye a chefe foundation for his overthrowe.[58]

A similar policy was advocated in 1623 by Sir Benjamin Rudyard, who urged that the Spanish King be cut up at the root and "impeached" or supplanted in the West Indies.[59] By 1640, when John Pym was urging the King to force his way into the Spanish West Indies and thus "easily make his majesty master of all that treasure,"[60] the English were fair on their way towards culling sizeable holdings out of the left-over spots of the West Indies. A brief resume of how this was done will not be out of place here.

Barbados was obtained in 1605 when visited by the British ship *Blossom*.[61] It was settled in 1625. The Bermudas came next in 1609. Though previously discovered by the Spaniards they had never been settled. St. Kitts, discovered by Columbus in 1493, was first settled by Sir Thomas Warner in 1623. Nevis and Barbuda were added in 1628. In the year following the Bahamas, also unsettled by the Spaniards, were included in the grant giving the Carolinas to Sir Robert Heath. Montserrat was colonized under Warner in 1632. In 1638 British sailors secured a foothold in Honduras, though it was not until the 1660s that a logwood business was established there from Jamaica, which had been taken from Spain in May 1655. In 1652 the British secured a foothold in Guiana; however this was ceded to the Dutch in 1667 in return for New York. In 1781 a footing was again secured there, which

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58 Richard Hakluyt, *A Discourse concerning Western Planting*, 1584, printed from a contemporary Manuscript, Charles Deane, editor, Cambridge, 1877, 45, 55.

59 Leo Francis Stock, *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America*, 5 vols., Washington, 1924–1941, I, 62.

60 *Ibid.*, I, 98.

61 The dates followed in this paragraph are for the most part those given by Helen Rex Keller, *The Dictionary of Dates*, 2 vols., New York, 1934, II, 557–580.

was ultimately to grow into British Guiana. Tortola of the Virgin Island group was occupied in 1666. The Turks and Caicos Islands were acquired through Bermuda. Uninhabited before 1678 they were first visited at that time by inhabitants of Bermuda because of their salt deposits.

The places mentioned above were to comprise the more important holdings of the British in Spanish American waters. However their seizure does not tell the whole story, since, throughout the colonial period the British were ever on the alert for further strategically situated lands. The entire litoral from Florida down round the Strait of Magellan and up into the Californias was periodically viewed for possible holdings. Even the unhospitable shores of barron Patagonia were seriously considered for their vantage point in the lucrative South Sea trade. All this is important for fully understanding the great zest which the British were to manifest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in their quest of trade and commerce.

The sketch here given of Great Britain's conduct of affairs in colonial Hispanic America has been brief in the extreme. However, it will be sufficient to indicate the tremendous interest which the British,—privateers, adventurers, merchants, and statesmen,—had in the Americas. As they saw it, it was upon trade, not on gold and silver alone, that the well-being of their nation rested. In particular they were interested in trade with the Americas. The reason for this was that there they could exchange their wares for raw products so necessary to further manufacture, and for bullion. The oriental trade to be sure was very valuable, but was to be engaged in with caution, since it might drain Great Britain of her bullion and end in mercantile, to say nothing of national calamity. In the Spanish trade there was no such danger. Quite the opposite, and therefore its great value.

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Troops to Red River

On May 20, 1870, a military expedition of modest proportions embarked from Collingwood, Ontario, on the south shore of Georgian Bay, on an arduous enterprise. It made its way slowly across Lake Superior to Thunder Bay, Ontario, on the north shore. From here it crossed the watershed, plunged through swamp and forest to Lake Winnipeg, and entered the Red River of the North. Its goal: Fort Garry and the Red River Settlement, the present Ste. Boniface and Winnipeg, Manitoba.

The official purpose of this expedition was shrouded in mystery at the time. Neither the Canadian Government nor the Imperial Government made public any satisfactory explanation. The result was confusion in the popular mind. Some thought it was nothing but a symbolic gesture. Others concluded that its purpose was punitive and warlike. The very composition of this body did not make for clarity. Its nucleus was regular troops of the imperial army, but the remainder were Canadian volunteers, mostly from Ontario. Its leader was an ambitious officer of the British forces, Colonel Garnet J. Wolesley.

If it had been question of a war to fight, pure and simple, the military could have acted with definiteness and dispatch. Such, however, was not the case. Both governments, Canadian and Imperial, were dickering and parrying with each other in such manner as to achieve the greater good for itself while making the lesser commitment. The result was diplomatic obscurantism leading to popular clamor, military delay, and constitutional confusion. We shall endeavor to learn the true purpose of this expedition and the manner in which that purpose was fulfilled.

Formation of Official Canadian Policy

Let us recall the facts. On July 1, 1867, after three years of careful negotiations and debate, British possessions north of the United States were united into the Dominion of Canada. Next, Rupert's Land, from Lake Superior to the Rockies, was to be sold by the Hudson's Bay Company to the Imperial Government of Britain, that is, its charter was to be retired for 300,000 pounds sterling. The Imperial Government was to be reimbursed in this amount by the new Dominion of Canada to which the territory was

to be added. The most populous portion of the vast expanse was the area in the Red River Settlement around the Assiniboine River flowing east and the Red flowing north. On the west bank of the Red River was the important Hudson's Bay Company post, Fort Garry, site of present Winnepeg about 350 miles northwest of St. Paul, Minnesota. Across the river was St. Boniface, settled by French speaking Métis.

In Britain the Gladstone ministry ruled, liberal, *laissez-faire,* and not too enthusiastic about overly strong ties between overseas possessions and the motherland. Lord Granville was Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone cabinet and in immediate charge of relations with Canada. In the recently established North American Dominion the ministry of John A. Macdonald held sway, Conservative, closely attached to the mother-country, and indeed more Empire-minded than Gladstone himself.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had provided for the admission of new states into the American union on a basis of equality with the original thirteen. However, the addition of the "great lone land" between Lake Superior and British Columbia to the new Dominion of Canada was not to be done in the same way. The former preserve of the Hudson's Bay Company would in effect be a "colony of a colony," a not very enviable position. Hence the protest movement of the native *Métis* (Half-breed) people led by Louis Riel and the Provisional Government established there which sought more equitable terms of admission to the Canadian Dominion. Fifteen years after the events described in the present article Louis Riel became mentally unhinged while leading the Saskatchewan Rising of French Métis and Indians, 1885. He had one-eighth Indian blood. At the time of his protest movement at Red River Settlement he was in his middle-twenties and a natural leader of the illiterate Métis both because of his Montreal education and the reputation of his father before him. Upon the invitation of Canada's Prime Minister the Métis had sent their delegates on March 23, 1870, to Ottawa to work out an agreement. By June 17 the delegates, Father N. J. Ritchot, pastor of St. Norbert's parish a few miles south of St. Boniface, and Alfred H. Scott, a Winnepeg merchant, had returned to Red River, while the third, Judge John Black, had gone on to England. The new terms granted provincial status to the Red River area. They were found acceptable when presented to the Provisional Government and ratified. The new

province of Manitoba was thus to be admitted to the Dominion of Canada on July 15, 1870.

If the issue had thus been settled to the apparent satisfaction of both the Canadian Government and the people of Red River why was there need of a military expedition sent with so much effort and expense? Why could it not be simply a matter of hoisting the flag of Canada and accepting the Governor appointed by the Dominion? During the Winter and Spring of 1869–1870 a good deal more than could meet the eye had occurred both at Red River and at Ottawa. Mutual suspicions dominated negotiations.

The original governor designated by Prime Minister Macdonald for the "Northwest" was William McDougall, the personification of all that the Métis feared with respect to their future status. His premature and blundering effort to install himself at Red River was prevented by the native inhabitants. Despite Macdonald's advice that he should conciliate his future subjects, he achieved a result exactly opposite. He it was who seems to have been the first to recommend that troops should be employed for the forceful maintenance of his authority. This he indicated in his very first report from Pembina, Dakota Territory, October 31, 1869[1] This report arrived in the Canadian capital on November 19, 1869, and the notion of employing troops was planted in the Prime Minister's mind. Four days later Macdonald wrote to Captain D. R. Cameron, who was with McDougall at Pembina, about possible use of a military force to establish Canadian authority at Red River. "If this complication is going to last, we must look forward to the necessity of sending a force via Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods."[2] Thus even at this early date the Canadian Prime Minister showed his basic distrust of the Métis at Red River. It was a distrust, however, that he was cautious not to make public as did the inept McDougall.

The frustrated and angry Governor-designate, balked at the International Boundary, was simple enough to believe that Canadian soldiers dressed as civilians could be assembled in Minnesota. Forming with these a two-pronged attack, he suggested that a main Canadian body march from Fort William on the north shore of Lake Superior after havng been transported there by boat.[3] McDougall's

[1] Cf. McDougall to Macdonald, *Macdonald Papers*, "Northwest Rebellion, 1869–1870," Vol. 2, 99.

[2] Macdonald to Cameron, November 23, 1869, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 529.

[3] "My opinion is that in any event you ought to call for volunteers who wish to migrate, and to send them on here early in the Spring. 500

ignorance of the fact that Minnesota was honeycombed with Métis, plus his disregard for the niceties of the international law involved in the gathering of a military expedition on the soil of a foreign country, the United States, are blatantly evident in this letter.[4]

Following a telegram from Macdonald John Rose, the official representative of Canada at London, urged the Imperial Government, as early as November 25, 1869, to employ Her Majesty's troops if necessary at Red River. Thus we see that by early Winter of 1869 the Canadian ministry seems already committed to a policy of forceful establishment of Canadian sovereignty at Red River by the employment of troops. No such policy was made public however. No explanation was given to the public at large nor on the floor of Parliament.[5]

This attitude of the "need" for forceful repression of the native inhabitants of Red River continued throughout December, 1869, to be advocated by McDougall, Rose, and Macdonald. Donald Smith of the Montreal office of the Hudson's Bay Company was commissioned by the Prime Minister to investigate and report about the situation at Red River. He, too, recommended troops to crush the insurrection.[6]

It should be understood that all negotiations between Ottawa and London were of a delicate nature. The suspicion of Prime Minister Macdonald that the Liberal mnistry at London was lukewarm in its desire to preserve empire ties has already been alluded to. Also, the embarrassment of the Government of the young country should be known. Two and one-half years previously self-governing Dominion status had been achieved. Now, in its very first

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good men *via* St. Paul making a rendezvous at Georgetown could take the arms at that place and descend the river on rafts and take up a position on either side of the River near the boundary.... 1,000 more, for whose use boats should be built this winter, might be sent via Fort Williams."—McDougall to Macdonald, November 8, 1869, *Macdonald Papers*, "Northwest Rebellion, 1869–1870," Vol. 2, 126.

[4] That McDougall indulged in prevarication is shown by what he wrote to Cameron later. "I have never proposed, contemplated, or asked for the aid of soldiers. If any fighting becomes necessary, it must be done by the loyal people of the Settlement in their own way and at their own time." McDougall to Cameron, November 30, 1869, *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, 517.

[5] Cf. Rose to Macdonald, November 25, 1869, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 172.

[6] Cf. Macdonald to McDougall, December 12, 1869, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 715; Macdonald to Langevin, December 15, 1869; *Ibid.*, 739; McDougall to Macdonald, December 28, 1869, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 317; Macdonald to Rose, December 31, 1869, Joseph Pope (ed.), *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald*, rev. ed., Toronto, 1930, 416; and Smith to Macdonald, January 4, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 399–400.

undertaking the fledgling Dominion seemed to be confessing to failure and must call on the mother-country for help. It created a situation it could not control. It took upon itelf a task it could not see through alone.

Next, there was diplomatic byplay between Ottawa and London concerning the procedure for transference of the former Hudson's Bay Company territory from the Crown to the North American Dominion. The original date agreed upon for transfer of sovereignty was December 1, 1869. Canada was to have made payment to Her Majesty's Government, and William McDougall was to have commenced his duties as the Ottawa-appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Canada's new domain in the West. By his rash and impolitic attempt to install himself ahead of time and his consequent forced retirement to American soil, the Governor-designate had caused a state of insurrection to exist in the territory. The native Métis, excluded from the negotiations that would determine their political (and probably economic) future, formed their own Provisional Government under the presidency of John Bruce who was later succeeded by Louis Riel. Their purpose was to seek more equitable terms of admission to the Canadian Dominion. They had no desire to be "bartered like cattle," nor to become a "colony of a colony." With the political situation in the West thus radically altered the Macdonald government withheld payment for the territory to Her Majesty's government. Until the area could be turned over in a peaceful condition the purchase would not be completed. It was thus the duty of the Imperial Government to suppress the rising, and that with her own troops and at her own expense. When this should be done, then Canada would make payment. This view, of course, was not acquiesced in by London, not only because of the expense, but also because of the Liberal government's unwillingness to become involved in warlike maneuvers so near United States during the delicate post-Civil War years.[7]

A compromise, of course, was ultimately worked out. Both Canadian Volunteers and British Regulars marched westwards, and the expense was shared by both governments. That the heavy hand of force should be used against the natives of the Northwest seems to have become the crystallized policy of the Macdonald Government by mid-Winter.[8] Such policy, to be sure, was not

[7] Cf. Granville to Sir John Young, January 8, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 341–342.

[8] "...we must not relax our preparations to vindicate by force if necessary, Her Majesty's Sovereignty in the North West,..." Macdonald to Rose, February 5, 1870, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 1023, 1022.

made public because of elements of sympathy in Canada itself for the people of Red River. Macdonald wanted Imperial troops in the Expeditionary Force because the Northwest was Imperial, but still not Canadian, territory. Even the Canadian Volunteers would be performing an Empire duty and not executing a Canadian invasion of a foreign country; moreover, they would be called for in Her Majesty's name. Before the end of January boats to transport the troops across the lakes had been arranged for. On February 11, 1870, the Canadian Government decided that troops should be on their way as soon as boats could move, for diplomatic negotiations with the delegates from Red River might break down.[9]

Iufluence of Imperial Policy

As Winter blended into Spring a divergence in policy toward the rising at Red River became evident between the Ottawa government and the Home Government at London. Unlike the former, the latter committed itself to conciliation of the populace of the new territory. They urged conciliation on the Canadian Government and specified that Imperial troops could be employed only to maintain order and not for the forceful repression of the Métis. In granting the requested military assistance Lord Granville, Secretary of State for the Colonies, cabled Imperial policy:

> The proposed military assistance will be given if reasonable terms are given to the Roman Catholic settlers and if Canadian Government enable H. M.'s Government to proclaim transfer simultaneous with movement of troops.[10]

Here we have the first evidence in either Canadian or Imperial correspondence that Canada should placate Catholics at Red River. (Those Métis who were French-speaking were Catholics; those who were English-speaking were Anglicans.) It appears to have been a new development to Governor-General Young also, for in his handwritten copy of this telegram he underlined "Roman Catholic," inserted an exclamation mark after them, and added (*sic*). At all events the British ministry wished to avoid all appearance of coercion in the dispatch of troops to Red River. They even desired that transfer of the Territorry to Canada should be com-

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[9] Cf. Macdonald to Rose, January 26, 1870, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 964–965; S. J. Dawson to Macdonald, January 29, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 533; and "Minutes of the Committee of Council," February 11, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 358.

[10] Granville to Young, March 5, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 403.

pleted together with or previous to their departure. Moreover, they wanted the Imperial troops withdrawn as soon as possible.[11]

The stand thus taken by the Imperial Government was not to the liking of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald. He had no desire to deal gently with the Métis if it could be avoided. This he adroitly refrained from making public, however. By early April he seemed less anxious about a too early payment of the purchase price of the Northwest and more anxious to get troops there to fix Canadian authority. To Governor-General Young he wrote:

> We will accept transfer at once—if England sends troops to act with ours and suppress the insurrection as proposed in our O[rder in] C[ouncil] of 11 Feb. and acceded to by Lord G[ranville]'s cable tel[egram] of 5 March.[12]

On the day following he gave to Young a full statement of his perplexity about the conditions under which England might be willing to send Imperial troops.

> The difficulty that I feel is this: Lord Granville says in his tel[egram] that if we accept the Country, England will send troops, but in his instructions to Sir C[linton] M[urdoch] he says the troops are not to be used to force the people to unite with Canada—in other words to be of no use. Now if we accept the Country we are committed to its conquest and must go on.
>
> We can't return the Country to Her Majesty or the H. B. Company.
>
> Again, why should we agree to pay for troops that may be ordered not to act when they get to Fort Garry? . . . I think a tel: communication to the following effect might go—
>
> Canada will accept transfer at once, if regular troops are sent to be used if necessary to put down insurrection.[13]

The Governor-General upon receipt of the above communication from the Prime Minister replied, in conjunction with the special envoy of the Home Government, Sir Clinton Murdoch, who was now with him, that the words: "if regular troops are sent to be used if necessary to put down insurrection" should not be employed. He then suggested that Macdonald and Sir Gorges Étienne Cartier and possibly others come for a verbal discussion at the Governor-General's office wth himself and Murdoch.[14] We do not know what conclusions were reached at this conference, but it appears

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11 Cf. Rose to Macdonald, March 23, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 547.
12 April 9, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 516.
13 Same to same, April 10, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 517–518.
14 Cf. Young to Macdonald, April 11, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 521–522.

that the Canadian Ministry was forced to back down from its demand for a strict guarantee that Imperial troops should be used if necessary to suppress the Métis of Red River. In the next telegram from Granville, April 23, 1870, no mention was made of the British Government's having provided any such guarantee.[15]

It is not improbable that Murdoch may have undertaken to convince the Canadian Prime Minister not by a theoretical but by a practical argument. He may have suggested that the latter's worries were needless, because actually no resistance would be offered the troops anyway. Murdoch, the Ministry, and the Governor-General had become convinced by the end of April at least, that the approach of the troops would mean the flight of Riel to American soil and the collapse of the Provisional Government at Red River. They thought (wrongly in fact) that Riel's support had been melting away. Murdoch wrote the Colonial Office as follows: "It is considered certain that Riel, on the advance of the Expedition, will leave the territory and seek refuge beyond the British Dominion."[16]

From this basic decision and conviction the Ottawa Government did not deviate in the weeks following. Thus soon afterwards, May 10, 1870, on the floor of Commons Georges Cartier, Acting Prime Minister during the illness of Macdonald, felt confident enough to insist without qualification that the troops for Red River were being sent merely on a peaceful mission. "It was necessary that her [Queen's] authority should be established there, and it was for that purpose the expedition was to be sent, and not for the purpose of carrying on war."[17] That the Acting Prime Minister persisted in this conviction we know from what he wrote shortly before his death to John A. Macdonald. He recalled to the latter the purpose of the military expedition as explained to the Red River delegate, Father N. J. Ritchot, by Governor-General Young.

> In the interview of the 19th [May, 1870], Lord Lisgar [Young] gave assurance to Father Ritchot that the military expedition was going to Red River not to arrest anyone, but to maintain order, as done by any garrison of regulars in any Canadian city where there was one.[18]

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[15] Cf. Granville to Young, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 525–526.

[16] Murdoch to Sir Frederick Rogers, April 28, 1870, Canada, *Journals of the House of Commons*, 1874, Vol. 8, Appendix, 6, "Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of Difficulties in the Northwest Territory in 1869–1870," 194. Hereinafter this source will be referred to as *Causes of Difficulties.*

[17] *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd Session, Vol. 1, 1870, 1551.

[18] Cartier to Macdonald, February 8, 1873, *Causes of Difficulties*, 105. Sir John Young subsequently became Lord Lisgar.

From the foregoing analysis we can discern the position of the Canadian and Imperial governments in the matter of sending troops to Red River in the Spring and Summer of 1870. But what was the reaction of the people of Red River themelves, the native Métis? How did they view the approach of this military force? Was it coming to maintain law and order in their midst, or to crush them for having refused admittance to McDougall? Was its role to be that of protector, or would it open the gates for the inrush of greedy and exploiting strangers from the East?

The passage of the Manitoba Bill, May 3, 1870, granting provincial status to the Red River Settlement would seem to have quieted the fears of the natives. They had signified on June 24, 1870, their willingness to enter the Canadian Dominion. However, the distrust of Prime Minister Macdonald for the Métis of the Northwest and their leader, Louis Riel, had long been evident. The natives could not then be sure of his intentions. In commissioning the Catholic Bishop of Ste. Boniface, Antonin A. Taché, to make the Dominion acceptable to the inhabitants of Red River Macdonald had shown himself adroit. For his part the Bishop was too trusting of the Canadian Ministry. He was a native of Quebec, beloved by the simple Métis, and at this time in his late thirties.

Influence of the Orange Society

An event occurred on March 4, 1870, at the Red River Settlement which goes far to explain the apprehension of Riel and the French Métis especially to the approach of a military expedition from the East. On that day an immigrant from Ontario had been executed at Fort Garry for armed rebellion and repeated insubordination. His name was Thomas Scott, a hulking bully-boy, who had emigrated to Canada itself in 1864.

Once it became known back in Ontario that Scott was a member of the Orange Society all the furor and pressure of that Society was organized in a grand campaign of vengeance on those responsible for the death of Brother Scott. The fact that the execution had taken place on territory over which Canada had no legal or constitutional authority or control did not dim the organized urge for vendetta. At lodge meetings, at public indignation gatherings, in the newspapers, and in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, as well as on the floor of the Dominion Parliament at Ottawa, the cry went up for the head of Riel and anyone else responsible for the

execution of Orangeman Scott. The Conservative Ministry of Macdonald and Cartier was besieged by angry demands from Ontario that the executioners be punished.

How to punish legally a deed performed before there was any Canadian authority at Red River was the nub of the problem. The execution had occurred on March 4, 1870. Canada did not obtain sovereignty till July 15, 1870. Wrathful Ontario demanded punishment, but the ministry had no constitutional way of inflicting it. It was a matter for the Imperial Government itself, and the latter's policy, as we have seen, was one of conciliation of the inhabitants of the Northwest. Legally and constitutionally, then, Orange Ontario's thirst for revenge was frustrated. However, another avenue was open.

Were Canadian Volunteers called for to march with British Regulars to Fort Garry? Good. This was the opening Ontario Orangemen wanted. They enlisted by the hundreds, so that they constituted the bulk of the force. They did not keep secret their vengeful intentions; yet they were allowed to enlist and to embark. Their aim was to capture Riel and whosoever else should be "guilty" and see to their punishment. Throughout the long journey from May 20 to August 27 their intentions were not effectively frowned on by the authorities. As events were to show they did carry out their vengeful plans by every means at their disposal.

Bishop Taché was not slow to detect the anxiety of the Métis at Red River over the coming of troops there. Upon his first return to Ste. Boniface in March he informed Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces in the Macdonald Ministry, of the dislike of the people of Red River for the proposd military expedition. "The threat of sending troops is, without doubt, the greatest obstacle to conciliation."[19] In early June he reported to the same Howe that general uneasiness was giving way to grave apprehension regarding the oncoming expedition, so that some were speaking of new troubles and possible resistance. "... I solemnly gave my word of honour and promised even in the name of the Canadian Government that the troops are sent on a mission of peace..."[20] Whatever his personal anxieties, the Bishop nevertheless continued his efforts to calm the fears of the native Métis. If the new Governor-

[19] Taché to Howe, March 11, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 21.

[20] Same to same, June 9, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 3, 39. Bishop Taché had been commissioned on February 16, 1870, by Prime Minister Macdonald to act at Red River in the name of the Canadian Government.—Cf. *Causes of Difficulties*, 19.

designate, Adams Archibald of Nova Scotia, would come in with the troops or even prior to them all would be well. He would be the civil authority and would control the military. In fact Bishop Taché assured Riel, probably because he was himself assured by Archibald, that the new Lieutenant-Governor would arrive *before* the troops.

M. Archibald regrette de ne pouvoir arriver par la voie de Pembina, son desir neanmoins est d'arriver au milieu de nous, et avant les troupes. En consequence il sera heaueux qu'on lue trouve un chemin soit par la Pointe les Chênes ou le lac des Roseaux.[21]

For his part Louis Riel, President of the Provisional Government, expressed his desire to welcome the new authority. "My profoundest respect to Mr. Archibald; we much desire his coming."[22] The Bishop continued to the same effect on August 5. "Le Gouverneur Archibald partira de même jour [August 8], mais par un autre chemin. Il arrivera avant les troupes, et je lui ai promis une bonne reception, s'il arrive par le chemin de Snow.[23]

After landing at Thunder Bay on the North shore of Lake Superior the leader of the expedition, Colonel Garnet Wolesley, saw fit on June 30 to state himself that the purpose of the Expedition was one of peace.[24] This proclamation Riel had printed and distributed throughout the Settlement. Furthermore Wolesley also appealed to Bishop Taché and J. H. McTavish, the Hudson's Bay Company officer at Fort Garry, for aid in securing Métis labor in extending eastwards the Snow Road.[25]

I have begged him [J. H. McTavish] to render every assistance in his power in obtaining the labor and funds required for this service [extending the Snow road eastwards]. I have the honor to request your Lordship's earnest cooperation in doing so, and being aware of the anxiety of your people to welcome us amongst them, I am led to hope that they will avail themselves of this opportunity of proving the sincerity of their wishes.[26]

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21 Taché to Riel, no date, published in *La Minerve*, Montreal, September 29, 1870, p. 2, col. 5.

22 Riel to Taché, July 24, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 37.

23 Taché to Riel, August 5, 1870, published in *La Minerve*, September 9, 1870, p. 2, col. 5.

24 Cf. Alexander Begg, *The Creation of Manitoba, or a History of the Red River Troubles*, Toronto, 1871, 383; and Taché, A. A., *The Northwest Difficulty, Bishop Taché on the Amnesty Question*, as appeared in the *Times*, (London), April 6, 7, and 8, 1874, no place no date, 12b.

25 This incomplete wagon road was projected from Ste. Boniface east to Lake of the Woods. Had it been finished the expedition could have marched in on it. Instead it proceeded by a longer route to Lake Winnipeg from where it entered the mouth of the Red River. It thus advanced on Fort Garry from the North.

26 Wolesley to Taché, June 30, 1870, Taché, *Northwest Difficulties*, 13b.

It is certain that the French Métis did respond to this appeal, even in their state of doubt about the intentions of the advancing troops. Moreover, the English and Scotch Métis did not respond. This we know from the witness of J. H. McTavish.

> . . . I issued notices in the Colonel's [Wolesley's] name, calling for men to commence the work, and went myself through the English portion of the Settlement, but failed in getting a single English half-breed or Swampy [Indian]. None but French half-breeds offered, though it was given out and well understood, that the road was to be pushed through in order to hurry in Her Majesty's troops.[27]

Role of Bishop Machray

A new influence made itself felt at this point. The part played by the Anglican bishop of Rupert's Land, Robert Machray, at that time thirty-nine years of age, should be understood. He had long been of the opinion that Imperial troops were needed to insure stability at Red River, as they had done on previous occasions. He expressed his views in writing to the Governor-General on March 18, 1870. Benjamin Sulté, private secretary of Archibald and member of the Red River expedition, has recorded that the Anglican Bishop of Rupert's Land had, despite Riel's proclamation that no resistance would be offered the troops, written to Wolesley on July 25, 1870, that it would be exceedingly unfortunate if the Expedition did not arrive until after Governor Archibald.

> J'ai peur que l'on adopte le projet de faire arriver ici le gouverneur avant nous. Ce serait la demarche la plus maladroite et la plus malheureuse que l'on pourrait faire; il est bien difficile de dire à present quelle serait dans ce cas la position du gouverneur. Profitez donc de toutes les chances que vous pourriez avoir pour jeter sans retard une force armée parmi nous.[28]

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[27] Quoted by S. J. Dawson in his "Report on the Red River Expedition," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 6, No. 47, p. 25. Dawson himself has commented that the reason the English language Métis did not cooperate was that the Red River terminus of the road was in the French portion of the Settlement.

[28] Machray to Wolesley, July 25, 1870, Benjamin Sulté, *L'Expedition Militaire de Manitoba, 1870*, Montreal, 1871, 35. Sulté does not say where he found this letter. The fears of Bishop Machray were by no means shared by the Hudson's Bay Company agent at Fort Garry, J. H. McTavish. "Whatever you may hear from others to the contrary, I feel confident that the Provisional Government are determined *coute que coute* to hand everything over quietly to the proper authorities, and in no case do I apprehend any rising on the part of the Engish or Indians." McTavish to Taché, July 31, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 36. With regard to the arrival of the new Lieutenant-Governor the same correspondent declared: ". . . I consider it highly advisable that Mr. Archibald should be on the spot, at least as soon as the troops." Same to same, July 31, 1870, *Ibid.*, 36.

In early August the Bishop sent the English speaking Métis Joseph Monkman with letters from himself and others at Red River to Colonel Wolesley providing information about the Provisional Government and supplies needed by the troops. The Bishop expressed his fears about the instability of the peace and urged the rapid approach of Wolesley's force. These letters Monkman delivered on August 4. On August 12 Wolesley received another communication from the anxious bishop pleading for one hundred men and a couple of guns at once. Moreover the Bishop took practical measures to assure the hastening of Wolesley's troops. A subscription among the English language parishes made possible the sending of six boats to assist the Expedition down the Winnipeg River from Rat Portage. One of his own clergy, J. P. Gardiner, took personal charge of the boats.[29] All this is confirmed by the author of the "Narrative of the Red River Expedition":

> A number of the English-speaking people of the lower Red River Settlement had, under the sanction of the Protestant Bishop, started off up the Winnipeg River to meet us with some large Hudson Bay boats, having experienced guides and crews, for the purpose of assisting us in descending that river . . . under charge of the Rev. Mr. Gardner [*sic*], an English clergyman. . .[30]

Thus we see that the English speaking portion of the population in conjunction with Bishop Machray, unlike the French, did want the military authority ahead of the civil authority. This in fact was how the issue was resolved. That the rapidity of the last stages of Wolesley's march was the reason Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald arrived so much later than he did seems to be confirmed by Archibald himself in his first report to Secretary of State for the Provinces Joseph Howe. "Colonel Wolesley made the latter part of his march with such rapidity that he was within a short distance of Upper Fort Garry, before it was known there that he had arrived in the River.[31]

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[29] Cf. Robert Machray, *Life of Robert Machray*, London, 1909, 210-211; also Dawson, *"Report on the Red River Expedition," loc. cit.*, 22.

[30] *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 109, 168b–169a; cf. also same, 168a–168b

[31] Archibald to Howe, September 3, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 9. Sulté has recorded that Archibald had been following one day behind the Expedition. But owing to the final burst of speed of the regular troops, he was left seven days behind. Cf. *L'Expedition Militaire de Manitoba, 1870*, 45.

The Tactics of Wolesley

Colonel Gamet Wolesley seemed to find it easy to suspect the motives of Louis Riel. He allowed himself to be influenced by false reports that Riel intended to fight. Such was his explanation to Bishop Taché days later after his arrival:

> We were quietly advancing certain to meet no resistance, when passing through the little village of Winnipeg, two horsemen arrived at full speed exclaiming: "Colonel Riel and his men want to fight!" You understand Monseigneur that I then had to take some military precautions to approach the Fort.[32]

The Colonel advanced up the Red River by stealth and caution. Messengers and scouts whom Riel had sent to meet him he arrested and detained. Their failure to return convinced the Métis Chief that Wolesley's intentions, despite his declaration of June 30 from Thunder Bay that his mission was one of peace, were nothing less than hostile. The Officer of the Expeditionary Forces who authored the "Narrative of the Red River Expedition" has accurately described the tactics of Wolesley: "We took every possible precaution to prevent intelligence of our arrival in the river from reaching Fort Garry. No one was permitted to pass in that direction, although every one was allowed to come within our line of skirmishers.[33]

It was too late now for resistance even if the Provisional Government had intended it. Following the counsel of Father Ritchot and Bishop Taché Riel was determined to hand over the reins of government peacefully to legitimate Canadian authority. Assuredly the new Governor was not another McDougall. Riel's work was now finished. He had already dismissed his potential army of a thousand Métis. Bishop Taché maintained outward optimism till the very eve of Wolesley's arrival with the British regulars. But to Riel it was obvious that he would have to seek safety in flight. He informed the Bishop of his conviction that the Ottawa politicians had deceived the prelate from first to last.[34] As the troops were entering the Fort, the President of the Provincial Government, his guard already dismissed, crossed the Red River and made his way to exile in Pembina and later Saint Joseph, Dakota Territory. It

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[32] Quoted from memory by Bishop Taché, Taché, *Northwest Difficulty*, 14b–15a.

[33] *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 109, 175a–b.

[34] Cf. G. Dugas, *Histoire véridique des faits qui ont preparé le mouvement des Métis a la Riviere Rouge en 1869*, Montreal, 1905, 192.

was an inglorious exit from office after nine months of nerve-wracking work. Riel had even prepared an address of welcome for the incoming Lieutenant-Governor.[35]

Red River thus had no civil authority from the time of Riel's departure, August 24, till the arrival of the Lieutenant-Governor, September 2, for Louis Riel had been empowered by the Dominion Government to continue in office until the coming of Adams Archibald.[36] On his own authority alone Colonel Wolesley called on Donald Smith to act as temporary civil ruler.

Parenthetically we can ask: what could have happened to the Red River Expedition had the Métis determined to resist? It was quite possible that the force could have been destroyed. If necessary, guerilla warfare could have been conducted all the way from Thunder Bay to Fort Garry. None of the Expedition had had any experience with such fighting, and they were altogether unfamiliar with the difficult terrain. Moreover, down the rapids of the Winnipeg River logs could have been floated to demolish the small boats the soldiers were in. In fact Indians had volunteered to do this should Riel approve. Also, as the force slogged its way toward Fort Garry across the rain-created, treeless morass an the morning of August 24, it could easily have been annihilated by a well-defended Fort with its numberous cannon. Resistance to Imperial authority, however, the Métis did not want.

Importance of the New Governor's Arrival

The timing of the Lieutenant-Governor's arrival was important because it would have much to do with the behavior of the troops. If he arrived before them, he would have a better chance to control them. If he arrived after them, he could not. It was to the advantage, then, of the vengeance-seekers that they seize those whom they regarded as blameworthy during a period of confusion and under the covering of military operations. This was in fact what actually happened. Some notion of their movements can be learned from Donald Smith's account in Commons the year following.

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[35] Cf. Riel to Taché, July 24, 1870, A. G. Morice, *A Critical History of the Red River Insurrection*, Winnipeg, Canadian Publishers, 1935, 341.

[36] Cf. deposition of Fr. Ritchot, *Causes of Difficulties*, 77. Governor-General Sir John Young also favored this function for Riel. "The Government must I suppose be left in Riel's hands until the possession of the country can be taken by H. M. troops." Young to Macdonald, April 7, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 508.

A number of excited people—some forty or fifty of them—came to him (Smith) asking to be sworn in as special constables to arrest the murderers. They said, "We will go to shoot them down, but not to take them in any other way." They demanded a warrant to commit murder, in fact. He [Donald Smith] refused them a warrant. . . . This was before the arrival of Governor Archibald.[37]

The new Governor could have come by way of St. Paul and Pembina, either in company with Bishop Taché, who was completing a second journey to Ottawa, or separately. He could have followed the expedition and himself have come in the Snow Road, if it had been completed. Finally, he could have followed the Expedition north to Lake Winnipeg and thence to the Red River Settlement. The last was the route he chose. In an early communication to Cartier he congratulated himself on his choice: "I am very glad that I came in here by the lakes. If it had been otherwise it would have injured me very much with that part of the settlement, whose violence it is at this moment of vast importance to be able to restrain."[38] The new Lieutenant-Governor seems to be saying that it was good policy for him not to return in the company of Bishop Taché via Saint Paul. He appears to have thought that this would constitute a siding with one portion of the Settlement, viz., the French. Thus he does not seem concerned about how much his action has titled the scales *against* the French Métis, who were already subject to a reign of terror at Red River. Further, his procedure is all the more surprising when we consider the instructions given him by the Dominion government. "You will also take measures to protect Immigrants flowing into that country, *and to restrain them from any lawless intrusion upon the settlers* or upon Indian tribes which may be calculated to provoke resistance."[39]

Arrival and Aftermath

On August 24, 1870, the Imperial soldiers led by Colonel Garnet Wolesley marched into the Red River Settlement and occupied Fort Garry. On August 27 the Canadian Volunteers came in and re-

[37] *Parl. Debates*, 4th Sess., Vol. 2, 1871, p. 1043. Brackets mine. "When these men applied for a warrant, the Lord Bishop of Rupert's Land and a number of the most respectable men in the place were present." *Ibid.*, p. 1044.

[38] Archibald to Cartier, September 10, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 137–138.

[39] "Instructions to Archibald," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 5. Italics mine.

leased their frustrations in drinking and brawling uncontrolled by the ineffective police force which Donald Smith had attempted to organize. The British regulars returned to the East on September 3, the day following the entry of Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald. Despite his avowed peaceful intentions of the previous month Colonel Wolesley on the day following his arrival made it understood that he had regarded the leaders of the Provisional Government as "outlaws" from whose "tyranny" he would deliver the Settlement.[40] This ultimate display of his true colors did not prevent the ambitious Wolesley from being feted in Montreal nor from subsequent promotion in the British forces.[41]

Two unpunished crimes committed by the vendetta-inspired Canadian Volunteers may be singled out: the murder of Elzear Goulet and the bayoneting of André Nault. In mid-September, 1870, the former was recognized in Winnipeg and supposed to have assisted personally in the execution of Thomas Scott. He was chased by a mob including two Volunteers and drowned attempting to swim the river to safety. Sticks and stones had been hurled at him, and, since he sank suddenly, one at least must have struck his head.[42]

In March of the year following André Nault, an uncle of Louis Riel, was bayoneted on American soil by Canadian Volunteers and left for dead. Actually he later recovered. The perpetrators of this deed were never punished.[43] The lawlessness of the Volunteers

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40 Cf. Dawson, "Report on the Red River Expedition," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 6, No. 47, p. 25; F. H. Schofield, *The Story of Manitoba*, Winnipeg, 1913, Vol. 1, 297; George Young, *Manitoba Memories*, Toronto, 1897, 188. With regard to Wolesley's remarks about "banditti" flying at the approach of the troops Dawson has written: "The people to whom he [Wolesley] alludes instead of flying at his approach like banditti, were quietly following their usual occupations, except those who were out, at his particular request, making a road to facilitate the movements of Her Majesty's troops, and the soldiers had had experienced guides on the Winnipeg, although the contrary is implied. *Ibid.*, 26.

41 Cf. Editorial, *Gazette*, Montreal, September 30, 1870, p. 2, col. 1.

42 Cf. news dispatch, *Gazette*, Montreal, October 7, 1870, p. 1, col. 8. For the official report of the Lieutenant-Governor on this incident cf. Archibald to Howe, September 17, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 15. The Colonial Office in London made anxious inquiries about Goulet's death, as Howe informed Archibald. Cf. Howe to Archibald, November 14, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, 51–52; Archibald to Howe, December 7, 1870, 52; Report of H. J. G. McConville to Archibald, September 27, 1870, 52–54; Howe to Archibald, December 27, 1870, 54; and Howe to F. Turville, December 27, 1870, 54.

43 Cf. news dispatch, *Herald*, Montreal, March 15, 1871, p. 2, col. 6; also March 21, 1871, p. 4, col. 1.

after their arrival at Red River was not officially intended when they were dispatched, yet it is a fact whether intended or not.

Conclusion

The military expedition to Red River in 1870 has recently been termed a "crackpot crusade."[44] Perhaps this description is accurate as far as the Canadian Volunteers are concerned, but the Expedition was more than that. We have seen that as far as the Imperial Government were concerned it was a peaceful symbol of transfer of sovereignty and a guarantee of order but in no sense a punitive force. No one was to be arrested nor punished, and the people of the Northwest were not to be united forcibly to Canada. So much for British official policy as determined by the Liberal Ministry in London. This policy the Canadian Government had perforce to acquiesce in officially and openly if British assistance both military and financial were to be made use of. As far as angry Orange Ontario was concerned the Expedition must above all capture and punish the executioners of Orangeman Scott. Official declarations to the contrary notwithstanding such was the determination of the overwhelming number of Canadian Volunteers most of whom were from the Province of Ontario.

Thus there were official policy on the one hand and contrary facts on the other. The Expedition was not officially punitive in character but was so in fact. Moreover the thirst for vengeance on the part of the Volunteers was not hidden from the authorities both military and political. Even the British leader, Colonel Garnet Wolesley, at length accepted it and connived at it upon his entry into Red River Settlement. It appears that Prime Minister Macdonald would please pro-Métis supporters by theoretical statements of official policy and at the same time please anti-Métis elements by the cold facts of vengeance at least partially achieved. The true purpose of the Expedition was one thing. The manner of its fulfillment was quite another.

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[44] J. K. Howard, *Strange Empire*, New York, Morrow, 1952.

Terence V. Powderly and the Knights of Labor

In 1886 the Order of the Knights of Labor, with a membership exceeding 700,000, stood as the dominant organization in the American labor movement. For a time it seemed as though it was destined to absorb all other unions and become the sole representative of American workingmen. Yet within a few short years the Knights as an important working-class body had disappeared. While the reasons for its failure are many, a study of the man who was its leader during its years of national prominence reveals both the strength and weaknesses of the Knights and throws much light upon this chapter of labor history.

Terence Vincent Powderly, head of the Order from 1879 to 1893, was born in Carbondale, Pennsylvania, on January 22, 1849, the son of Irish parents who had migrated to America in 1827. First entering the labor movement in 1871 by joining a local of the Machinists and Blacksmiths International Union, his ascent to national leadership was rapid, and in September 1879 he was chosen to succeed the retiring Uriah S. Stephens as Master Workman of the Knights of Labor.[1]

During the eighties Powderly was by far the most popular and renowned labor leader in the United States. His vision of a better world, his voluminous correspondence with the rank and file, and his obvious sincerity and sense of dedication and mission all contributed to his great appeal. It was, in fact, in the field of publicity and education that he made his greatest and most enduring contribution to the labor movement. Powderly developed nothing original in the way of organizational technique or policies. His major accomplishment was to draw attention to American workers and to make workingmen aware of a growing labor movement. However, as we will see, Powderly was more a reformer than a job– and wage–conscious labor leader, and drew more from the humanitarian heritage of the ante-bellum period than he contributed to the development of American labor ideology.

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[1] Powderly to James E. Barrett, January 15, 1889, Powderly Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.). Unless otherwise noted, all manuscript citations are from this collection. See also Powderly's autobiography, *The Path I Trod*, New York, 1940.

The most important ingredient in Powderly's philosophy was a desire to destroy the wage system. As he often stated: "The aim of the Knights of Labor—properly understood—is to make each man his own employer." This hostility toward capitalism was based more upon emotional than scientific reasoning, for he once wrote that he would banish the term "class" from the English language if he could do so. Powderly had little knowledge of the socialist analysis of society, and never assigned a significant role to economics as a factor in the development of society.[2]

Powderly then faced the more practical problem of adopting a course of action resulting in the abolition of the wage system. Because of his reform heritage and failure to understand the importance of economic factors, he could never fully comprehend the need for economic action by the working class. Rather he proclaimed over and over again the importance of education as the primary means of superseding the wage system. Always counselling patience and forbearance, he warned that the process of education could not be successful in a matter of a few months. In 1886, at the height of what historians have termed the "Great Upheaval," he asked workingmen to "submit to the injustice at the hands of the employer in patience for a while longer," for first their own condition and that of the employers had to be studied and understood. After laborers had learned what they were "justly entitled to . . . the tribunal of arbitration . . . [would] settle the rest."[3]

Despite the evident disinclination of employers to raise wages or shorten hours, Powderly suggested that all employers and employees should each form their own trade organizations, mutually adopt a price and wage scale, and then boycott those refusing to be bound by the agreement. In 1888 he polled the Knights for

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[2] *Journal of the Knights of Labor,* XIII (May 4, 1893), 5; *Journal of United Labor,* I (June 15, 1880), 21; Powderly, "The Organization of Labor," *North American Review,* CXXXV (August 1882), 123; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1880, 170; Powderly, *The Path I Trod,* 161, 427.

Powderly was contemptuous of all socialists, and generally used the term to denounce those of whom he was not fond. In 1880 he accepted a membership card in the Socialist Labor Party from Philip Van Patten, the party's national secretary. But Powderly never took any action on it, accepting it as a gesture of friendship; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1887, 1536. Cf. also Powderly to Robert D. Layton, May 1, 1882; Powderly to Chester A. Arthur, November 11, 1884; Powderly to John W. Gilson, April 6, 1886.

[3] Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, reprinted in Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics and Inspection, *The Official History of the Great Strike of 1886 on the Southwestern Railway System,* Jefferson City, 1887, 70–71.

the purpose of establishing an "Educational Fund," to which contributions would be voluntary. Although the answer was an affirmative one, the fund never amounted to more than $20,000. In the end little was accomplished. The rank and file appeared to be more interested in practical results than they were in education.[4]

Combined with Powderly's belief in education was an abiding faith in co-operation as a means of abolishing the wage system. Powderly had grown to maturity at a time when the communitarian movement, as propounded by Fourier and Brisbane, was still strong. He retained in later life the conviction that society could be reconstructed along co-operative lines. In the late eighties, influenced by a reading of Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward,* he became an adherent of the Nationalist movement. Until 1885 the concept of co-operation played a significant role in the history of the Knights. Numerous co-operative projects were undertaken, but most of them failed. Although Powderly recognized that co-operative enterprises were bound to fail unless sufficient capital could be secured, he never took any action that might have resulted in the raising of funds, contenting himself instead with speeches attacking the existing system and advocating co-operation as an alternative.[5]

A natural outgrowth of his repugnance toward the existing industrial system was his hostility toward trade unionism. Rejecting the pragmatism of a trade unionist such as Samuel Gompers, Powderly looked upon higher wages or shorter hours as mere palliatives which would bring about no permanent betterment of the workingman's condition. While proclaiming his dislike of trade union aims and methods, he nevertheless insisted that no real conflict existed between the Knights and the unions, and in fact issued invitation after invitation for trade unions to enter the Knights as a body. Later, when the labor movement was nearly rent asunder by the conflict between the two groups, Powderly took the position that it was a war between individuals rather than organizations. In 1889 he privately described the leaders of the American Federa-

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[4] *Journal of the Knights of Labor,* XII (January 28, 1892), 1; *Journal of United Labor,* VIII (March 31, 1888), 2602, (May 26, 1888), 2633; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1888, *Report of the General Treasurer,* 13; 1889, *Report of the General Secretary Treasurer,* 13; 1890, *Report of the General Secretary Treasurer,* 9.

[5] Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor, 1859 to 1889,* Columbus, 1889, 460; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1880, 170–171; Powderly to Henry E. Sharpe, October 23, 1883; Powderly to Felix Adler, January 20, 1884; Powderly to unidentified correspondent, c. February 20, 1890.

tion of Labor as a group of "damn gin guzzling, pot bellied, red nosed, scab faced, dirty shirted, unwashed, leather arsed, empty headed, two faced, rattle headed, itchy palmed scavengers." Yet Powderly was capable of writing that he had never held "but the friendliest of feelings for the Trades Unions of America."[6] In other words, he drew a fine distinction between the membership and leadership of the trade unions, refusing to recognize that a unionist such as Gompers relied upon rank and file support.

By the mid-eighties the differing objectives of the Knights and the unions resulted in open conflict. While the Order sought to introduce a co-operative society, the unions accepted capitalism and worked within the existing structure for increased benefits. The fight began to rage in earnest after hostilities commenced between the Knights and the Cigar Makers' International Union, which was led by Adolph Strasser and Gompers. At the 1886 General Assembly of the Order, District Assembly 49, center of anti-unionist sentiment, had enough power to secure passage of a resolution ordering all members of the Knights, under pain of expulsion, to leave the C.M.I.U. Unwilling to engage in a long drawn-out fight, Powderly was unhappy at this turn of events. In desperation he interpreted the resolution as broadly as possible, promising dispensations if C.M.I.U. members belonging to the Order would promise to desist from harmful activities. At the same time Powderly avoided antagonizing District Assembly 49, although he did work quietly for repeal of the resolution, which he ultimately ruled unconstitutional and which was rescinded the following year. But the crucial moment for compromise had passed, since the trade unions had already embarked on a war to the finish. Powderly, caught between District Assembly 49 and the C.M.I.U., did little. The militant Strasser and Gompers were determined to ensure the total supremacy of the trade union form of organization, and Powderly proved no match for them.[7]

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[6] Powderly to Tom O'Reilly, December 19, 1889; Powderly to J. T. Lavery, July 15, 1890; Powderly to J. T. Tuohy, November 7, 1890; Powderly to J. P. McDonnell, September 24, 1892; Powderly to James Rogers, December 19 1892; *Journal of United Labor*, I (June 15, 1880), 21, and VIII (September 10, 1887), 2486; *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XIII (January 12, 1893), 1; Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, *Proceedings*, 1886, 1807–1808, 1818–1819; *John Swinton's Paper*, June 20, 1886; *Cigar Makers' Official Journal*, XI (August 1886), 6; *The Carpenter*, VI (October 1886), 1.

[7] Powderly to Henry Dettman, August 11, 1886; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, April 17, 1886; Powderly to John O'Keefe, January 3, 1887; Powderly to J. F. Cronin, February 10, 1887; Powderly to Edwin M.

Certain traits in Powderly's character created numerous difficulties during his leadership of the Knights. Often intolerant of dissenting views, he tended to exaggerate the relative importance of his own position. In the administration of the Order he was unable to delegate responsibility to subordinates, and insisted upon supervising even minute details. His relations with the General Executive Board were not always close. While the Board worked under a common roof in Philadelphia, Powderly remained a hundred miles distant in Scranton, journeying only infrequently for meetings with the Board. He spent much of his time writing letters, many of which expressed dissatisfaction with his heavy burdens.[8]

When events moved rapidly, Powderly frequently demonstrated an inability to meet changing conditions, often offering the poor state of his health as an excuse for inaction. Moreover, when hundreds of thousands of workingmen flocked to the Order's banner in the feverish years of 1885 and 1886, Powderly did little more than issue complaint after complaint. He insisted that striking workingmen could not be admitted to membership, that such rapid growth was unhealthy, and that he could not possibly keep pace with ensuing developments. On more than one occasion he suggested that the General Executive Board prohibit strikes altogether and recall the charters of those assemblies which disobeyed the order.[9]

The faith placed by Powderly on arbitration, conciliation, and education was naturally reflected by his actions as head of the Knights. His handling of the eight-hour agitation during the eighties serves as an example of his methods. In 1884 the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions had selected May 1, 1886, as the date on which all workingmen were to press for the eight-hour day.[10] The Order too, from its inception, had also been a partisan of this cause, but had always been vague as to the means of implementing it. Its support, at least in theory, was primarily

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Blake, March 18, 1887; Powderly to John B. Dempsey, April 1, 1887; Powderly to John Devlin, September 14, 1887; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 42, 200, 282; 1887, 1528–1531, 1677, 1732–1733, 1822-1823.

8 Cf. Powderly to Frederick Turner, December 31, 1885; Powderly to John W. Hayes, April 29, 1887; Powderly to John J. Roche, August 12, 1887.

9 Powderly to Edward B. Irving, December 4, 1885; Powderly to Frederick Turner, December 31, 1885; Powderly to Dan F. Tomson, January 23, 1886; Powderly to Michael Healy, December 1, 1886; Powderly to John W. Hayes, January 13, 1888. Cf. also Powderly's Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, reprinted in *Official History of the Great Strike*, 69–75.

10 Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, *Proceedings*, 1884, 14.

a concession to the strong feelings of workingmen toward eight hours. Powderly and other leading officials, however, emphasized that the abolition of the wage system would automatically resolve the problem. They argued that a reduction in hours was a mere palliative.

In 1885 Powderly advised the General Assembly that no attention should be given the movement because most people were ignorant of its significance. Furthermore, neither the date nor the plan of action were appropriate. In his famous Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, he ordered all assemblies to refrain from striking for eight hours under the impression they were obeying the wishes of the General Assembly. At the 1886 convention he affirmed his opposition to the means adopted by those active in the movement. Powderly's hostile course stirred the wrath of many trade unionists, and this was in part responsible for the alienation of the unions from the Knights.[11]

In 1888 the A. F. of L. embarked on another eight-hour crusade but soon came to the conclusion that better results could be achieved if the movement were confined to those trades having at least a fair chance of success. The date chosen to press for eight hours was May 1, 1890. Gompers wrote the Knights requesting its co-operation, and Powderly introduced a resolution in support of the movement. But no aid was forthcoming on the part of the Order, and Powderly reiterated his opposition to the means chosen by the trade unions, privately condemning the leaders of the A. F. of L. in derogatory language. Although he favored eight hours in theory, his hostility toward any concrete plan made him in effect an opponent of the movement. Powderly's disregard of the great appeal of the eight-hour movements ultimately drove many workingmen into the arms of the trade unions, where their aspirations seemed to have a better chance of early realization.[12]

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[11] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1885, 15; 1886, 39, 273, 278; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 495–505; Powderly, "The Army of the Discontented," *North American Review*, CXL (April 1885), 369–377; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 72–73; Powderly to John Franey, December 4, 1885; Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, *Proceedings*, 1886, 6.

[12] A. F. of L., *Proceedings*, 1888, 25; 1889, 29–30; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1889, 51–52; Powderly to John W. Hayes, December 15 and 16, 1889; Powderly to A. R. Lake, December 21, 1889; Powderly, "The Plea for Eight Hours," *North American Review*, CL (April 1890), 464–469; Gompers to A. W. Wright, July 10, 1893, Gompers Letter Books (A. F. of L.–C. I. O. Building, Washington, D. C.). Cf. also Powderly to M. J. Byrne, December 21, 1889; Powderly to M. M. Cullen, May 21, 1888; Powderly to Tom O'Reilly, December 19, 1889; Powderly to J. T. Lavery, July 15, 1890.

Emphasis upon the abolition of the wage system led Powderly to condemn the use of the strike by workingmen. Regarding higher wages and shorter hours as expediencies, he naturally opposed strikes as a means of securing such objectives. Furthermore, feeling that the destruction of the wage system had to be preceded by the enlightenment of the people as to their true interests, Powderly opposed the strike *per se,* and probably would have fought against its use even as a means of introducing the co-operative society. Despite his hostile attitude, however, it was clear that workingmen were more interested in tangible benefits than they were in the reformation of society, and one of their prime weapons was the strike. Pressure from the rank and file forced the Order to establish successively a Resistance Fund, a Defence Fund, and an Assistance Fund. The attitude of Powderly and other leaders, in addition to the fact that inadequate revenue was provided for, insured the ineffectiveness of such funds. Powderly's dislike of anything remotely related to strikes was illustrated by his pronouncements. In 1880 he suggested that the money in the Resistance Fund be used for co-operative purposes. In 1883 he complained that the "number of appeals for assistance . . . is frightful . . . my advice . . . is to shut down on all appeals and stick to the original plan of the order, that of educating the members as to the folly of strikes." Two years later he recommended the abolition of the Assistance Fund, and in 1888 informed the Knights that had the money spent on strikes been utilized for education, strikes would have been rendered needless.[13]

Despite Powderly's opposition, however, he was forced to participate actively as head of the Order in some strikes involving its members. The first major strike he took part in came in 1885 when the Knights won a startling victory over Jay Gould. A wildcat walkout on the Wabash line following a 10 per cent wage reduction had caught Gould totally unprepared, and in September Powderly negotiated a favorable settlement. Members of the Order were not to be discriminated against; locked-out employees were to be reinstated as quickly as possible; and Powderly in turn promised that in the future no strike would take place until there had been a meeting with railroad officials.[14] The Southwest strike,

[13] Pittsburgh *Times,* July 16, 1883; George E. McNeill, ed., *The Labor Movement: The Problem of To-day,* Boston, 1887, 415–416; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1880, 169–170, 172; 1883, 405; 1885, 23; 1888, *Report of the General Master Workman,* 3; Powderly to William A. Varner, February 8, 1883.

[14] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1885, 87–91.

commencing six months later, presented a completely different situation, for Gould was well prepared for any trouble. Indeed, he may have courted it with the intention of destroying the power of the Order on his lines.

A walkout on the Texas Pacific took place on March 6, 1886, ostensibly because of the discharge of C. A. Hall, a member of the Order. Actually the workers had for some time expressed a growing discontent with the railroad's policies. By March 10 the men of the Missouri Pacific, controlled by Gould, had also left their jobs. The leader of the strike was Martin Irons, chairman of the Executive Board of District Assembly 101. He was not, as Powderly later claimed, a novice; rather he evinced many qualities of successful leadership.[15]

Following the discharge of Hall, the Executive Board of District Assembly 101 sent out telegrams to all locals under its jurisdiction asking for support. In response to the affirmative replies a walkout was ordered on March 6. Neither Powderly nor the General Executive Board knew of the walkout until after its inauguration. The vice-president of the Missouri Pacific blamed Powderly for the stoppage. Powderly in turn asked for the reinstatement of Hall pending a full investigation, but to no avail. An attempt by the governors of Missouri and Kansas to get H. M. Hoxie, manager of the Gould system, to meet with a committee of the Order also proved fruitless. Hoxie was unalterably opposed to a meeting with any representatives of the Knights, favoring only a meeting with actual employees.[16]

At this critical juncture Powderly, on March 13, chose to issue a Secret Circular to all members of the Order. This quickly reached the hands of the newspapers and became public property. In this manifesto Powderly condemned strikes in any form.

> A stop must be called and the ship brought back to her moorings. It has always been, and is at the present time, my policy to advocate conciliation and arbitration in the settlement of disputes . . . Thousands of men who have become disgusted with the ruinous policy of the strike . . . were drawn to us because we proclaimed to mankind that we had discarded the strike until all else had failed. . . . No matter what advantage we gain by the strike, it is only medicating the symptoms; it does not penetrate the system,

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15 *Ibid.*, 1886, 82–83, 164–165, 170–172; Martin Irons, "My Experiences in the Labor Movement," *Lippincott's Magazine*, XXXVII (June 1886), 618–627.

16 Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 81–82; Ruth A. Allen, *The Great Southwest Strike*, Austin, 1942, 63–64.

and therefore fails in effecting a cure. . . . You must submit to injustice at the hands of the employer in patience for a while longer. Bide well your time. Make no display of organization or strength until you have every man and woman in your department of industry organized, and then do not strike, but study, not only your own condition, but that of your employer. Find out how much you are justly entitled to, and the tribunal of arbitration will settle the rest.[17]

These sentiments had been expressed by Powderly in the past, but their reiteration at this critical moment served only to place the head of the Order in the contradictory position of publicly opposing a strike of which he was the leader. The irony of the situation must have appeared highly amusing to Gould and served only to stiffen his determination to break the power of the Knights on his railroad system.

Powderly then agreed to Irons' request that he go to New York City and endeavor to see Gould. On March 28 the meeting took place. Gould adopted the position that as one of several directors he had no power to intervene personally. He finally agreed to send Hoxie a telegram instructing him to give preference in rehiring to employees of the railroad, and not to discriminate against the Order. The crucial section of the message stated; "We see no objection to arbitrate any differences between the employees and the company, past and future." There is some circumstancial evidence indicating that Gould sent Hoxie another message that was never made public. Although Powderly had no legal authority to end the strike, since that power was vested in the originating authority, the Executive Board of District Assembly 101 honored the settlement and ordered the workers to return to their jobs.[18]

This settlement was too vague to provide the basis for a lasting agreement. Ensuing events proved this, for after the strike had ended Hoxie issued a statement that he was willing to meet a committee of employees "who are actually at work in the service of the company." This was interpreted so as to exclude negotiators of the Knights representing the workers. The Executive Boards of District Assemblies 101, 93, and 17, after being informed by Hoxie that only 50 per cent of his former staff would be rehired and that only he would decide who would be taken back, had no choice

[17] *Official History of the Great Strike*, 70–71.

[18] Powderly to Martin Irons, March 25, 1886; Powderly to Jay Gould, April 11, 1886; "Investigation of Labor Troubles in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Texas, and Illinois" (1888), *House Report 4174*, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 22, 37, 40–41; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 75–76.

but to order the strike to continue. Even before this the Knights' General Executive Board had retracted its instructions ending the walkout.[19]

Throughout the entire affair Powderly insisted that the workers had erred in striking. After Gould reneged on the March 28 agreement Powderly refused to seek another conference. On April 11 he asked Gould to force Hoxie to comply with the settlement, even divorcing Gould from any responsibility for Hoxie's actions. But soon Powderly was convinced that Gould was as "untruthful as the devil," and issued an appeal to the Order for financial aid. At the same time, however, he wrote to John W. Hayes and Charles H. Litchman, two prominent officials of the Knights, asking them to serve on a committee which would investigate his contention that the strike was a rebellious move by the workers intended to defy the authority of the General Executive Board. Finally, on May 3, the Board unconditionally called off the strike.[20]

After the strike the Knights rapidly lost ground among the men of the Southwest, many of whom resented what they considered to be a betrayal of their interests by the Order. Powderly, however, always maintained that he had been thrust into an unfortunate situation not of his own making. He refused to face the fact that employers at that time would rarely concede anything to the workers unless forced to do so by superior strength. Any concession gained by labor usually required a strong union to see that the gains were maintained. Yet during the walkout Powderly wistfully wrote to Gould suggesting that the Knights would withdraw from the strike if Gould would reach an equitable settlement with the workers on his own. Many strikers also felt that a serious error had been committed in surrendering unconditionally to Gould, for the hope that the congressional committee investigating the strike would protect the workers never materialized.[21]

A few months later, following quickly upon the heels of the disastrous defeat inflicted by Gould, came the Chicago stockyards

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[19] *Official History of the Great Strike*, 78–80, 87–88; "Investigation of Labor Troubles," Pt. I, 27.

[20] Powderly to James Ward, April 8, 1886; Powderly to William O. McDowell, April 8, 10, 11 and 13, 1886; Powderly to Jay Gould, April 11, 1886; Powderly to Frederick Turner, April 12, 1886; Powderly to "the Order Wherever Found," April [?] 1886; Powderly to John W. Hayes, April 14, 1886; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, April 17, 1886; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 101, 111–112.

[21] *Journal of United Labor*, VII (November 10, 1886), 2200; New Haven *Workmen's Advocate*, March 5, 1887; Powderly to Gould, April 11, 1886; "Investigation of Labor Troubles," Pt. I, 17.

strike. Powderly's actions in this walkout served only to confirm the poor impression gained by many who felt that his handling of the Southwest strike was one of the prime reasons for its failure.

During the May 1886 eight-hour agitation the Chicago stockyard workers had successfully struck for eight hours. Throughout the summer the packers attempted to reduce wages. When the workers refused to accept the cut the employers reinstituted the ten-hour day. The General Assembly, then in session, decided to send T. B. Barry, a member of the General Executive Board, to Chicago with instructions not to involve the Knights. Barry, upon his arrival, concluded an agreement with two companies to order the strike off and have the men return to the ten-hour day. At a later date the two companies were to break away from the packers' organization and institute an eight-hour day with nine hours pay. Barry agreed to this settlement because he felt the workers were "fighting a losing fight." The workers returned to work only to go out on strike two weeks later. Barry returned to Chicago and the General Executive Board sent Albert A. Carlton to assist him, again with orders not to involve the Knights.[22]

Prior to Carlton's arrival in Chicago, Powderly sent the following communication to Barry:

> In a circular issued March 13, 1886, I stated the policy of the Knights of Labor on the eight-hour question. . . . In opposition to that circular the men at stockyards struck for eight hours. . . . You were sent to try and settle . . . You settled by ordering the men back at the old hours. They have, in violation of law and your order, and without notifying us, again struck for eight hours. The Board instructs you and Carlton . . . to settle by putting the men back at the old hours . . . If the men refuse, take their charters. We must have obedience and discipline.

This dispatch, immediately becoming public property, strengthened the determination of the packers not to concede. While Powderly was uninformed of Barry's previous agreement, the moment was not propituous for such instructions. Barry and Carlton immediately wired Powderly of their opposition to his instructions, but by that time it was too late to affect the outcome. Powderly was bitterly condemned by the stockyard workers, and the Knights entered a spiral of decline in Chicago. Barry was so incensed at Powderly's

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[22] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 174–175; 1887, 1419–1420; Barry to Powderly, October 19, 1886; Barry to Powderly and the General Executive Board, November 7, 1886; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 149–152.

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actions that an open break occurred between the two men, and two years later Barry was expelled from the Order, largely at Powderly's behest.[23]

Like many other labor leaders, Powderly also participated in politics. As head of the Knights he was in large measure responsible for its political policy, and his own personal experiences often conditioned his political attitude. Between 1878 and 1882 Powderly took part in Pennsylvania politics under the auspices of the Greenback Labor Party. During these years the Order worked closely, although unofficially, with that party. Nevertheless, Powderly maintained that no man could be forced to vote for a particular candidate, and he consistently proclaimed that the purpose of the Order was to educate men and parties. At the same time he stated that he would recommend voting for a candidate who was a member of the Order in place of one who was not. Although generally advocating a nonpartisan political attitude, Powderly's actions also were in part motivated by personal ambition. While publicly stating that he belonged to no party, he often engaged in negotiations in the hope of being elected to high public office. Although he declined in 1882 the nomination for Secretary of Internal Affairs in Pennsylvania, his reluctance was due primarily to his

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[23] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1887, 1421, 1482–1485. Joseph R. Buchanan in his autobiography claimed that Powderly called off the strike after receiving a letter from a Roman Catholic priest exhorting him to end the suffering and misery of the workers and their families. Powderly, on the other hand, claimed that he had not opened the letter until *after* the strike had been called off. Actually it matters little whose version is correct for, in any case, Powderly's course would probably have been similar. His ideological hostility toward strikes insured his lack of sympathy toward the stockyard workers.—Joseph R. Buchanan, *The Story of a Labor Agitator*, New York, 1903, 319–322; P. M. Flannigan to Powderly, October 16, 1886, reprinted in Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 147–148; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1887, 1479.

Powderly so resented what he regarded were unjustified attacks upon his actions during the Southwest and stockyards strikes that during the walkout on the Reading Railroad system in the winter of 1887–1888 he decided not to interfere in any way. Although tempted to step into the strike, he changed his mind, explaining to Hayes on January 13 that "From the information at hand and from the experience of the past I am led to the opinion that my interference will do no good and inasmuch as I have been blamed for failure of the Southwest strike, the Stock yards strike and other strikes in which I was forced to interfere after they had been started without any advice from me, I feel that I am justified in doing as much as the man requested 'in keeping hands off' and giving them a show;" Powderly to Austin Corbin, January 12, 1888 (letter never sent); Powderly to John W. Hayes, January 13 and February 7, 1888; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, February 13, 1888.

belief that the Greenback Labor Party had cheated him out of a seat in Congress.[24]

Powderly's disillusionment was the occasion for a change in the Order's political policy, and the close relationship with the Greenback Labor Party was dissolved. For the succeeding four years the problems of growth and strikes took up so much time that Powerly gave little attention to politics. His attitude was also influenced by the realization that labor participation in politics had not met with notable success, and the experiences of the National Labor Union only heightened this fact.[25]

However, he was unable to renounce politics completely, and after 1882 attempted to use his influence in the legislative arena. In February, 1884, Powderly appeared before a congressional committee in support of an anti-contract-labor bill being pushed by Local Assembly 300. In 1885 he suggested that the Order establish lobbies in state capitals and also in Washington. The following year Powderly was momentarily caught up in the political enthusiasm engendered by the "Great Upheaval," and he endorsed a plan to build up a congressional labor bloc. At the same time he refused to permit the Order to become involved with the National Union Labor Party, heir to the Greenback Labor Party.[26]

After 1886 Powderly directed his major efforts toward forging a working alliance with the American farmers. The steps in this direction were motivated only partly by a hope of inducing the farmers to affiliate themselves with the Order. Equally important was Powderly's desire to secure agrarian support in the legislative halls of the nation. Such a coalition was perfectly compatible with his reformism. Seeking the establishment of a society of small producers, he assumed the existence of a community of interests between farmer and worker.[27]

Yet Powderly, although moving in the direction of an agrarian alliance, still affirmed his nonpartisanship. In 1888 he reiterated

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[24] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1880, 258; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 285–286; McNeill, *The Labor Movement*, 417–418; *Journal of United Labor*, III (June 1882), 241–242; Powderly to Joseph Labadie, November 13, 1882.

Between 1878 and 1884 Powderly also held the post of mayor of Scranton.

[25] Cf. Gerald N. Grob, "Reform Unionism: The National Labor Union," *Journal of Economic History*, XIV (Spring 1954), 126–142.

[26] Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 444–447; Powderly to George Edmunds, January 14, 1885; Powderly to Ralph Beaumont, July 27, 1886; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1885, 16; *Journal of United Labor*, VII (February 5, 1887), 2276.

[27] *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XII (April 28, 1892), 1.

his belief that when an officer entered the service of a political party he had a moral obligation to resign from the Order. Powderly's ambitions, however, induced him to engage in secret political negotiations with both major political parties in the fall and summer of 1888. Although no results were forthcoming, it is by no means certain that Powderly would not have accepted a sufficiently tempting offer.[28]

Between 1889 and 1892 the alliance between the Order and farmers grew closer together. In December 1889 Powderly attended the farmers' convention in St. Louis. Nevertheless, throughout this period Powderly consistently maintained that when he voted for a farmer-labor party, it was only as an individual and not as a Knight. Each step that he took was a cautious one. In 1890 he conducted a poll to determine the sentiment of the rank and file toward political action. When chosen as a delegate to the convention of the People's Party in 1892 he refused, stating that he would attend, but only as an individual. During the ensuing campaign he was lukewarm toward Weaver's candidacy, doing little except writing letters. His lack of enthusiasm for Weaver was evident when he expressed a preference for Harrison rather than Cleveland.[29]

Powderly's political beliefs were generally in keeping with the majority of trade union leaders. Except when personal ambition became important, he retained a nonpartisan attitude with an emphasis on the value of the lobby and support of candidates friendly toward labor. His moves in the direction of a farmer-labor alliance were partly motivated by a hope of preventing a numerically powerful element within the Order from committing that organization to a particular political party. After Powderly's exit the Knights joined in full support of Bryan in 1896.[30]

In Powderly's vision of a united working class striving for the abolition of the wage system and the establishment of a co-operative society, there stood certain barriers that could not be ignored, namely

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[28] Powderly to I. N. Ross, September 11, 1888. I have also benefited immensely from the excellent study by Edward T. James, "American Labor and Political Action, 1865–1896: The Knights of Labor and Its Predecessors," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1954.

[29] *Journal of the Knights of Labor,* X (January 16, 1890), 1–3; (April 24, 1890), 1; (May 1, 1890), 1; (June 5, 1890), 1; XI (October 16, 1890), 1; XII (June 2, 1892), 1; XIII (June 30, 1892), 1; Powderly to A. H. Shank, January 15, 1892; Powderly to F. Reed Agnew, June 14, 1892; Powderly to J. A. Fox, September 30, 1892; Powderly to G. F. Washburn, October 13, 1892.

[30] Cf. Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly,* 1896, 51–52, 59–60.

the problems of female, Negro, Chinese and immigrant labor. These groups were often utilized by employers in the capacity of cheap labor or strikebreakers, thus undermining the effectiveness of labor organizations.

In admitting women to the Order, Powderly ruled in 1881 that separate forms and rituals for women were unnecessary, and during the eighties the Knights became the first major labor body to include thousands of women workers within its ranks.[31]

On the pressing issue of the admission of Negroes, Powderly expressed his opinion that color was not a qualification for membership. At the Richmond General Assembly in 1886 he permitted himself to be introduced by a Negro delegate from New York City. Powderly felt that cheap Negro labor had to be eliminated if white labor was to organize effectively. While the Knights did organize tens of thousands of colored workingmen, there was much rank and file pressure to separate or exclude the Negro altogether. This pressure forced Powderly to adopt a moderate position. "The color line cannot be rubbed out," he wrote in 1887, "nor can the prejudice against the colored man be overcome in a day. I believe that for the present it would be better to organize colored men by themselves." In 1889 he informed the St. Louis farmers' convention: "We believe the Southern people are capable of managing the negro. . . . The social relations of the races is not the question. . . . we do ask that where the black man becomes a lever with which to oppress the white man . . . he shall be protected . . . When it comes to my home that is my concern, and none have the right to say with whom I shall associate there."[32]

In the area of immigration Powderly adopted a position common to most contemporary labor leaders. In 1884 he supported the restriction of European immigration. "There is grave danger," Powderly told the Order eight years later, "that in a babel of tongues we may forget that we are freemen in this country, and in losing sight of that fact allow the incoming horde to Europeanize us before we can Americanize them." His views in regard to the Chinese were quite similar. In 1880 he supported attempts to force Congress

[31] *Ibid.*, September 1879, 125, 131; Norman J. Ware, *The Labor Movement in the United States 1860–1895*, New York, 1929, 348; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 384.

[32] Powderly to J. Stewart, October 8, 1879; Powderly to W. H. Lynch, April 13, 1886; Powderly to J. M. Bannan, July 8, 1887; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1880, 257; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 651–660; *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, X (January 16, 1890), 1–2.

to abrogate the Burlingame Treaty, and at the General Assembly ruled against a point of order permitting the Chinese to join the Knights. In 1882 Powderly went to Washington to lobby for the termination of the Burlingame Treaty. When news of the Chinese massacre in 1885 at Rock Springs, Wyoming Territory, involving members of the Order, became known, Powderly retreated somewhat from his earlier position, expressing the thought that perhaps the Knights had gone too far. His attitude in regard to the Chinese, however, never underwent any significant transformation.[33]

In 1893 Powderly was deposed by an alliance of Western agrarians headed by James R. Sovereign of Iowa and socialists led by Daniel De Leon of New York City. The difficulty arose when Powderly, who had the constitutional power to present to the General Assembly nominees for election to the General Executive Board, refused to present men acceptable to the convention. His action led one delegate to remark:

> I have become convinced, since the opening of this session, that the General Master Workman holds as his enemy every delegate who does not vote in accordance with his views on all questions, and appears unwilling to place in nomination for the General Executive Board any man who is likely to stand up for his own opinions when they happen to conflict with those of his chief.

Powderly twice resigned in the hope of forcing the convention to accede to his wishes. The second time the General Assembly, to Powderly's consternation, accepted his resignation and elected James R. Sovereign as his successor.[34]

The end of Powderly's career as leader of the Knights of Labor also marks the conclusion of a significant chapter in the history of the labor movement. Powderly was the final representative of a group of labor reformers hoping to return to a pre-industrial society. But the time for such a change had passed. By 1900 the frontier was gone; suitable land for farming had all been taken up; and large-scale enterprise was dominant. As a result Powderly's reform program did not fit the environment, for the *raison d'être* had been cut away from many of the old objectives. The technology and organization of society had made the co-operative workshop some-

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[33] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1884, 575–577; 1892, 5; *Journal of United Labor*, I (August 15, 1880), 39; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 426–427; Powderly to unidentified correspondent, November 19, 1882; Powderly to J. W. Adams, February 7, 1883; Powderly to Thomas Neasham, October 31, 1885.

[34] Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assemby*, 1893, 7–61.

what of an anachronism, and the ideal of the small producer was technologically obsolete. Perhaps the best summation of Powderly's years of leadership in the labor movement was expressed in a letter written shortly before his deposal as head of the Knights:

I have held a most anomalous position before the public for the last 20 years. All of this time I have opposed strikes and boycotts; I have contended that the wage question was of secondary consideration; I have contended that the short-hour question was not the end but merely the means to an end . . . but all of this time I have been fighting for a raise in wages, a reduction in the hours of labor or some paltry demand of the trade element to the exclusion of the very work that I have constantly advocated. Just think of it! opposing strikes and always striking; opposing a battle for short hours and lacking the time to devote to anything else. Battling with my pen in the leading journals and magazines of the day for the grand things we are educating the people on, and fighting with might and main for the little things. Our Order has held me up to the present position I hold because of the reputation I have won in the nation at large by taking high ground, and yet the trade element in the Order has always kept me busy at the base of the breast works throwing up the earth which they trampled down. Again, no man in this country has so many domineering bosses as I have, for every member feels it to be his right to sit down and abuse me if he pleases or order me around to do as he likes and not as I think. . . . On the other hand my relations with my brother officers . . . are not pleasant . . . I who have been preaching independence for others have been the slave of thousands, and as my reward am as little understood by the people I work for as Hoke Smith or Dink Botts.[35]

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[35] Powderly to Mrs. A. P. Stevens, April 11, 1893. I have not touched upon Powderly's actions in the difficulties between the Knights and the Catholic Church during the eighties. Aside from being too long, the story has been more than amply related and documented by Henry J. Browne in *The Catholic Church and the Knights of Labor*, Washington, D. C., 1949, and "Terence V. Powderly and Church-Labor Difficulties of the Early 1880's," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXII (April 1946), 1–27. As Father Browne has pointed out, the difficulties which churchmen and labor leaders had to adjust revolved around the Knights' oath-bound secrecy, its Masonic aspects, its resemblances to the Molly Maguires, and its apparent socialistic or radical character. Powderly's version of the troubles in a chapter in his autobiography entitled "Ecclesiastical Opposition" (*The Path I Trod*, 317–381), is not fully authenticated either by his personal papers nor the views of prominent churchmen. Powderly claimed that the Catholic Church leaders of the eighties "advised obedience to the established order" (*Ibid.*, 342). Within the Church, however, as in contemporary American society, all shades of opinion existed on the so-called "labor problem."

A Note on Early Sonora and Arizona

Father Kino's *Chomites*

Studying the numerous works pertaining to the early spiritual conquest of the northwest of New Spain, one finds that not all investigators are in accord. There are points of no great importance perhaps, that have been variously presented and interpreted so as to clarify ambiguous statements or to inject some meaning to an obscure sentence. This procedure helped the investigator as well as the student, but, as further research throws more light upon the past, the variations should be dealt with more seriously for the sake of truth and benefit of future scholars. The remarks that follow are offered not as criticism but in helpful sincerity and with due respect for those that have preceded me in the rugged study of Spanish manuscripts, some of which are of illegible scription and nearly all of intricate phraseology, abounding in obsolete words and numerous abbreviations that defy unravelling.

Father Kino's *chomites* have puzzled various writers. When the renowned explorer-missionary of the southwest visited the native villages, to win over the aborigines he gave them *chomite colorado.* The item has been identified by the late Professor Herbert E. Bolton as a red bandanna, and Bolton dubs Kino's policy as "handkerchief diplomacy."[1] More recently Ernest J. Burrus, S.J., in his *Kino Reports to Headquarters* refers to *chomites colorados* as small red bandannas.[2] The Spanish phase reads ". . . le pusse un poco de chomite colorado en la caveza . . ." which Burrus translates "I put a small red bandanna on his head." However, in nearly all instances where the noun *chomite* or its plural is used, it is found modified by the adjective *"poco"* meaning little and implying quantity or amount, not size.

Juan Matheo Mange in his *Luz de Tierra Incógnita* states: ". . . hallamos una ranchería en que conté 30 almas, hablándoles y dado un poco de chomite y agujas, proseguimos al Sur . . . ,"[3] which

[1] *Rim of Christendom,* New York, 1936, 150.
[2] Rome, Italy, 1954, pages 41, 73, 75; the Spanish phrase herein is on p. 74.
[3] Mexico, 1926, 231.

translated almost literally says: "We found a settlement in which I counted 30 souls; having talked to and given them a small amount of *chomite* and needles, we proceeded south." The fact that *chomite* appeared associated with needles offered a solution to the ambiguity; it refers to red coral beads, or a substance resembling coral reef from which the Indians could make beads and string them with the needles given. In support of this argument and perhaps to answer the query taking shape in the reader's mind, let me quote Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca who in 1536 visited the northern part of Sonora:

> The people gave us many deer and cotton shawls better than those of New Spain, many beads and certain corals found on the South Sea, and fine turquoises that come from the north. Indeed they gave us every thing they had. To me they gave five emeralds made into arrowheads, which they use at their singing and dancing.[4]

On February 6, 1606, Captain Diego Martínez de Hurdaide wrote thus:

> So that others might know the esteem in which the coral is held, all a soldier has to carry is six arm-lengths of the white and ninety beads of the red; said coral is brought by the aborigines from the Yaqui River, also from the Quivira River, where it is said it is found. I have witnessed how the Indians prize the red coral; they have it of the most vivid color and I had to trade two horses for the little I am sending as a sample. It is said that the Mayo Indians have much, but as they are at war, it has not been possible to enter and barter. There are also certain stones called turquoises of a hue similar to the seven small ones being sent along with the coral. They are beautiful and in demand in Guadalajara, Culiacán and other places from which agents are sent to buy them.[5]

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[4] *The Narrative of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca*, edited by Frederick W. Hodge, in *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States 1528–1543*, New York, 1907, 106; this is a most accurate translation of the *Relación de los Naufragios y Comentarios*, Madrid, 1906, I, 118.

[5] Unpublished manuscript in the Archivo General de la Nación, México, ramo de Historia, tomo 316, sección de Jesuitas, folios 39–149 titled: Carta y Relación que yó el General Diego Martínez de Urdaide envío al Excelentísimo Señor Virrey de la Nueva España para que la vea mi Padre Nicolás de Arnaya, Provincial de la Compañía de Jesús. The Spanish is as follows:

"Para que se vea de la consideración que será el coral que traen los naturales del Río Yaquimí, que allí dicen lo hay y en el Río de Quivira, lleva el soldado, por todo, seis brazas de lo blanco y noventa cuentas de lo colorado; qué estiman mucho los indios de lo colorado, lo hé visto; hay con más viva la color, y me costó dos caballos que dí por el que para muestra basta y se podrá sacar por el lo demás; los del Mayo poseen mucho y como están en guerra no se ha podido entrar a resgatar; así mismo hay unas piedras que llaman turquesas, muy hermosas, de la color de las siete pequeñuelas que van con el dicho coral, que de Guadalajara, Culiacán y otras partes las envían a comprar."

It is to be noted that Hurdaide, while mentioning what he had heard as to the sources, skillfully evades an opinion as to the truthfulness of the statements. He definitely calls it coral, classifies it into two varieties, but as in the case of the turquoises, his careful wording implies a certain doubt. He may not have been well versed in paleontology or geology, but very likely knew that reef-building corals could only fluorish in clean, shallow, fresh, seawater, or he might have suspected that they were fossil corals of the Silurian type, favosytes or halysites. At any rate, they looked like corals, were so called by his men, all of whom were less learned than he, and in order to avoid responsibility, he sent samples. He names the two rivers where it was said the coral came from although the Quivira one—later explorers discovered—was as mythical as the province of the same name. As to the Mayo tribe, well, they were on the warpath and Hurdaide reports what he heard. The South Sea referred to by Núñez Cabeza de Vaca was one of the names given to the California Gulf. Thus, it is possible that towards the end of the century, when Father Kino came north, he had learned the true nature of the substance and initiated a new nomenclature. And as Father Burrus points out, *chomite* is synonymous with *zagalejo,* indicative of a gown, tunic or skirt, from which the learned Dr. Bolton deduced it might have been something that could be placed upon the head.

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Notes and Comments

Calendar of Philippine Documents in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library, Edited by Paul S Lietz, was published toward the end of 1956. It will undoubtedly prove a great boon to scholars of many avocations, just as its predecessor, Ruth Lapham Butler's *Check List of Manuscripts in the Edward E. Ayer Collection* of the Newberry Library has been since its publication in 1937. These guides to materials are realizations of the ideal of the famed Library to render all possible aid to students and researchers.

In his introduction Dr. Lietz traces briefly the history of the collection of Philippine materials gathered by Mr. Ayer at the turn of the century, of their use by Blair and Robertson, of the subsequent additions of manuscripts, and of their coming to the Library. The three hundred and seventy items in the *Calendar* run to about seven thousand pages, and it must be said that Dr. Lietz has personalized them handsomely by giving all the necessary biographical data of each, the date and place of birth of the document, its author and addressee, the Spanish description of the time, the later characterization in English, and the technical data of its long life. Arranged chronologically the *Calendar* begins at the year 1557 and ends with the 1903 entry. To make the book more helpful the manuscript list is followed by a "Short Title List of Transcripts from Philippine Documents in the Spanish Archives," which runs to fifty pages and contains in chronological order items dating from *circa* A. D. 1280 to *circa* 1843.

A great number of the calendared items present an immediate challenge to research for a scholarly article or book. Titles and topics are plentiful for a wide variety of interested students: of ethnology, linguistics , administration, missions, trade, ecclesiastical history, colonialism, international relations, education, agriculture, and native customs. The book is beautifully printed and concludes its two hundred and fifty-nine pages with a fine index. It may be acquired from the Newberry Library for the reasonable sum of six dollars.

* * * *

Probably the most scholarly, native American historian of colonial times was Francisco Javier Alegre. Born in 1729 in Vera Cruz,

Mexico, and educated in the Jesuit schools there, he entered the Company of Jesus in 1747, and was ordained priest in 1754. After some years of writing and teaching in Yucatan he was assigned the task of producing a history of the Jesuits in New Spain in 1764. He had collected his materials and had prepared a first draft of the work when without warning on June 25, 1767, he and the other Jesuits were arrested and exiled from the Spanish possessions. He arrived in Bologna in 1768, and there until his death in 1788 he wrote his manuscript history. One of the several copies of this was published in three volumes in Mexico City in 1841–1842 by Carlos Maria de Bustamente. Despite its deficiencies in editing and printing it has been of great value to civil and Church historians as well as to anthropologists and geographers.

The first volume of a much needed new edition is now at hand: *Historia de la Provincia de la Compañía de Jesús en Nueva España,* Tomo I, Libros 1–3 (Años 1566–1596), Nueva Edición por Ernest J. Burrus, S.J., y Felix Zubillaga, S.J., Vol. IX of the Bibliotheca Instituti Historici Societatis Jesu, Rome, 1956. The work is very capably done by two veteran historians of the Jesuits and remarkably well printed. The authorities and documents used by Alegre are amply cited in footnotes, where too will be found disputed points and references to other documents not available to the exiled scholar. In an appendix of nearly a hundred pages there are twenty-two documents amplifying or explaining the 430 pages of the Historia covering the first thirty years of the activities of the Jesuits in North America. There is a bibliography of seventeen pages, an introduction of forty pages including a biographical sketch of Alegre, a description of his sources, and some citations from scholars of the esteem in which they held Alegre's work. A calendar list of the forty other works of the humanist and historian and an excellent index complete the 640 pages of this welcome volume.

* * * *

The Minnesota Historical Society in November of last year, the eve of the State Centennial, published a revised reprint edition of the first volume of William Watts Folwell's four volume *A History of Minnesota.* The set, completed between 1921 and 1929, has been treasured by scholars and constantly used by students of Minnesota history, but, while copies of the last three volumes are

still available, this first volume has long been out of print and classified as a collector's item. Folwell was eighty-eight years of age in 1921 when the first volume came from the press and he died four years short of a hundred when the last volume went to press. One of his many outstanding public services was his presidential term at the University of Minnesota from its beginnings in 1869 to 1884. His achievements are briefly recounted by Russell W. Fridley in the introduction.

The present edition is designed to keep the style and findings of Folmer as they were in the original text, even though many new materials have been found during the past thirty-five years and much research has been done on Minnesota from pre-statehood times to 1857, the period of the book. Mr. Fridley says in his introduction: "No attempt has been made to incorporate newly discovered sources or to bring Folwell's interpretations up to date in the light of subsequent research. Only minor errors have been corrected, and new maps and illustrations have been added." Scholars will be inclined to agree that substantially the findings of Folwell are still accurate. All but the rare book dealers will be happy over the availability of this new printing and the modest list price of six dollars and a half.

* * * *

One would have to be omniscient as regards literature of the world to pass competent judgment on the *Treasury of World Literature,* edited by Dagobert D. Runes and published in 1956 by Philosophical Library, New York. The huge tome of 1,450 pages, whose list price is $15, has selections from poems, essays, dramas, novels, and orations of almost every people ancient and modern, each translated into English.

Rapid perusal of the contents reveals the natural defects and merits of such a vast compilation. There seems to be an overabundance of "snippings" which leave one unsatisfied by reason of their incompleteness; the presence of too many old "favorites" leaves one wondering why his own "favorites" were not chosen; there is many times a lack of sufficient explanation or explication; there appears to be a stress on scenes of violence and love; Hebrew figures in literature and oriental thinkers receive more prominence than is customary in anthologies. The merits of the collection are the great variety, the rareness or uniqueness of some selections, the useful-

ness as a guide to unheard of authors, and the availability of an armchair or bedside book for a few moments of reading.

* * * *

A newsletter written in German prior to 1506 describing the sea route from Lisbon to Calicut was printed in Germany a year or so after 1506. It was reprinted with some verbal changes by a second German press in 1508. Five copies of the two printings exist at present. One of the earlier is in the James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota Library. This was selected for publication in 1956 and now appears in the handsome little volume, *From Lisbon to Calicut*. The contents are a six page Commentary by John Parker, Curator of the James Ford Bell Collection; a Facsimile of the six page German letter in green type; the five page Translator's Note of Alvin E. Prottengeier in five pages; the Translation in six pages, and six pages of Notes and Bibliography. The unknown German writer, gathering jottings of information in Lisbon, evidently reported accurately what he had heard without distinguishing the true from the false. The book has value as one of a thousand new copies of the old letter and as an illustration of excellent format and typesetting. One of the copies now may become a library treasure for five dollars.

* * * *

To our knowledge the most complete study of the land, the people, and the resources of any state of the Union in *Virginia at Mid-Century,* published in 1955 by Henry Holt and Company. The author is Jean Gottmann of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, who is the French geographer noted for similar studies of European countries. In the 584 pages are to be found seventy maps, charts, and graphs besides the hundred pictures illustrating every kind of human activity in Virginia. Gottmann gathered his material by detailed studies of each county and city and of the farming, industrial, white-collar, and professional residents thereof. He has assessed the value and the potentialities of the great state in detail and has done so to the extent of making a living personality of Virginia. He has laid out a program by his critical evaluation whereby the people and their legislators can develop that personality

to its highest economic and cultural stature. His work is well planned and well carried out.

* * * *

The compact little *Chicago History,* published quarterly by the Chicago Historical Society, and edited, or better, written by Paul M. Angle, devoted its Fall, 1956, number to "Chicago in 1856." In choice pictures and prose Mr. Angle described the political, social, economic, commercial and cultural aspects of the fast growing city. This article concluded the centennial series printed in the three preceding numbers: "The World in 1856," "The United States in 1856," and "Illinois in 1856," all in all an informal but interesting volume.

* * * *

The William and Mary Quarterly for October, 1956, is quite noteworthy in that its one hundred fifty pages contains a symposium on the "History of Science" during the colonial period. The titles of the articles and documents indicate the coverage of the American scientific scene prior to 1776. "Cadwallader Colden's Extension of the Newtonian Principles," by Brooke Hindle, considers Colden's "audacious claim" that he "had discovered the cause of gravitation." Professor Genevieve Miller writes: "Smallpox Inoculation in England and America: A Reappraisal." Denis I. Duveen collaborates with Herbert S. Klickstein on "The 'American' Edition of Lavoisier's *L'art de fabriquer le salin et la potasse.*" Harry Woolfe has "British Preparations for Observing the Transit of Venus of 1761." Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., edits "Nicholas Collin's Appeal to American Scientists" as expressed in "An Essay on Those Inquiries in Natural Philosophy, Which at Present are the Most Beneficial to the United States of America." And finally there is "Astrology in Colonial America: An Extended Query," by William D. Stahlman.

* * * *

Charles McKew Parr's *So Noble a Captain, The Life and Times of Ferdinand Magellan,* appeared in 1953 and was received with wide acclaim by a score of reviewers in popular and scholarly periodicals. It has now been translated into Spanish by Don José Alberich Sotomayor and published in Madrid by Editorial Sapientia.

Commended for its historical objectivity, documentation even in minute details, and for its pleasant and easy narrative style, the translation, *Magallanes, Un noble Capitán,* may be considered as useful from another viewpoint, namely, for reading purposes in Spanish language and literature classes of the college level. The translation made with such care and literary grace by Alberich Sotomayor adds a pedagogical value to the work. This is not to say that it should be studied by students through an entire semester, but rather that it can be used for purposes of outside or additional reading, while some of the technical passages can be used as models of translation from one language to another. For the translator has conveyed the author's thought accurately in a simple style with a limited vocabulary and syntactical clarity, eschewing excessively technical vocables. Added to this, the book is so constructed that the action develops in a background of high adventure and ominous commercial and political intrigues, which so affect the destiny of the great explorer that in his tragic death one can see a climax analogous to that found in heroic tragedies. The narrative is one from real life and would have for students more value than the correlative readings generally chosen from fiction. All in all we have in this book, or in selected chapters from it, material calculated to interest, to educate, to instruct the reader by increasing his knowledge of the Spanish language while at the same time adding to his comprehension of the historical aspects of the great age of discovery and colonization.—Jaroslaw Flys, Department of Spanish, Loyola University.

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The Bishop of Natchez and the Confederate Chaplaincy

The conflict of 1861–1865 created a need for services from the churches of the Confederacy which they found difficult to render throughout the period of the war. The machinery of the denominations was geared for peace time ministration to the faithful settled in established and usually permanent congregations. Consequently, when large numbers of men were assembled in armies and camps, the problem of providing spiritual guidance to both became almost insoluble for Protestant and Catholics alike.

An almost continuous demand for Catholic chaplains was a source of anxiety to William Henry Elder, Bishop of Natchez, whose diocese consisted of the entire state of Mississippi.[1] From the beginning of the war until the Federal occupation of his episcopal city, Elder strove mightily to provide spiritual guidance to the military forces. Even though he was responsible for serving fifteen churches and twenty-eight preaching stations with only a slender force of sixteen diocesan priests, Elder at the outbreak of hostilities permitted two of them to accompany the departing troops.[2]

1 William Henry Elder (1819–1904) was born in Baltimore, Maryland, and educated at Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland, and Urban College, Rome. Ordained to the priesthood in 1846, he returned to and was successively professor and president of Mount Saint Mary's. He was appointed Bishop of Natchez in 1857 and was consecrated to that office in the Baltimore cathedral. Twenty-three years later he was transferred to Cincinnati where he became coadjutor to his old friend Archbishop John Purcell with the right of succession. Upon the death of Purcell in 1883, Elder became Archbishop of Cincinnati. The period of his episcopacy in Natchez is fully covered in Richard O. Gerow, *Cradle Days of St. Mary's*, Natchez, 1941, 133–196.

2 *Metropolitan Catholic Almanac and Laity's Directory, for the United States, Canada, and the British Provinces, 1861*, Baltimore, 1861, 118. As far as can be gathered from the *Almanac* there were approximately 278 priests in the Confederate dioceses at the outbreak of the war. The

Later in 1861, the priest at Jackson, Mississippi, was granted a commission as chaplain with the consent of the bishop. Despite this drain on his manpower, when Elder went to New Orleans in December, 1861, to assist at the dedication of a new church, Archbishop John Mary Odin spoke with him about sending a chaplain to a Louisiana regiment. Upon his return home, Elder found a letter lamenting the lack of a Catholic chaplain in the 18th Mississippi Regiment and requesting a priest. His unhesitating reply to his importuner was "I wrote immediately to Bishop [John] McGill of Richmond & if it is he cannot send one I shall in the meanwhile make arrangements to let one of our Priests go."[3]

Subsequent reports of the lack of priests among the troops of Manassas caused Elder to take counsel with John Quinlan, Bishop of Mobile.

> My conscience has been uneasy lately about our Soldiers. In December I wrote as I promised to Bishop McGill to make some inquiries about Chaplains. From his answer I concluded that a Chaplain would have little to do because he told me the Soldiers [*sic*] has no care to make use of his services. Consequently I took no further steps. But after all it semes to me, that the soldiers of our respective Dioceses being an important part of our flocks we ought to follow them with our solicitude & make at least all reasonable exertions to bring them to the practice of their religion. Are we obliged to wait till they ask for Chaplains? Is it not better for us to enquire into their needs if they are indifferent that very indifference is a thing that ought to awake our compassion & call forth our exertions to remove it. It is frightful to read some of the letters from camp & see how wickedness, godlessness & immorality must be prevailing. Besides the number of souls lost in battle & sickness what will be the situation of the

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Dioceses of Richmond, Savannah, Wheeling, Charleston, New Orleans, Galveston, Little Rock, Mobile, Natchez, Natchitoches, and Nashville, and the Vicariate Apostolic of Florida, had various ways of listing the priests, some indicating the number of diocesan and religious clergy, some including all under the general term "clergymen." At least forty belonged to religious orders and thus were not available for appointment by the bishop for chaplain service. Some were from the North and from foreign lands. Seventy-eight are listed as "on the missions," presumably not available. From 1861 to 1866 the *Almanacs* have no data on these dioceses, except for Natchez.

[3] Elder to Father Francis Pont, May 17, 1861, Elder Letterbook, Number VI, 236; Elder to Mr. John E. Elliott, December 10, 1861, Elder Letterbook, Number VII, 237. The Elder Letterbooks are letter press copies preserved in the Archives of the Diocese of Natchez. Many pages are torn out but fragments remain and it is possible to determine to whom addressed from the index which Elder carefully kept in the front of each volume. Unless otherwise indicated all citations are from the Elder Letterbooks which will be referred to by Roman numerals with Arabic numerals indicating pages therein. Permission to use these materials was graciously granted by His Excellency the Most Reverend Richard O. Gerow, Bishop of Natchez.

country after the war if the great body of our young men come home hardened & demoralized?[4]

For these reasons, the bishop continued, he was inclined to sacrifice some of the blessings of religion on the home front for the sake of those poor soldiers. Accordingly he sent one of his priests to the Louisiana regiment as the Archbishop of New Orleans had begged him to do in December.

The policy followed by the Catholic prelates of waiting for specific calls for chaplains from the army appeared to Elder to be a mistake. "Is it not our place as Pastors to *follow* our flocks with our solicitude, to enquire into their wants, & to seek means to relieve them?" he wrote to Archbishop Odin.[5] He voiced the same thoughts to Patrick N. Lynch, Bishop of Charleston, when he queried "Ought not we ourselves to take measures to get commissions" as chaplains for the needed priests? "And is it not better to let congregations at home have only half their usual attendance—than to let so many hundreds of young men live & die in such exposure of their souls without help?"[6]

Yet, when Elder made application to the Richmond authorities for chaplains' commissions for his priests, they were not always forthcoming. In August, 1862, for example, he wrote to the Secretary of War for a commission for the Reverend John B. Mouton to serve the military hospitals located along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. When he had not heard from the application by October, General Albert Blanchard, a Catholic, advised him to write to Colonel Lucius B. Northrop, the Confederate Commissary General, also a Catholic. This Elder did on October 21, but as late as November 19, he still had received no answer.[7]

Bishop McGill's statement to the effect that a Catholic chaplain would find little to do not only puzzled but very naturally worried Elder. Judging from the fact that his two priests at Columbus, Mississippi, were continually occupied, he concluded that the difference was in the conduct of the individual chaplains. "If the Priest waited to be called for, indifference & human respect will keep men away. But if he be a zealous shepherd he will look on this indifference as the very matter to be remedied & he will be

4 Elder to Quinlan, February 26, 1862, VII, 326.
5 Fragment, Elder to Odin, Between February 28 and March 5, 1862, VII, 319.
6 Elder to Lynch, March 1, 1862, VII, 340.
7 Elder to McGill, October 17, 1862, VIII, 114; Elder to Northrup, October 21, 1862, VIII, 120; Ibid., November 12, 1862, VIII, 160; Elder to Bishop Augustus Martin, November 19, 1862, VIII, 166.

diligent in going about to hunt up Catholics & bring to them their duty & thus he will have work enough."[8] Elder's own experience in visiting the hospitals contradicted the Bishop of Richmond's statement. When he spoke to soldiers about confession, "some would express at once their willingness or even desire to make it. Others would make some faint excuses for a little while but almost invariably they would yield to a few words of advice."[9]

Elder attacked the problem of providing chaplains for the armed forces at all levels. When the Confederate Congress in May of 1861, was discussing the appointment of chaplains to the Navy, the method proposed was that used in the Federal Navy. Under this system a chaplain was appointed without regard for the beliefs or wishes of the men he was to serve. Elder deplored this method for "perhaps not one man in fifty believed in his teachings or cared for his prayers—& not a few of them found his service a burden to their consciences." In order that the Catholic seamen would not be ignored or subjected to persecution in the matter of religious service, Elder felt that if the old system of appointing one chaplain to a ship was retained "then they ought certainly to take one who is most agreeable—not to the President—not to the officers—but to the majority of souls on board."[10]

It was the bishop's opinion that it would accord more with American republican institutions "if the appointing of Chaplains & the number & choice of the individuals were made dependent on the *voluntary* system with the government doing something for their encouragement." In a letter to the Bishop of Charleston Elder further outlined his plan.

> Let Government assign a certain portion which [it] would pay to the Chaplain—say one half or one fourth of what he should reasonably expect & let the men if they choose make up the complement for one agreeable to themselves. If they have not religion enough to do this—the govt. will be saved the expense of providing religious service which is not wanted by those interested.—And if the men on one ship be divided in sentiments—each body has religion enough to furnish the complement for a separate clergyman pleasing to themselves—let them have the advantage of two or even three Clergymen. It is a novelty but that is no objection. All progress is novelty. If inconveniences are anticipated a little foresight followed by a little experience will easily devise arrangements & regulations which will remedy affairs.[11]

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[8] Elder to Lynch, March 1, 1862, VII, 340.
[9] Elder to McGill, August 4, 1862, VIII, 10.
[10] Elder to Father Napoleon Perche, May 9, 1861, VI, 211.
[11] Elder to Lynch, May 9, 1861, Archives of the Diocese of Charleston, Envelope 126. This letter is missing from the Elder letterbooks at Natchez.

Supplying food and clothing to the soldiers and paying salaries to the officers was an inconvenience to the government, continued the bishop, nevertheless, it was the duty of the government to provide for the welfare of those in its service. Thus, any objection that this system of providing chaplains would involve additional expense to the government should have no weight. "Men who give themselves wholly to the defence of their country—& are willing to give a portion of their pay—the price of their blood—to obtain the helps of religion—are certainly entitled to have their wants supplied."[12] Then too, Elder added, the same system could be applied to the army.

Thoroughly convinced of the practicability of this or a similar plan, Elder wrote to the other bishops, to the editor of the Catholic paper in New Orleans, and to the Natchez newspaper, urging a change from the old Federal system of appointment. To the Reverend Napoleon Perche, editor of the New Orleans *Propagateur Catholique,* who, he recognized, knew better than he how to obtain acknowledgement of the rights of conscience in the Navy, Elder recommended the use of every effort speedily. "Do not have any delicacy in writing to Bishops on the matter. The interests are too important & the matter too urgent to suffer scruples of delicacy," the Natchez prelate advised the clerical newsman.[13] In spite of such measures, nothing ever came to Elder's plan.

In 1862 the method by which chaplains were appointed to the army became a matter of grave concern to Elder. His experience in the hospitals had convinced him that one regiment was not enough to occupy a priest's full time. He, therefore, made inquiry of Generals Pierre G. T. Beauregard and Braxton Bragg as to their power to assign chaplains to a brigade or to a division. This power of assignment was not theirs, they advised him, but the appointment came from the War Department and the nomination was made by the officers of the regiment. Here again was the old Federal system which was unfair to the men, who were obviously at the mercy of their officers. Beauregard and Bragg encouraged Elder to make application for a change. Journeying to Mobile, Elder and Bishop Quinlan drew up a memorial to the Confederate Congress requesting that one Catholic priest always be appointed as chaplain to each division of the army. Their memorial was then sent to the Bishop of Richmond on August 4, who signed it and presented it. When a favorable response was not forthcoming,

12 *Ibid.*
13 Elder to Father Napoleon Perche, May 9, 1861, VI, 211.

Elder in October suggested to McGill that it might be well for him to press the matter of the memorial personally. "With such an amount of multifarious business as the officials of Richmond have on hand, it is very natural for them to forget or to lay aside anything which they are not especially urged to attend to."[14] In spite of this, no progress was ever made in the matter.

After the passage of the conscription law, amendments to it were proposed at every meeting of the Congress. Elder, with his dwindling supply of priests, was particularly fearful that a draft law applying indiscriminately to all men of the Confederacy would be passed. With this as a possibility, he felt that some interchange of ideas as to the proper course to be pursued should take place, so that the prelates of the South would show some unanimity of sentiment and uniformity of act. He did not believe, he wrote the Bishop of Richmond, that there was room "to question that it would be positively sinful for any Priest actually to engage in the soldier's life; & it seems to me that no grave reason like compulsion, imprisonment, or other punishment would be a sufficient [reason to] justify him in entering on it." If some officials were allowed discretionary power to exempt or detail some of the clergy most needed at home for ministerial duty, "would it be right for a Bishop or Priest to make application for such exemption or detail?" Elder was of the opinion that if the exemption was to be granted at the discretion of an officer in the nature of a gratuitous favor then the bishops should not allow application to be made by the priests and that it should be forbidden by censure if necessary.[15]

Elder's fears concerning conscription were never realized; for the fall of New Orleans and the subsequent occupation of Natchez by the Federal troops placed his priests beyond the reach of the Confederate conscript officers. With the coming of the enemy the problem of the Confederate chaplaincy also faded. Indeed, Elder now encountered problems of a more personal nature. In 1864 he was arrested by the Federal commander and exiled for a short period from his episcopal seat. Even so, as long as he had been able he had labored incessantly to provide the Catholics in the military service of the Confederate States of America with spiritual consolation.

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[14] Elder to McGill, August 4, 1862, VIII, 10; Elder to Bishop Augustus Martin, November 19, 1862, VIII, 166; Elder to McGill, October 17, 1862, VIII, 114.

[15] Elder to McGill, September 25, 1862, VIII, 94.

American Liberalism: Its Meaning and Consistency

I

Since roughly the turn of this century, a great political argument has been raging in this country over the meaning of the term "liberalism" in the context of our society. This discussion began with the desertion of many conservatives from the party which nominated William Jennings Bryan in 1896; increased in intensity with the accession to power of Woodrow Wilson and his New Freedom policies in 1912; and reached an almost ludicrous peak in the era of the New Deal. At this writing the term is still in full debate.

Basically, this argument stems from the increasing role government (especially the Federal) has been playing in the United States since shortly before the turn of the century in attempting to regulate business growth and monopoly, curb property rights, and in general provide as much social security as possible for all its citizens. Such a role and such practices, it has been asserted, represent a distinct departure from the foundations of American greatness and, although pushed through to realization by the so-called liberal parties of the country, in reality represent a definite departure from that tradition and are therefore examples of false liberalism.

Thus in 1896 and 1912 when William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson respectively captured control of the Democracy, many prominent Democrats went over to the Republicans with the charges that the policies advocated by Bryan and in some measure put through by Wilson constituted a desertion of the party's principles and that the "real" Democracy of Cleveland and Jefferson was no more.[1] And when, in the 1930s, the New Deal became a reality, leading members of the Republican party solemnly met in conclave and cautioned Franklin Delano Roosevelt to "stop ignoring the principles of Thomas Jefferson."[2] In fact, as late as the 1952 National Convention of the Republican party the keynote

[1] H. S. Merrill, *Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West, 1865–1896,* Baton Rouge, 1953, 273–274.

[2] Charles A. Beard, *Jefferson, Corporations, and the Constitution,* National Home Library Foundation, Washington, D. C., 1936, 35.

speaker, obviously aware of the honorific value of the term, spent some time trying to convince his audience that his and not the opposition's party was the true liberal party because it stood for the "essence" of liberalism, an antipathy to big government.[3]

Such an argument, of course, resolves itself ultimately into the question of the State in American society. Should it be positive as the liberals of today insist? Or should it be basically negative as the conservatives and/or the critics of "false" liberalism contend?

That it will be difficult to arrive at a simple answer to these questions will be readily admitted. But let us for the moment add yet another question to our list, a question that will be perhaps even more difficult to answer. Is it not just possible that neither side is correct in the above argument, that neither side is properly in the liberal tradition for the simple reason that it is a relative one and that the closest we can come to a definition of it is that recent pronouncement which weakly says that at best it "has been a series of departures from the past, led by men who represented the trends of their eras"?[4] Can we, in short, trace a *real* liberal tradition in this country and thus answer the above argument regarding who is today following that tradition? Or must we concede that today the term is meaningless?

Again we are confronted with a question that has, perhaps, no simple answer. But in all this darkness there is one ray of light. And that is the fact that with all the debating that has been going on between the various proponents of this or that liberalism in the last sixty years, one thing is true: *both* sides agree that the prototype of all American liberals was Thomas Jefferson and that it will be adherence to or deviation from his principles that will most surely mark one as a true believer or heretic of the American liberal faith. With this, then, as perhaps the only starting point of agreement between our two opposing camps, it should be possible to answer the

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[3] General Douglas MacArthur at Chicago. For the full text of this speech see *U. S. News & World Report*, July 18, 1952, 88–92. These same sentiments can be found currently in such periodicals as *The Freeman* and such weekly newsletters as *Human Events*. The latter in its February 2, 1957, issue evidences this theory very well when it prints with obvious approval excerpts from a letter from former Senator Joseph H. Ball (Minnesota) who says in part: "*Human Events* does a first-class job of reflecting the conservative viewpoint on national affairs which coincides in most respects with the classical 'liberal' viewpoint. The great majority of our press today has swallowed without question the pseudo-'liberal' philosophy which dominates our national politics, and which unfortunately has far more in common with totalitarianism than with individual liberty." See *Human Events*, Vol. XIV, No. 5.

[4] J. C. Long, *The Liberal Presidents*, New York, 1948, 7.

above questions by examining once again the principles and actions of Jefferson in the attempt to determine who is and who is not in his tradition and whether adherence to his principles (if any such adherence exists) can justify our declaring that there has been and is a consistent American liberal tradition which is operative today.

II

If Thomas Jefferson is to be the norm for discovering who is today in or out of the American liberal tradition, it would seem, on the surface at least, that the critics of the so-called "false" liberalism seem to have the better of the argument. For any decently equipped schoolboy knows, or has been told, that Jefferson stood for states' rights, for strict construction of the Constitution, and, above all, for *laissez faire*. These are certainly today the property of the conservatives and not the so-called liberals. Moreover, it would be intellectual suicide to deny that Jefferson is the great American individualist *par excellence*. And individualism, especially of the "rugged" variety, can hardly be said to have been the rallying cry of the liberals of the past sixty years.

On the other hand, how can the followers of Bryan, Wilson, and Roosevelt be censured for themselves claiming to have been in the straight and narrow tradition of Jefferson when, to cite just one of his standard biographers, Charles M. Wiltse, can, after an exhaustive study of that liberal's thought and actions, conclude that "his [Jefferson's] most characteristic position was nearer to social utilitarianism than to the individualism with which his name is most apt to be associated"?[5] In the light of this analysis, surely the advocates of the policies of Populism, the New Freedom, and the New Deal can hardly be blamed for claiming the mantle of the great man for themselves.

The key to this riddle, it would seem, lies in the fact that Jefferson was indeed an individualist—but that there is individualism and individualism. It will only be after critically separating the various theories of individualism and the State extant in the eighteenth century that we will be able to arrive at a correct analysis of Jefferson and the nature of his individualism.

Now the touchstone of individualism in the United States has been consistently an advocacy of natural rights. It should never

[5] Charles M. Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy*, Chapel Hill, 1935, 177.

be forgotten that the emphasis upon natural rights rather than the natural law came into being in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries precisely at the time the middle classes were coming into their own with a vengeance, were replacing a corporate society with an individualistic one, and were consequently putting emphasis upon rights of man as *man* rather than rights by status.[6]

Moreover, by emphasizing "rights" rather than law, the entrepreneurs were setting up an antagonism between man and the State which not only had not existed in such sharp focus before, but which, because the entrepreneurs demanded as much freedom of movement and possession as possible, relegated government to the position of being at best a negative entity, the sole purpose of which was to protect the rights of man, property especially. Indeed, it has been remarked that for John Locke, whose formula of natural rights became the classic in England and America, the treatment he gives to government and law is actually incidental to his treatment of the natural right of property.[7] And this is so, not only because his most famous work was avowedly a justification of the triumph of the landed gentry in 1688, but also because Locke breaks radically with the whole common good concept of the medieval period and concentrates on the individual good.

According to Locke, man, although having social qualities, is not basically a social and political animal in the Aristotelian-Thomis-

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[6] John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, New York, 1950, 97: "Throughout the Middle Ages the reign of law was directed primarily to the preservation of the *status quo* but with the seventeenth century the end of law was conceived more and more in terms of enabling individuals to *do* things and possess things.... Although there was some idea of rights peculiar to corporations and groups in the Middle Ages, the idea of natural rights peculiar to individuals first emerged as a definite concept in the seventeenth century and Grotius was one of the first to define them. These rights which are recognized by natural law and demonstrable by reason belong to individuals by virtue of their humanity—they are qualities inherent in persons and since they belong to an individual because of his nature as a human being they are called 'natural rights'." See also J. Salwyn Shapiro, *Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism*, New York, 1949, 9–10; Harold J. Laski, *The Rise of Liberalism: The Philosophy of a Business Civilization*, New York, 1936.

[7] Paschal Larkin, *Property in the Eighteenth Century: With Special Reference to England and Locke*, London, 1930, 65: "His main object was to insist on the individuals' right to property as against the arbitrary interference of the State and probably that prevented him from recognizing more explicitly than he does that private property is a social function as well as an individual right. He nowhere puts the responsibility which should accompany ownership on the same plane as the right to private property itself. He does not, like some previous writers, distinguish between the right to property in general and the right to specific pieces or forms of property. One might almost say that he tends to confuse the fact of private property with the right to private property."

tic sense. He is an atom, living originally in a state of nature and possessed of certain natural rights, all of which are absolute and presocial and prepolitical in nature and origin. Government and society are artificial entities and the only reason men enter society and set up a government, insofar as Locke never explains adequately why man has to leave a state which is supposedly natural to him, is to make sure that these absolute presocial and prepolitical rights are more secure. Thus a government is created which can only protect, not curb, these rights. And this is especially true of property, the social consequences notwithstanding.[8]

In the light of this doctrine, it is rather easy to see why the natural rights, argument was, if the pun is pardoned, so natural for the individualists to rely upon. For this argument not only justified the overthrowing of the *ancien regime* to make way for the setting up of an individualistic society, but it had inherent in it from the premises by which it was formulated, a justification for unrestrained individualism as regards property within the society so set up.[9]

Now Jefferson was probably the most famous exponent of natural rights in this country. Moreover, Jefferson was at one with the middle classes in their advocacy of natural rights for the purpose of setting up and making secure an individualistic society in place of the *ancien regime*. In this respect, all Americans, precisely because they were Americans, were in agreement. For as early as the middle of the eighteenth century, if not before, America was definitely showing signs of having thrown off any of the half-hearted attempts to make it feudalistic and was evolving into what it has remained, a country with a middle class, individualistic society.

Yet it is one thing to say that because Jefferson stood for natural rights, he stood for an individualistic society. This is quite true; but it is quite another thing to say that because he stood for natural rights he stood for unrestrained individualism within the context of that type of society. This is quite false.

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[8] *Ibid.*, 78–79: "He never includes in a description of the contract any limitation to the defense of property.... The net result, however, of his vacillating attitude was that a theory of property rights based on the legal *status quo* of his day tended to be substituted for one which traced the justification of property to its origins in human needs and human labor. In other words, the State's sanction could be regarded as a sufficient justification of large fortunes no matter by what means acquired."

[9] Robert G. McCloskey, *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise*, Harvard Political Studies, Cambridge, 1951, 6: "But whatever his intentions may have been, Locke's expression of it was ambiguous; and the practical effect of his thought was undoubtedly to justify not only the Glorious Revolution, but Western Capitalism."

For the unrestrained individualism which has been a feature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in both England and America has come primarily from the Lockean natural rights concept of property as an absolute natural presocial and prepolitical right.[10] It is this concept which relegated government to the sole and negative role of seeing that property rights were protected and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.

Yet this is *not,* according to either Jefferson himself or his most prominent biographers and commentators, Jefferson's concept of property or, consequently, of the role of the state regrading property. According to Jefferson, property *is* a natural right. That is, Jefferson held

> . . . that a right to property is founded in our natural wants, in the means with which we are endowed to satisfy these wants, and the right to what we acquire by those means without violating the similar rights of other sensible beings.[11]

However, for Jefferson, this right to property is not, as for Locke, a prepolitical right, a right anterior to society. It is a civil right, a right flowing from society. For in looking at Jefferson's view of natural rights and their division it is found that:

> Of the first kind are the rights of thinking, speaking, forming and giving opinions, and perhaps all those which can be fully exercised by the individual without the aid of exterior assistance—or in other words, rights of personal competency. Of the second kind are those of personal protection of acquiring and possessing property, in the exercise of which the individual natural power is less than the natural right.[12]

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[10] *Ibid.,* 9; "For American philistines from 1776 onward and with increasing consistency 'liberty' was translated as the freedom to engage in economic enterprise, while the more basic and humane significance of the term was gradually submerged. And by 1876, when Field invoked the Declaration of Independence in his defense of property rights, democratic credo was no longer recognizable; it had been like Hegel's dialectic, turned upside down." See also Merle Curti, "The Great Mr. Locke; America's Philosopher," *Huntington Library Bulletin,* No. 11, April, 1937; Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought,* New York, 1940, chap. xviii; Chester M. Destler, "The Opposition of American Businessmen to Social Control During the 'Gilded Age'," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXXIX (March, 1953).

[11] Thomas Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* eds. A. A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, 20 vols., Washington, D. C., 1903, XIV, 487.

[12] This statement was originally attributed to Jefferson by Gilbert Chinard in his biography *Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of Americanism,* Boston, 1929, 80–81, but it is now conceded that it was written by Thomas Paine after consultation with Jefferson. In any case, Jefferson in a letter to Monroe agreed that he "professed the same principles." *Writings,* VIII, 207. For comments on this division of rights see Chinard, 79–85, 233; Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition,* 72–74, 136–144; and Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man,* Boston, 1951, 225.

Why is not property for Jefferson a presocial and prepolitical right in the same sense as for Locke? Simply because, strictly speaking, there are for Jefferson no presocial and prepolitical rights since man is basically a political and social animal.[13] As such, man has natural rights, rights which the government cannot touch, such as the personal and political rights of religion and of expression; but because man is by nature a political and social animal and because by natural law the earth is given to all men, the right to and of this property is put in the category of a civil right since man requires the aid of society to help him acquire as well as secure his share to this right. As Koch sums this up:

> This distinction between natural and civil rights is basic in Jefferson's philosophy. Essential freedoms are personal and political. Inextricably connected with Jefferson's principle is his thesis that all men have a natural right to a share of the earth that with proper cultivation would take care of primary needs. This principle enables Jefferson to criticize specific laws of landed property, where these pervert natural rights.[14]

Jefferson himself confirmed this interpretation of his views on property in 1813 when, speaking specifically on the property rights of inventors, but broadening his discussion to the general laws of property, he said:

> It has been pretended by some, (and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions, and not merely for their own lives, but inheritable to their heirs. But while it is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature at all, it would be singular to admit a natural and even hereditary right to inventors. It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the subject, that no individual has, of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for instance. By an universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all men equally and in common, is the property for the moment of him who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the occupation, the property goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law and is given late in the progress of society.[15]

Now how does this analysis of Jefferson's concept of property affect our problem? What, in other words, does this tell us of Jefferson's views on the role of the state in an individualistic society?

Jefferson himself best summed up the answers to this question in a letter to James Madison's cousin in 1785. As he said then:

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[13] Adrienne Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 147; also Wiltse, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[14] Adrienne Koch, *Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration*, New York, 1950, 64–65.

[15] Jefferson, *Writings*, VIII, 333.

I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable, but the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, *legislators cannot invent too many devices for subdividing property,* only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind. The descent of property of every kind, therefore, to all the children or to all the brothers and sisters or other relatives in equal degree is a politic measure and a practicable one. Another means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise. Whenever there are in any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the *laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right.* The earth is given as a common stock for man to labor and live on. If for the encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we must take care that other employment be provided for those excluded from the appropriation. If we do not, the fundamental right to labor the earth returns to the unemployed. It is too soon yet in our country to say that every man who cannot find employment but can find uncultivated land shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a moderate rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land. The small landholders are the most precious part of the state.[16]

Thus for Jefferson, unlike Locke, the state in regard to property has a positive duty. It does not come into existence merely to protect rights, especially those of property. It also has the duty to see that the right *to* property is observed. In short, Locke emphasizes property rights and ends up with a negative state, boosting individualism. Jefferson emphasizes the right to property and ends up with a stage which is somewhat positive, curbing individualism.

Nor is it surprising that Jeffersonian Democracy emerges embodying a concept of the State and the role of government which is not wholly negative. And why? Simply because Jefferson, unlike Locke, did not hold that man was a presocial and prepolitical atom, living originally in a state of nature, but was basically a political and social animal. He and his colleagues may have taken Locke to heart for his "consent of the governed" and "right of revolution" theories, but, as recent scholarship has confirmed, John Locke was by no means the only author on natural law read by the colonists. In fact, it seems fair to conclude that, before the Revolution, most of the learned men of the colonies were ingrained with a theory of natural law which in certain respects had the essentials of the Aristotelian-Thomistic position and most certainly regarded man as

16 *Ibid.*, XIX, 17–18. My italics.

essentially a social and political animal, subject to natural law as well as natural right.[17]

In the light of this, it is then not surprising that Jefferson's concept of the state should be somewhat along the lines of a positive one. For the real break in the political tradition of the West came, as we have seen, as a result of the individualistic emphasis upon natural right rather than natural law. Yet Jeffersonian theory, though couched occasionally in terms of natural rights is, upon close examination, actually much closer to natural-law than natural-right concepts.[18] Indeed it might almost be said that Jefferson merely transfers the natural law of the medieval period into the period of an individualistic society and couches it in the languages of the latter! Certainly this is true as regards his key doctrine of property. For as Koch sums that up:

> The first application of the principle established that specific property rights are civil and not natural rights. The earth is made for the use of the living by natural law, but specific lands are owned by the living only in virtue of the laws of society. The portion of the earth occupied by any man ceases to be with his death and reverts to society.[19]

And St. Thomas Aquinas says this:

> The common possession of things is to be attributed to natural law, not in the sense that natural law decrees that all things are to be held in common and that there is to be no private possession, but in the sense that there is no distinction of property on grounds of natural law but only by human agreement; and this pertains to positive law as we have already shown. Thus private property is not opposed to natural law, but is an addition to it devised by the human reason.[20]

Moreover, Jeffersonian theory exhibits no inflexibility as regards natural rights. Jefferson himself insisted that "man can have no rights in opposition to his social duties," that is, to the common

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[17] See for instance, Ray Forrest Harvey, *Jean Jacques Burlamaqui: A Liberal Tradition in American Constitutionalism,* Chapel Hill, 1937, chaps. iv, v. Also B. F. Wright, *American Interpretations of Natural Law* Cambridge, 1931; May G. O'Donnell, *James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive Law,* New York, 1937. For Wilson's arguments that property was not the sole object of government see Max Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,* rev. ed., New Haven, 1937, I, 605–606.

[18] Koch remarks that Jefferson speaks rarely of social contract but does speak often of natural law; Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,* 110.

[19] *Ibid.,* 64.

[20] A. P. D'Entreves (ed), *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings,* Oxford, 1948, 169.

good.[21] And whenever circumstances demand it, natural law—in true medieval fashion—takes precedence over individual rights for the common good. Koch thus summarizes the precedence:

> Whenever the interpretation of natural law weighs heavily on the side of justice, the cleavage between a theory of natural law and natural right disappears. It is for this reason that Jefferson is able to maintain that he is "convinced that man has no natural rights in opposition to his social duties." The law of nature and nations is thus part of moral philosophy, just as the theory of rights is, only not so fully.[22]

Still this tendency of Jefferson (and the people who supported him) to lean toward natural law and the curbing of individualism rather than to natural rights and the boosting of individualism does not mean that Jefferson and his colleagues believed in a completely positive or paternalistic state. Indeed, just the opposite is true. For as staunch members and advocates of an individualistic society and its political counterpart—republican government—their key doctrine revolved about the requisite of as broad a distribution of private property as possible, not only because the dignity of man demands it and because he has a natural right to it, but because a wide distribution of property was necessary to divide wealth and thus power, ensuring as a consequence the maintenance of republican government.[23] Jefferson and his colleagues were certainly realists who saw that political democracy could endure only as long as it was built on a sound base of economic democracy.[24] It was no doubt

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21 Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition,* 177: "Jefferson saw nothing incongrous, however, in asserting that men have no rights in opposition to their social duties, a point which he makes in one form or another so frequently that it cannot be discounted as a passing whim."

22 Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,* 146.

23 That the pre-Civil War Jeffersonian and Jacksonian liberals were quite conscious of the economic basis of republicanism and were not—as is sometimes held—interested only in political liberalism is now becoming more and more to be accepted. See, for instance, Charles A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy,* New York, 1915; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson,* Boston, 1945. For the thesis of James Harrington that "power follows wealth" and that the complexion of government in any state will be determined by the distribution of its wealth, see H. F. Russell-Smith, *Harrington and His Oceana,* Cambridge, 1914. For Harrington's influence on the Jeffersonians see Eugene T. Mudge, *The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of Caroline,* New York, 1939, 95, 166, 275; Louis Hartz, "American Political Thought and the American Revolution," *American Political Science Review,* XLVI (June, 1952), 341–342. The thesis that Jefferson's predilection for the small farmer stemmed from an idealistic physiocratic doctrine rather than a more realistic attachment for them as small property holders has been seriously challenged in Richard Hofstadter, "Parrington and the Jeffersonian Tradition," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* II (1941), 391–400.

24 See Eugene P. Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790–1800,* New York, 1942, 119; also Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,* 175.

ideas such as these which prompted a later Jeffersonian Democrat, Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, to appraise and advocate as the "true policy" of the party not the superficial principles of "states' rights" or "local self-government" but policy having for its end:

> . . . to build up the middle class; to sustain the villages, to populate the rural districts, and to let the power of the government remain with the middle class! I want no miserable city rabble on the one hand. I want no pampered, bloated, corrupted aristocracy on the other.[25]

III

On the one hand, therefore, Jeffersonian Democracy stands for positive government and on the other for as much individualism as possible,[26] not a regulated individualism, but an individualism designed precisely to make people as independent as possible.

What we see, therefore, emerging from this analysis of Jefferson is neither a completely positive state nor a completely negative one, but what the writer—for want of a better term—has chosen to call the positive-negative state. And what is the positive-negative state? It is a state which believes in as much individualism as possible and is, in this sense, basically negative. More, it is a state which feels also that it has the duty to step in and curb individualism when that individualism threatens to destroy *all* individualism and thus republicanism. In this latter sense, therefore, it is qualifiedly positive.[27] Or, to put it more concretely, it is a state which on the key doctrine of private property wants as much private ownership as possible, for this is the means to stable republican government, but also a state whose function and duty is, both from humanitarian and realistic political urgings, to curb unrestrained concentrations of property which threaten republicanism. It is, therefore, a state which strives to be as negative as possible and only positive in its efforts to restore conditions which will allow it to resume this basic role.

If in this sense it is necessary to characterize Jefferson's idea of the state as *laissez faire,* well and good. For who, after all, does not want as little government as *possible?* But this is a far cry from

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[25] Quoted in Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization,* New York, 1927, I, 676–677.

[26] Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition,* 214.

[27] *Ibid.,* 70–71.

the Lockean theory of property rights, the state, and individualism which the conservatives (erroneously invoking Jefferson's name) have clung to from the days of Hamilton.[28] As was said before, there is individualism and individualism.

In the light, then, of all of the above—using Jefferson as the norm, it is a little difficult to see how the conservatives of later days can legitimately describe the policies of Populism, the New Freedom, or the New Deal, all of which are now seemingly accepted by the controlling groups of both major parties, as policies of "false" liberalism advocated by "pseudo" liberals. Indeed, just the opposite seems to be true. For it has been these policies which, in an increasingly industrial America, have made it possible to avoid, in the words of Andrew Johnson, "a miserable city rabble" on the one hand and a "bloated, corrupted aristocracy" on the other. Moreover, we might add, that today they seem to have helped to avoid Communism, which feeds on imbalanced societies.

In doing this such policies have been in the best tradition of real, Jeffersonian liberalism. For as Wilson himself said in 1912:

> You know that one of the interesting things that Mr. Jefferson said in those early days of simplicity which marked the beginnings of our government was that the best government consisted in as little governing as possible. And there is still a sense in which that is true. It is still intolerable for the government to interfere with our individual activities *except where it is necessary to interfere with them in order to free them.* But I feel confident that if Jefferson were living in our day he would see what we see: that the individual is caught in a great confused nexus of all sorts of complicated circumstances, and that to let him alone is to leave him helpless as against the obstacles with which he has to contend; and that, therefore, law in our day must come to the assistance of the individual. It must come to his assistance to see that he gets fair play; that is all, but that is much.[29]

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[28] See Curti, "The Great Mr. Locke," 151 ff; Wright, *American Interpretations of Natural Law*, 175; and Francis G. Wilson, *The American Political Mind*, New York, 1949, 119.

[29] Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom*, New York, 1913, 283–284. My italics.

Towns of the Alabama Black Belt

The Black Belt of Alabama, as described officially by J. D. Pope and socially in other articles of this series, is the strip of prairie soil twenty-five miles and less in width that curves from the eastern part of the state through the western state line into Mississippi.[1] It is bordered on the north and south by the towns of Montgomery, Selma, Linden, Marion, Greensboro, Eutaw, Livingston, Camden, and Union Springs. The characteristic black soil is formed by the mixture of the soft limestone base rock with the humus of the surface in the counties of Sumter, Greene, Hale, Perry, Marengo, Dallas, Wilcox, Lowndes, Montgomery, and Bullock, but for purposes of this study the periphery of sandy, hillside, non-prairie lands is included. Black Belters like to think that the culture in the vicinity of the prairie is superior to that in the sandy lands due to the background of plantation "wealth and culture" which presumably existed there prior to the Civil War. Although Negroes far out-number the white people in the Black Belt, their preponderance does not constitute a basis for definition, since there are other sections of Alabama that also have heavy Negro population. The climate of the Black Belt is hot and the summers are long.

Although it was not invaded until late in the Civil War, the Federal armies that appeared there in 1865 and the general wartime drain upon its resources left the region in somewhat the same condition as other sections of the South. Consequently, the results of the war, the burdens of Reconstruction, and the effects of the depression of 1873 left much recovering to be done there at the time our study opens in 1875.

Black Belt communities ranged in size from small rural villages to the city of Montgomery, which in 1870 had a population of 10,588, a third that of Mobile.[2] In 1870 and 1880 the only towns of

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[1] J. D. Pope, "Types of Farming Areas," in Alabama State Department of Agriculture and Industries, *Agriculture in Alabama*, Montgomery, 1930, 53 ff. See also Glenn N. Sisk, "Social Aspects of the Alabama Black Belt, 1875–1917," MID-AMERICA, XXXVII (January, 1955), 31–47, and "Town Business in the Alabama Black Belt, 1875–1917," MID-AMERICA, XXXVIII (January, 1956), 47–56.

[2] Montgomery's population increased as follows: 1890: 21,883; 1900: 30,346; 1910: 38,136; 1920: 43,464; Alabama State Department of Archives and History, *Alabama Official and Statistical Register, 1903*, Montgomery, Alabama, 1903, 190–192, 303; *Ibid.*, 1923, 298 ff.

over 2,000 population were Montgomery, Selma, and Marion. Montgomery in 1880 had 16,713; Selma 7,529; and Marion 2,074. By census standards for urban population of 2,500 or more, only 7.3 per cent of Black Belt population could be so classed in 1880.[3] This percentage had risen to 19.1 by 1920, while that of the state was 21.7.[4] The small villages usually had a few hundred people or less, the county seat towns a few hundred to about two thousand. Selma reached 15,589, and Union Springs 4,125 in 1920. Demopolis was the largest non-county seat town with 2,779 in 1920.[5]

Of the larger towns there were two general types—the older ones which existed because they were trading centers for the surrounding plantation areas or because they were county seats, and the newer towns which because of some small industry or agricultural enterprise and the energy of their people were gaining population and a little prosperity. The latter type was likely to be found in the areas predominantly inhabited by white people rather than in the prairies. Towns like York, Moundville, Fort Deposit, and Akron were of the New South; they manifested an enterprise not characteristic of the older, more aristocratic communities of the prairie section. Livingston, Eutaw, Greensboro, Marion, Uniontown, Union Springs, Camden, Hayneville, Selma, and Montgomery were old Black Belt towns which prided themselves on their pasts and felt their superiority to the upstart communities of the sandy lands. This attitude persisted in Union Springs in spite of the fact that it acquired some industry.

Besides their function as rural trade centers and county seats, Black Belt towns had as one of their functions the furnishing of professional services to the townspeople and the farmers of surrounding areas. Lawyers, doctors, dentists, teachers, and ministers constituted the professional men and women of the average Black Belt town. Most of these groups are discussed elsewhere.

For fifteen or twenty years after the close of the Civil War enterprise and progress were scarce in the towns of the Black Belt. It was not until 1884, for instance, that there was a semblance of building of new stores or residences in Greensboro. "The sound

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[3] *Statistics of the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census, 1880,* Washington, D. C., 1883, 49 ff., cited hereafter as *Tenth Census, 1880.*

[4] *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920,* Washington, D. C., 1921, vol. I, Population, 1920, 150; cited hereafter as *Fourteenth Census, 1920.*

[5] *Alabama Official and Statistical Register, 1903,* 188 ff; *Ibid.,* 1923, 298 ff.

of the hammer and the saw had been unknown for nearly a quarter of a century."[6] Following 1884 a few structures were erected, houses were painted, and the nineties saw the erection of new brick store buildings in place of wooden ones.[7] Camden and Montgomery reported real estate, building, and repairing activity in 1880.[8] The general demoralization in Black Belt towns was observable in the lack of civic pride, the deterioration of streets and sidewalks, the disinclination to clean up garbage or trash, and the generally rundown condition of public facilities. By 1890, however, interest was manifested in new civic and business activities.[9]

Many small communities[10] dotted the map and served an integral purpose in the social and economic fabric of the countryside. Dozens of these places are listed in the *Alabama Gazetteer and Business Directory* of 1884–1885. Some were not listed in *Young's Directory* of 1910–1911, but most seemed to be holding up quite well at the latter date. According to the above-mentioned sources villages of less than a hundred to a few hundred had such businesses and services as general merchandise stores, druggists, blacksmiths, physicians, hotels, cotton gins, saw mills, grist mills, shoe-makers, justices of the peace, dentists, barbers, notaries public, schools, churches, butchers, lawyers, carpenters, undertakers, saloons, and livery stables. These communities were necessary to serve the local farm areas, and their contact with the outside world was measured by their nearness to a railroad station. Fortunate was the town which had the advantage of being a railroad station or even a river landing. It was these communities of a few hundred population that suffered or lost their reason for being when the boll weevil injured their economic base and good roads gave access by car to larger towns in the period after 1915.

The county seat was usually a center of trade as well as of legal matters for the county. Typically the courthouse of brick or cement, was the most prominent building in town. It stood in the center of a square or on the main street, surrounded by stores and other business houses, with residence streets leading out from the business

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6 W. E. W. Yerby, *History of Greensboro, Alabama, From Its Earliest Settlement,* Montgomery, 1908, 119.

7 *Ibid.,* pp. 119, 121, 122; *Alabama Beacon,* October 26, 1886; *Linden Reporter,* December 12, 1890.

8 *Montgomery Daily Advertiser,* January 6, September 16, 1880.

9 *Marion Standard,* August 6, October 22, 1890, January 25, 1894.

10 Like Tilden, Minter, Portland in Dallas County; Midway in Bullock; Pike Road, Pine Level, Mt. Meigs in Montgomery County; Havana, Newbern in Hale County; and Forkland in Greene County.

center. In these towns lived the merchants, lawyers, doctors, and planters who served or owned much of the surrounding plantation area. On Saturdays and at holiday seasons the colored farmers and their families crowded into these towns to spend their meager advances and mingle with their fellows on the streets, which they monopolized on these special occasions. Court week brought to the county seats a varied group of participants in the activities of the court. Many of these spent the night at the hotels, since the journey from distant points in the county was frequently long and arduous. Life was informal, gay, and leisurely for both whites and Negroes. The drug stores, courthouses, and other public places served as meeting points and social gathering centers for young and old, male and female, white and colored.

The types of homes ranged from the cabins of the Negroes through the modest one-story cottages typical of the small towns, to the large two-story homes, often in the colonial ante-bellum style with imposing "gallery" and white columns. The Black Belt followed the rest of the country in the late nineteenth century for "gingerbread" or American Gothic architecture. The homes built in this style were adorned with lattice-like banisters on the porches and stained glass windows; a cupola on one corner of the house gave a castle-like effect.[11]

In the early part of the period 1875–1917, each family in the small communities drew water from a private well in the back yard, and every man was certain he owned the best well in town.[12] Some were shallow and seepy, some were deep and pure. The well bucket tended to give way to pumps.[13] Artesian mineral wells were found at many points, among them Selma, Montgomery, and Livingston. These waters, containing iron, sulphur, magnesia, and common salt, gained a reputation as curative agents for dyspepsia and other stomach disorders.[14] However, public utilities were improved when Montgomery acquired water works in 1873,[15] Selma in 1886,[16] and Marion, Demopolis, Union Springs, Eutaw, and Greensboro during

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11 Citizens' Union, Selma, Alabama, *Selma, Alabama and Its Attractive Features, 1884*, n.p., 1884, 6; cited hereafter as *Selma, Alabama.*

12 W. H. Lovelace, "History of Marion," in *Marion Times–Standard*, October 30, 1919.

13 C. C. Grayson, *Yesterday, Memories of Selma and Its People*, n.p., n.d., 108.

14 *Selma, Alabama*, 5, 6; H. G. McCall, *A Sketch Historical and Statistical of the City of Montgomery*, 1895, 21, 22.

15 *Ibid.*, 21, 22.

16 *Montgomery Advertiser*, September 27, 1886; Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma*, 72, 73.

the nineties.[17] Artesian wells and stand-pipes were the usual source of water for these systems.

Kerosene lamps lighted most of the homes and the town streets until the coming of electricity, though candles were in use by many people as late as 1885.[18] One of the first duties of a housewife was to see that the lamps were filled, the wicks trimmed and ready for the night.[19]

Montgomery had gas for street lighting much earlier than the other towns of the section. The Montgomery Gas Light Company was established in 1852, and manufactured gas from coal until 1860. The Civil War caused a change from coal to wood process, and wood gas continued until 1876, when the works were changed back to coal as the coal fields of Alabama developed.[20] In the evenings the city lamplighter, mounted on horseback, lighted the gas jets on the streets.[21] Selma had gas street lights in the seventies, but even so, the streets were "very dark, only an occasional gas lamp threw its dim light on the wayfarer. Hogs, horses, cows, etc., were allowed to roam at will, and the hazards of night walking were great."[22] Union Springs had only three street lamps in 1879.[23] Marion complained of the inefficiency of its street lamp lighter in 1885, and considered his services unnecessary on moonlight nights.[24] Judson College installed gas and water fixtures in 1887. Selma was pleased in 1893 with the "elegant cooking stoves" with "six different places to light the gas" and "jets for heating water for a bath room."[25] Greensboro had no street lamps until 1883. An electric light plant was started in 1899, and then the kerosene lamps were replaced by arc lights.[26]

Electric lights were a matter of curiosity in the smaller towns in the middle eighties. A notice appearing in the *Eutaw Whig and*

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17 *Marion Standard*, January 25, 1894; *Linden Reporter*, November 15, 1895; *Union Springs Herald*, January 22, 1896, May 13, 1896; Ordinances of the Town of Eutaw, Alabama, March, 1897, 99; Yerby, *History of* Greensboro, 125.

18 C. C. Grayson, "Early Days in Selma" in Selma *Times-Journal*, May 4, 1946; Historic Records Survey, Work Projects Administration, Hale County, Alabama (State Department of Archives); Marion *True Democrat*, September 26, 1883; *Marengo News-Journal*, November 20, 1882; Yerby, *History of Greensboro*, 127, 128.

19 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma*, 109.

20 McCall, *A Sketch of Montgomery*, 23.

21 *City Code of Montgomery* (1879), 82.

22 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma*, 27.

23 *Union Springs Herald*, March 24, 1879.

24 *Marion Standard*, August 19, 1885,

25 *Selma Weekly Times*, June 8, 1893.

26 Yerby, *History of Greensboro*, 127–128.

Observer, June 26, 1884, insisted: "Be sure to see the Electric light at Alexina House." Selma's electric light plant began operation August 3, 1886, after a long struggle with the gas company.[27] Electric lights came to Montgomery in 1882.[28] Hydro-electric power using the Tallapoosa River was installed at Montgomery in 1896.[29] Eutaw, Greensboro, and Demopolis acquired electric light systems during the nineties.[30] Marion, in 1902, had electric arc lights operated on the moon system, by which the city lights would run all night during the dark nights and on moonlight nights from sundown until the moon was two hours high.[31]

In later years of the period the attainment of all night electric service and finally day current were matters of pride to the towns. The Greensboro Water and Light Company installed all night electric service on July 1, 1912.[32] From the time of the World War the Alabama Power Company, the Alabama Water Company, and other large operating companies began to buy the properties of the local companies. Under the management of these corporations electric service was improved and lines were extended to hitherto unwired areas.[33]

Joseph A. Gaboury, an engineer and capitalist, came to Montgomery, in 1884, and began the operation of mule drawn cars.[34] "On the night of March 24–25, 1886, a street car was seen coming up Commerce Street without any of the little Texas mules that usually strove so valiantly with the heavy loads." Gaboury had invested in some of the electric motors advanced by Charles J. Van Depeole, and secured the rights from the Montgomery City Council to make a trial run.[35] The "Lightning Route," as the street railway was known, was considered a success, and by June, 1887, fifteen miles

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[27] Historic Records Survey, WPA, Dallas County (State Department of Archives); *Montgomery Daily Advertiser,* September 27, 1886.

[28] McCall, *A Sketch of Montgomery,* 23.

[29] Alabama Power Company, *Power Development in Alabama* (n.p.: n.d.); State Abstract Company, *Pocket Map of the City* of Montgomery, 1899 (State Department of Archives); *Montgomery Advertiser,* September 25, 1902.

[30] *Alabama Beacon,* Greensboro, August 4, 1897; *Demopolis Express,* February 3, 24, 1898.

[31] M. R. Darden, "The History of Marion, Alabama, 1817–1940," (unpublished M. A. thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute: 1941), 76, cited hereafter as "History of Marion."

[32] *Greensboro Watchman,* June 13, 1912.

[33] Ordinances of the Town of Greensboro, Alabama, 1922; *Greensboro Watchman,* June 8, 1922; Darden, "History of Marion," 76.

[34] Alabama Power Company, *The Lightning Route,* Montgomery, Alabama, 1936.

[35] *Ibid.; Montgomery Advertiser,* September 27, 1886.

of line was electrified. Numerous companies developed until, in 1906, the hodge-podge of systems was consolidated into a single corporation known as the Montgomery Traction Company.[36]

Selma was operating horse drawn street cars as early as 1872.[37] In 1888 she discarded her horse cars entirely in favor of a dummy engine which pulled the cars.[38] Union Springs had a street car line in 1887, and there was talk of such a line in York in 1889.[39]

The fire companies of the cities and the towns were composed of volunteers. Montgomery adopted a system of paid firemen in 1898[40] and Selma in 1907,[41] but until that time fighting fires was the task of amateurs, as it continued to be in the smaller towns.[42]

The fire companies were colorful organizations, much given to fanfare, and greatly admired by the citizens of their respective towns. They wore bright uniforms and had frequent parades.[43] The Phoenix Company of Selma had a monthly "washing," when the members "a hundred strong" would put on their regular regalia—red flannel shirts, black belts, black and red helmets. After a short parade they would stop at the cistern, lower the suction hose into it, attach the hose to the engine, and send two streams of water on top of the hotel building.[44] In Montgomery there were several fire companies, all of them vying with each other at quarterly inspection time in Court Square, so that these occasions in the center of the business district usually ended in water battles. The annual spring parades of the Montgomery Fire Department were as spectacular as a Mardi Gras parade.[45]

The smaller towns imitated the pomp of the Selma and Montgomery companies. Soon after Union Springs organized a volunteer company in 1868, a parade was held. According to the *Union*

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36 The Alabama Power Company acquired all street railway property in Montgomery in 1923. In 1936 the company discontinued the electric street cars in favor of modern gasoline busses. Alabama Power Company, *The Lightning Route.*

37 "Early Days in Selma," in *Selma Times-Journal,* May 4, 1946.

38 B. F. Riley, *Alabama As It Is, or The Immigrant's and Capitalist's Guide Book to Alabama,* Montgomery, 1887, 1893, 161; Mobile and Ohio Railroad, *The Great South,* St. Louis and Mobile, 1888.

39 *Union Springs Herald,* July 27, 1887; *York News,* December, 19, 1889.

40 *Annual Message ... John H. Clisby, Mayor of Montgomery ... 1898,* 45.

41 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma,* 137.

42 *Alabama Beacon,* Greensboro, February 2, 1873; Ordinances of the Town of Eutaw, Alabama, May 12, 1898, 121.

43 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma,* 135; Minutes of the Dexter Fire Engine Company, Montgomery, Alabama, June 11, 1888–March 2, 1891 (State Department of Archives): *Union Springs Times,* June 6, 1868.

44 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma,* 135.

45 T. L. McDaniel, *History of Montgomery Fire Department, 1817–1926,* n.p., 1926, 36.

Spring Times of June 6, speeches were made, the engine was wreathed in flowers and festoons of evergreen, and "in order to show the ability of the company to manage the engine, at the order of . . . 'double quick' the boys made it rattle along as if it had wings."

The fire companies were organized as clubs and were actually social organizations. The young men of the "better families" belonged, and it was not unusual to "blackball" undesirable candidates.[46] Each company had its own hall, where dances and other amusements were held.[47] Picnics, excursions to distant cities, and tournaments were among their social activities.[48]

The fire fighting equipment included horse drawn steam engines, hooks, ladders, jams, buckets, hose, and reel. The Montgomery Fire Department had in 1885 an active and honorary membership of 357. They operated three steam engines and one hand engine, one hook and ladder truck, and four two-horse carriages. A fire alarm system was in operation. Financial support came from the city government, from a tax on insurance companies, and from contributions of the members.[49] Greensboro, Demopolis, Eutaw, and Marion had fire equipment and organizations during the eighties and nineties.[50]

Telegraph lines came to the Black Belt before the Civil War. The line of the Washington City and New Orleans Telegraph Company was run from Mobile to Cahaba, thence to Montgomery, in 1853. An office was opened in Selma in October, 1853.[51] Lines were extended sometimes by the enterprise of local townsmen during the seventies and eighties, as for example, the citizens of Greensboro who donated a thousand dollars in 1869 to induce the Western Union Telegraph Company to extend its line from Marion to their town.[52] Even small communities along the river had their

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46 Minutes of the Dexter Fire Engine Company, June 11, 1888, 17.

47 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma,* 137; souvenirs of fire department functions (collection of Lucharlle Wilson, Montgomery, Alabama).

48 T. L. McDaniel, *History of Montgomery Fire Department, 1817–1926,* 36–40; Minutes of the Dexter Fire Engine Company, June 11, 1888, 19–20, April 8, 1889, 51, May 20, 1889, 54, January 5, 1891, 91. See entire volume covering June 11, 1888–March 2, 1891.

49 John Hardy, *Selma, Her Institutions and Her Men,* 1879, 160, cited hereafter as *Selma;* Citizens' Union, *Selma, Alabama,* 22; McCall, *A Sketch of Montgomery,* 21.

50 Yerby, *History of Greensboro,* 130–131. *Alabama Beacon,* Greensboro, February 8, 1873; *Marengo News-Journal,* Demopolis, March 9, 1876; *Demopolis Express,* January 4, 1893; Eutaw *Whig and Observer,* March 20, 1888, April 15, 1880; Ordinances of the Town of Eutaw, Alabama, May 12, 1898, 121; *Marion Commonwealth,* November 21, 1878; *Marion Standard,* January 25, 1883, December 26, 1888.

51 Hardy, *Selma,* 160.

52 *Wilcox News and Pacificator,* Camden, June 23, 1882; Yerby, *History of Greensboro,* 196.

Western Union telegraph lines, and Postal Telegraph was erecting its lines to small towns of the Black Belt by 1890.[53]

The Montgomery Telephone Exchange was in operation by October, 1882.[54] In 1885 the city had a Bell Telephone Exchange with subscribers and a branch line twelve miles long to Prattville. A private telephone wire also connected Selma and Montgomery, and a line to Wetumpka was being built.[55]

The smaller towns were usually served in the nineties by small local companies.[56] The new Alabama Telephone Company was committed in 1894 to furnish Selma "perpetual service, night, day, and Sunday," while Greensboro acquired an exchange in 1896 after several citizens had already been operating their private lines from residences to store and office and from Greensboro to Tuscaloosa.[57] A telephone line was erected from the depot to a drug store in Marion in 1894, and the following year poles were erected through the city. [58]

Various efforts were made to increase the number of telephone subscribers in a town. In Selma and in Marion the names and numbers of new subscribers were reported in the newspaper.[59] Union Springs in 1895 was striving to reach the goal of a hundred subscribers, and in Demopolis subscribers were charged extra for each neighbor who used their phones.[60] Marion's method of advertising had real charm. One evening the local string band "discoursed sweet music" near the telephone in Wilkerson's Drug Store, and it was heard over their telephones by the subscribers.[61]

Since it was important that isolated towns have telephone connection with telegraph lines at some point, long distance connections entered these villages before local connections did.[62] In 1891 the Marengo and Perry Telephone Company had offices in Demopolis and in six neighboring small towns, while in 1898 the Demopolis Telephone Company had connections with twenty towns and ham-

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53 *Livingston Journal,* September 21, 1883, November 14, 1890, December 5, 1890.
54 *Montgomery Advertiser and Mail,* October 10, 1882.
55 McCall, *A Sketch of Montgomery,* 23.
56 *Marengo News,* Demopolis, April 9, 1891.
57 *Selma Morning Times,* October 6, 1894; *Alabama Beacon,* April 16, 1895, February 24, 1897.
58 *Marion Standard,* March 14, 1895.
59 *Selma Morning Times,* August 11, 1895; *Marion Standard,* November 21, 1895.
60 *Union Springs Herald,* April 29, 1896; *Demopolis Express,* January 2, 1896.
61 *Marion Standard,* March 14, 1895.
62 Riley, *Alabama As It Is,* 152–159.

lets.[63] By 1907 even a rural community like McCainville in Sumter County was beginning to feel "real cityfied" because of the new telephone line from Livingston.[64] The service, however, was not always satisfactory. Linden's telephone system, as late as 1912, was weakening subscribers' chances for heaven because it was sure to "make you swear."[65]

The unusually miry condition of Black Belt streets led to an early effort to improve them. It was a matter of some pride if the streets of a town were in an improved condition. The Uniontown correspondent of the *Marion Standard* spoke in complimentary terms in 1883 of the streets of Demopolis:

> The side walks are in good repair and the streets are fully lighted with handsome lamps. This is quite a contrast to our town; the plank walks are covered wih mud and slime, they are so sleek it is almost impossible to keep on them in the day time and at night our streets are in total darkness, and we have to grope our way from place to place as best we can. . . .[66]

Marion paved her streets in 1892 with "artificial stone pavements."[67]

Greensboro, in 1897, complained of the sand beds on her main street, which, however, was being covered with "clay and packable dirt" to make a "good hard driveway" which proved a "relief to our horses." A sidewalk cleaning ordinance was enforced, which freed the sidewalks from displays of goods and benches on which loafers had been wont to bask in the sunshine.[68] Greensboro acquired a partial concrete sidewalk in 1900, yet Camden's streets were of "good clay with a smooth gradual slope." The chief problem was to avoid washing by a proper scraping of the sides and throwing the surplus dirt into the center of the streets.[69]

Selma offers a very good example of the stages through which other Black Belt towns evolved more belatedly, in street building. First was the stage through which Selma passed in the seventies when streets were sometimes "almost impassable." Broad Street, being most used, was a deep sand bed with mud almost ankle deep after hard rains.[70] Trees were growing on either side of the street,

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[63] *Marengo News*, Demopolis, October 8, 1891; *Demopolis Express*, February 10, 1898.
[64] *Sumter County Call*, Epes, March 7, 1907.
[65] *Linden Democrat-Reporter*, December 19, 1912.
[66] *Marengo News-Journal*, January 20, 1883.
[67] *Marion Standard*, January 13, 1892.
[68] *Alabama Beacon*, March 31, September 8, and May 5, 1897.
[69] *Montgomery Advertiser*, January 27, 1900; *Wilcox Progress*, February 9, 1898.
[70] Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma*, 32, 33. Garbage was strewn over the streets in 1867.

and the shade of the overhanging boughs was in summer a refuge for the people, as well as for horses and the conveniences of customers. The mud of winter gave way to the dust of summer, when the sprinkle cart was a necessary vehicle in dry weather.[71]

The second stage came in the eighties when the streets of Selma were generally—

> as level as a parlor floor, with just sufficient undulation here and there to secure thorough drainage. The streets are wide and straight and intersect each other at right angles. The principal streets are graded and graveled, leaving wide sidewalks beautifully sodded with grass. The luxuriant water oaks which stand in stately grandeur along the walks form almost an unbroken shade. Broad margins of the greenest grass line the streets and walks .... In some portions of the city the wide streets are divided in twain by columns of verdant oaks.[72]

The third stage came when these quaint, small town scenes gave way to paving and many of the trees were removed to give place to concrete sidewalks and business houses. The smaller towns were acquiring sidewalks around 1905.[73]

Montgomery was more advanced than the smaller towns in the care of its streets. A detailed city code forbade misuse of the streets in such a way as to leave them obstructed or filthy.[74] Montgomery's streets in 1885 were wide, illuminated by electric and gas lights, many lined with shade trees, with an ample system of drainage and underground sewerage. Sidewalks were both concrete and dirt. Several small parks, the grounds of the state capitol, and a $7,000 fountain in Court Square were visible effects of beautification programs and evidences of civic pride.[75] The purchase of Oak Park in 1900 added a public recreation area to the facilities of the city.[76] The movement now had its momentum, and the process of paving, sidewalk building, and garbage disposal went on with vigor in the next years of the new century.[77]

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71 *Alabama Beacon,* October 25, 1904; *Marion Standard,* November 19, 1884.

72 Citizen's Union, *Selma, Alabama,* 6.

73 Grayson, *Yesterday, Selma,* 90; *Eutaw Whig and Observer,* January 12, April 20, 1905.

74 City Code of Montgomery, 1879, Sections 269–273, 107.

75 McCall, *A Sketch of Montgomery,* 12.

76 *Annual Message ... E. B. Joseph, Mayor of Montgomery, ... 1900,* 88.

77 *Annual Message ... C. P. McIntyre, Mayor of Montgomery ....* 1905, 14–16; *Annual Message ... W. M. Teague, Mayor of Montgomery ... 1907,* 9, 10, 159.

Document

General O'Reilly's Arrival at New Orleans

Introduction

Although France had ceded Louisiana (the territory west of the Mississippi and the city of New Orleans) to Spain by secret treaty in 1762, official notification of the transfer did not reach the colony until 1764, for the cession had been kept secret lest England seize the territory before the Spanish could take possession. Spain showed slight enthusiasm for her new colony, apparently considering it to be of little worth, and delayed the appointment of the first governor, Antonio de Ulloa, until 1765. When Ulloa reached New Orleans in March, 1766, he found great discontent among the inhabitants of the colony, who were distrustful of Spain's commercial policies and who hoped that France would reclaim the colony. Due to Ulloa's lack of military support and to the hostility of the colonists, his attempt to administer the colony ended in his being forced to leave New Orleans as a result of open armed resistance by the colonists in October, 1768. The man chosen by the Spanish authorities to succeed him was General Alejandro O'Reilly,[1] who effectively took possession of the territory and quickly brought order to the colony.

A source of much information concerning O'Reilly's activities on his arrival in Louisiana is the document given below, preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms 18.577[26]. It has been

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[1] Alejandro O'Reilly (1725–1794) was one of Spain's most able generals. Irish by birth, he went to Spain and at an early age entered the Spanish Army. He took part in the War of the Austrian Succession in Italy; in 1757 he joined the Austrian Army with which he served until 1759. In that year he went to France in whose army he took service. Recommended to Charles III of Spain, he returned to that country and took part in the campaign against Portugal (1762). He was sent to Havana when it was restored to Spain after the British occupation and rebuilt the fortifications. After acting as governor of Louisiana, he was the leader of an unsuccessful campaign in Africa (1775). As a result, he was severely criticized but retained the favor of Charles III who assigned him to various posts in the provinces. Although he lost favor at the death of Charles (1788), he was given another command in 1793 but died before taking up his duties.

described as an eyewitness account of the events related,[2] although there is nothing in the text which indicates that the author necessarily witnessed everything he relates unless it be the fact that he quotes the speeches of La Frénière and O'Reilly. In any case, the author of the account must have had access to official papers and other sources of information since he gives, apparently in full, the letter sent by O'Reilly to the French governor Aubry and data regarding the number and kinds of troops who accompanied O'Reilly. The *Diario* which the author follows from August 18 may be either a personal diary or some official journal.

A possible clue to the identity of the author lies in the fact that he gives the time of the arrival in New Orleans of the bearer of the letter to Aubry and reports Aubry's oral reply to the messenger. The happenings at O'Reilly's headquarters during the absence of the messenger are not mentioned. It is possible, then, that the author of the account was the messenger sent by O'Reilly to Aubry; Gayarré says the messenger was Francisco Bouligny.[3]

One point on which there seems to be no agreement is the number of O'Reilly's troops. Gayarré, who apparently used this document without indicating his source, gives the number as 2,600.[4] Other figures cited are 3,000[5] and 3,600.[6] The figure given in the document is quite clearly 2,100. Rodríguez Casado, citing this document and reading the figure 2,100 correctly, mistakenly gives 750 as the number of Catalan fusiliers.[7] A comparison of the digits of the two figures (2,100 and 150) and those found elsewhere in the manuscript leaves no doubt as to the differences between 1, 6 and 7.

Rodríguez Casado on two occasions is inexact in his references to the document. Discussing O'Reilly's assurances to the prisoners, he quotes " 'porque su deseo sincero era que todos justificasen su conducta; entretanto, sus bienes serían secuestrados.' "[8] This is, to be sure, the sense of the passage in question, but it is by no means a faithful quotation. Again he cites the document in support of his statement that "El traslado de los detenidos a la prisión

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2 Vicente Rodríguez Casado, *Primeros años de dominación española en la Luisiana,* Madrid, 1942, 319.
3 Charles Gayarré, *History of Louisiana,* 4th ed., New Orleans, 1903, II, 289.
4 *Ibid.,* II, 296.
5 Garnie William McGinty, *A History of Louisiana,* New York, 1949, 70.
6 *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th ed., XVII, 59.
7 *Primeros años,* 321.
8 *Ibid.,* 330. See entry for August 21 in the document.

se hizo a las diez de la mañana . . ." (p. 330). In the entry for August 21, the day in question, there is no mention of any specific hour.

Other than the resolution of certain abbreviations indicated by brackets, the document is given as in the manuscript; the erratic spelling, punctuation, and use of accent marks are unchanged.

Document

El dia 24 de Junio de èste año desembarcò en la Havana el Th[enien]te G[ene]ral Dn Alexandro O-Reilly con las ordenes de S[u] M[ajestad] para tomar las tropas necesarias, y demas pertrechos, y ir a la Luisiana a tomar posesion de aquella Provincia en nombre de S. M.

Assi por la actibidad, y celo del expresado general como por las disposiciones bien ordenadas del Thte. Gral Antonio Bucareli Governador de la Havana, y por el admirable orden, y methodo que establecio, para que todo se hiciese sin confusion, y con la maior diligencia se dispusieron, embarcaron y hicieron ala vela, en onze dias 21 embarcaciones que llebaban 2100 hombres de Tropa, un trèn de 50 Cañones, municiones, viberes, y Hospital, a lo que contribuyò por su parte el celo y disposicion del Jefe de Esquadra D Juan Antonio de la Colina.

La Tropa se componia de un Batallon de Lisbòa: otro del fixo de la Havana; 80 hombres de una compañia de Granaderos de cada uno de los tres cuerpos de Milicias de la Havana: 150 Artilleros: 40 Dragones y 50 Soldados de las milicias de caballeria del monte de la Havana, con 150 fusileros cathalanes.

Todo este comboy se hizo ala vela de la Havana el dia 6 de Julio, y llegò ala voca del rio Misisipi el 20. Por este Rio se debian subir 32 leguas para llegar a la Ciud[a]d del Nuebo Orleans, y en la voca de èl mandò dar fondo D. Alexandro O-Reilly, para esperar algunas embarcaciones del Comboy, que se havian atrasado, y despachò un oficial al Gov[ernad]or Frances del nuebo Orleans con la carta sig[uien]te.

"Mui S[eñ]or mio:—S. M. C[atólica] a cuio servicio me hallo de Thte. gral, se hà dignado comisionarme p[ar]a en su nombre tomar posesion de la Luisiana, Nueba Orleans, y Yslas en que esta situada d[ic]ha ciudad, a cuio fin llebo las correspondientes or[de]n[e]s, que reserbo en mi poder para su entrega a V[uestra]

S[eñoría] en propria mano a n[ues]tra primera vista: Anticipo a V. S. esta noticia con la de mi arribo oy a la Balisa, y de estar prosiguiendo mi navegacion para esa ciudad, y la mucha complacencia que me resultarà de quanto fuese de su satisfaccion, y obsequio. Ruego a V. S. q[u]e se sirba tomar las providencias que en esta ocasion considère del mejor servicio de ambas Magestades, y correspondientes al obgeto de mi Comision, franqueandome al mismo t[iem]po ocasiones de que acredite mi mui att[en]ta y afectuosa voluntad. Dios gu[ard]e Va. a bordo del Volante a 20 de Julio de 1769.— B[esa] l[a] m[an]o de V. S. su m[á]s att[en]to seg[ur]o servi[d]or Dn Alexandro O'Reilly—Sor. dn Phelipe Aubry."

El oficial que llebó esta carta salio de la frag[a]ta del Comand[an]te el dia 21 al amanecer y llegó el 24 a la noche a la Nueba Orleans donde le recivio el Gov[ernad]or con mucho agrado, y le dixo, que estaba pronto a entregar la Provincia a los Españoles, y que si los habitantes querian hazer alguna oposicion èl con su tropa y parciales se unirian a los Españoles para castigar su audacia, y esto mismo dijo a los havitantes y negociantes que mandó juntar al otro dia, de resulta de lo qual, y viendo el Pueblo el peligro en que se hallaba, despues de varios debates determinaron nombrar tres diputados para cumplimentar al Generl. è implorar su clemencia para cuio fin fueron nombrados los Señores la Freniere, Marquiz, y Millet: Estos Diputados bolvieron con el ofiz[ia]l q[u]e havia llevado la carta, y llegaron en 40 horas a la frag[a]ta del Com[andan]te al qual hizo Mr. la Freniere la arenga sig[uien]te.

El Sor. Marquiz antiguo Com[andan]te de la Com[pañí]a Suisa, y Habitante: el Sor. Millet Th[enient]e de milicias, y negociante: y Yo Procur[ad]or Genl. del Rey y havitante, hemos sido escojidos para venir a asegurar a V[uestra] E[xcelencia] de la sumision de la Colonia alas or[de]n[e]s de las Magestad[e]s Christ[ianísi]ma y Cath[óli]ca y de su veneracion por las virtudes, y talentos militares que han colocado a V. E. en el alto puesto en q[u]e se halla: Estamos encargados de asegurar a V. E. el profundo resp[ec]to de la Colonia por S. M. C. su amor por S. M. Christma. y por toda la augusta familia de Borbon. La Colonia no ha tenido nunca intencion de faltar nada al profundo respecto que profesa al grande monarca que V. E. representa. La dureza del genio de Dn Antonio de Ullóa, y la subvercion de los privilegios asegurados p[o]r el acto de cesion han sido la sola causa de las reboluciones sucedidas en esta Colonia: Suplicamos a V. E. de no mirarla como

un Pais conquistado: Las or[de]n[e]s de que V. E. es Portador son suficientes para tomar posesion del Pais, y hacer mas efectos en los Corazones, que las armas en las manos. El Francès es docil, y acostumbrado a ser governado con dulcura: V. E. verà a su llegada todos sugetos alas or[de]n[e]s de las dos Magestades: La Colonia implora del patrocinio de V. E. sus privilegios, y de su equidad demora competente para aquellos que desean transmigrarse.

Dn Alexandro O-Reilly escuchó esta arenga sin interrumpirle con la Seriedad, y Señorio corresp[ondien]te a su Caracter y respondio con estas o semejantes voces—Señores: No es posible alos hombres juzgar de las cosas sin enterarse antes de los antez[eden]tes. Luego q[u]e Yo llégue ala Ciudad pondrè especial cuidado en instruirme a fondo de todo. Pueden V[uestras]m[ercede]s estar seguros que mi m[ay]or gusto serà hacer bien, y que sentirè entrañablem[en]te verme precisado a hacer mal a nadie, Yo serè el primero en facilitar a Vms. medios para justificarse: Tranquilen Vms. a todo el Pueblo, y asegurenle de las buenas disposiciones en que me hallo llevado de mi Caracter: Veo con gusto el Partido q[u]e Vms. han tomado, pues de lo contrario esten Vms. seguros, que hubiera echo respectar el Pavellon de mi Rey y que nada hubiera sido capas de detenerme: Tal era mi determinacion, y hubiera remontado el rio hasta los Ilinoeses si hubiera sido preciso. Los hombres en el Delirio no reflexionan ni ven las inconsequencias de sus acciones: se han figurado Vms. ser capaces de resistir a las fuerzas de uno de los mas poderosos Reyes de la Europa? Y han podido Vms. pensar que el Rey Christianisso. unido por los lazos de la sangre y por la mas estrecha amistad con el Rey mi amo hubiese nunca apoyado ni puesto atencion a los gritos de un Pueblo sedicioso? A esta vos Sedicioso Marquiz quizo alegar algunas razones: El Genl. le respondio con dulcura—Ya he d[ic]ho a Vms. señores que a su tiempo escucharè con gusto sus razones: A Dios gracias estoy libre de preocupaciones, y no ignoro que muchas vezes las cosas que parecen negras desde lejos, suelen verse blancas quando uno se aproxima.

Haviendo marchado estos Diputados embió el Genl. con ellos varios oficiales p[ar]a q[u]e preparasen los quarteles, y aloxamiento p[ar]a la Tropa, y viendo quanto importaba la brevedad, y q[u]e las Calmas, y vientos contrarios lo detenian mucho, hizo trabajar toda la Tropa, y a fuerza de su constancia se consiguio el q[u]e acabase de llegar todo el comboy a vista de la Ciudad el 17 por la mañana, y desde este dia se seguirà el Diario.

18 de Agosto. Al amanecer todas las Embarcaciones que ocupaban

ya con buen or[de]n el frente de la Ciudad pusieron su plancha para el Desembarco.

Poco despues fue el Gov[ernad]or francès con sus oficiales a cumplimentar a n[uest]ro Gefe quien saltò en tierra con esta Comitiba y fue ala casa q[u]e le estaba destinada; pero antes de medio dia se restituyò a bordo para dar las or[de]n[e]s Conducentes al Desembarco que se hizo en la forma sig[uien]te.

A las 5 Disparò la Capitana un Cañonazo que fue señal para empabezar y q[u]e toda la tropa desembarcase a un tiempo con prontitud, y buen or[de]n como se executò ocupando cada una el puesto que se le havia destinado en la Plaza de armas que forma tres frentes en quadrilongo, y al quarto (que es uno de los dos mayores) baña el rio, y fue por dondo se hizo el Desembarco.

Al frente del rio estaba el principal y delante de este, una hasta de vandera y formada la poca tropa veterana francesa con las milicias del Pais a su isquierda.

El frente menor de la Plaza, a la derecha de la Tropa Francesa formò la columna trocada del Regim[ien]to de Lisbóa, en el frente opuesto a los franceses formaron los Artilleros, Fusileros de Montaña, dragones y las tres compañias de milicias de Blancos, Pardos y Morenos, q[u]e estaban en el centro segun la prerrogacion q[u]e a cada uno correspondia.

Ocupaba el Rexim[ien]to de La Havana (cerrando el quadro) el costado Ysquierdo de la tropa francesa, que era el frente opuesto a èl de Lisbóa; pero dejò claro por el qual se entraba en la calle donde està la Iglesia, y enq[u]e se formò la tropa de Caballeria del monte de la Havana.

En la calle que està ala Cabeza del regim[ien]to de Lisboa y al costado del prinsipal se colocò la tropa del Batallon que deve formarse para esta guarnicion, y que venia en Piquetes, los quales se destinaron para mudar la tropa francesa que estaba en las Puertas, y demas Guardias de esta Ciudad.

En medio del quadro al frente del pr[incip]al estaba el Gov[ernad]or francès con las primeras personas del Consexo, y del Pueblo, que fueron a recivir a n[uest]ro Gefe quando vajò a tierra, a cuio tiempo le hizo su saludo la frag[a]ta Comand[an]ta cuia marineria, y la de las demas embarcaciones que de antemano estaba ya en las vergas, y topes le dieron cinco vezes el *Viva el Rey.*

Al entrar S. E. en el quadro se le hicieron los honores de Cap[itá]n gral. de Provincia, y se encaminò con su Comitiba y la francesa al pie del hasta de la vandera en donde presentò al

citado Gov[ernad]or las or[de]n[e]s de S. M. Christianissa. concernientes ala formal cesion q[u]e hizo de d[ic]ha Provincia a S. M. C. y los Poderes que authorizaban a S. E. para tomar posesion en nombre de este Soberano: en cuia conseq[uenci]a publicó el referido Gov[ernado]r que ya estaban todos libres del Juram[en]to de fiel vasallage q[u]e hasta entonces los sugetaba al primero de los expresados Monarcas, y despues de esta ceremonia se enarbolò la vandera de España en d[ic]ha Hasta, en las quatro Puertas de la Ciudad, y enfrente de la casa de n[uest]ro Genl. Los franceses (dirigidos por su Gov[ernad]or) dieron cinco vezes *Viva el Rey.* N[uest]ra tropa lo egecutò tres vezes con una descarga graneada, y al mismo que la salva de la frag[a]ta Comand[an]ta.

Ymmediatam[en]te saliò el Thte. Coronel D. Luis de las Casas (ya elegido p[ar]a Sarg[en]to m[ayo]r de esta Plaza) con el que hasta entonces lo fue, y condugeron la tropa destinada a mudar todas las guardias y custodia de la polvora, y Artilleria.

Executado lo anted[ic]ho fue n[uest]ro Gefe con los de los Cuerpos, y los susod[ic]hos franceses a la Yglesia en q[u]e fue recivido con Palio, y la acostumbrada solemnidad: El Cura o Vicario pr[incip]al hizo a S. E. una arenga mui patetica en nombre del Pueblo y con las mas tiernas protestas de fidelidad: Correspondio el Genl. eloquente y conciso ofreciendo protexer la religion, hazer respectar alos Ministros del santuario, sobstener la authoridad del Rey, y el decoro de sus armas, atender al bien pu[bli]co y guardar just[ici]a a todos.

Despues de este acto se entrò en la Yglesia en donde se cantò el *Te Deum* a cuio t[iem]po la tropa, y frag[a]ta repitieron sus descargas en accion de gracias.

Concluido tan piadoso acto bolvio S. E. con la ya d[ic]ha comitiba a ver desfilar las tropas que dirigiendose a sus respectivos quarteles rompieron el quadro, y saludaron a S. E. a tiempo de pasar por donde estaba.

Dia 19. Combidó S. E. a comer al Govern[ad]or Francès y otras personas de Distinccion y a los Gefes de los Cuerpos sinq[u]e estos obsequios, ni las ocupaciones del dia ant[eri]or impidiesen q[u]e S. E. empesase a tomar declaraciones secretas sobre los pasados sucesos y a registrar con sus ojos quantos instrumentos pudo recojer conducentes a este fin.

El dia 20. sin abandonar d[ic]ho cuid[a]do fue a visitar al Gov[ernad]or Francès con todo el Cuerpo de oficiales n[uest]ros.

El dia 21. Por la mañana citò a su casa 9 de los pr[incip]ales

vezinos de esta Ciudad mandando al mismo tiempo que se arrestasen en el pr[incip]al otros tres de inferior clase.

Hizo cargo a aquellos de la conducta que se decia havian tenido en tiempo de la Conjuracion formada p[ar]a la expulsion del Gov[ernad]or Ulloa y demàs Españoles que estaban en esta Provincia: Les hablò con expreciones pateticas, y convincentes, y concluiò diciendoles, que eran acusados de haber formado la conjuracion por lo que los miraba, como a reos de estado, que iban a ser procesados, que serian oydas sus defensas, que se les administraria pronta y recta just[ici]a que todo se egecutaba de or[de]n del Rey, Soberano mui piadoso, pero que sobstiene su respectable authoridad, y el decoro de sus vasallos: que S. E. no tomaria otra parte en esta causa (cuios juezes estaban alli presentes y les hizo ver) que la q[u]e fuese conducente a favorecerlos, y que deseaba que todos pudiesen justificar plenam[en]te su conducta que entretanto estarian arrestados y sequestrados sus bienes para cuio Ynventario asistiria por parte de cada uno el sujeto que quisieren nombrar el qual presenciaria tambien el reconocim[ien]to de todos los papeles q[u]e se hallasen.

En virtud de lo antez[eden]te cada uno nombrò a q[uie]n quizo tomando alli mismo apuntacion de los sujetos elegidos.

Despues mandò S. E. a los Reos que entregasen sus espadas, y acompañado cada uno de dos oficiales n[uest]ros q[u]e le llebaban por el brazo se introdugeron en medio de dos Compañias de Granaderos que los llebaron a Depositar con separaz[i]on en una casa bien custodiada, en la frag[a]ta del Rey y en otras dos embarcaciones de las mayores del Comboy dejando en todas la corresp[ondien]te guardia para custodiar a estos infelices, y q[u]e no tengan comunicacion alguna entre tanto que se les toman sus declaraciones, y que se havilitan havitacion[e]s en que estèn mas comodos y seguros.

El dia 22 se publicò con solemnid[a]d un vando en que se concede perdon en nombre del Rey a todos los habitant[e]s de esta Provincia q[u]e fueron inducidos y engañados por los authores dela Sedicion.

Este indulto hizo que respirasen los Coraz[one]s de este Vecindario a q[uie]n havia consternado la nov[eda]d del dia antez[eden]te.

El dia 23 se citò en publicos edictos alos havitantes de esta Ciud[a]d y de sus immediaz[ione]s dejando los restantes de la Provincia para

otros dias, y los que estàn mas distantes lo egecutaràn en sus regulares a presencia de los sugetos que sean Comisionados para que se hallen el 26 a las 7 de la mañana en casa de S. E. a hacer el solemne juram[en]to de vasallaje y fidelidad a su nuebo Soberano. *El dia 24* se prendio a otro de los principales Gefes dela Sublevaz[i]on y pasò S. E. oficio al Gov[ernad]or francès p[ar]a q[u]e arestàse, y asegurase la persona, papeles, y Bienes del Comiss[ari]o de esta nacion que egercia las funciones de su Yntend[en]te q[uie]n tubo en su casa las Juntas p[ar]a la expulsion de los Españoles, y mandó imprimir el edicto difamatorio que entonces se publicò contra nosotros.

El referido Gov[ernad]or egecutò immed[iatamen]te lo q[ue] n[uest]ro Genl. le pidio y manteniendo al Comisario baxo la Custodia de dos oficiales, y 30 soldados que ninguna comunicaz[ió]n le dejan se le forma el proceso tomando las Comben[ien]tes declaraz[ione]s despues de haver sequestrado quanto tiene, y de haver hecho la entrega de los papeles concernientes a su empleo, a su secretario q[u]e pareze es la persona de la m[ay]or confianza.

Dio S. E. varias provid[encia]s relatibas ala buena Adm[inistraci]on de just[ici]a en favor de estos havitantes eligiendo p[ar]a este efecto los mas inteligentes, y acreditados de probidad entre ellos.

El dia 26 se hizo el Juram[en]to de fidelidad solemnem[en]te y empezando p[o]r el estado Eclesiastico al que siguieron por su or[de]n los demas.

El dia 27 Egecutaron lo mismo los Acadienses y Alemanes q[u]e no pudieron hacerlo antes.

El dia 28 y sig[uien]tes desembarcò la Artilleria, y demas pertrechos de ella con los viberes y quanto quedaba a bordo de las embarcaz[ione]s del Comboy.

Siguen las Provid[encia]s de buen gov[ier]no y el proceso de los Reos.

Nueba Orleans 30 de Ag[os]to de 1769.

Translation

On the 24th of June of this year, Lieutenant General Alejandro O'Reilly, with His Majesty's orders to take the necessary troops and supplies and to go to Louisiana to take possession of that province in the name of His Majesty, landed in Havana.

Due to the activity and zeal of the said general, to the well ordered arrangements of Lieutenant General Antonio Bucareli, Governor of Havana, and to the admirable order and method which he established so that all might be done without confusion and with the greatest dispatch, in eleven days 21 vessels carrying 2,100 troops, a train of 50 cannon, ammunition, provisions, and a hospital were made ready, manned, and put underway. The diligence and ability of Squadron Leader Don Juan Antonio de la Colonia contributed to this.

The troop was composed of a battalion from Lisbon, another from the Havana garrison regiment, 80 men of a company of grenadiers from each one of the three militia corps of Havana, 150 artillerymen, 40 dragoons, 50 mounted militiamen of Havana, and 150 Catalan fusiliers.

All this convoy sailed from Havana the 6th of July and arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi River the 20th. To reach the city of New Orleans it was necessary to go up this river 32 leagues. At the mouth Don Alejandro O'Reilly gave the order to drop anchor to await some vessels of the convoy which had been delayed, and he sent an officer to the French governor of New Orleans with the following letter.

"My Dear Sir: His Catholic Majesty, in whose service I am lieutenant general, has deigned to commission me to take possession in his name of Louisiana, New Orleans, and the islands on which said city is situated, for which purpose I bear the proper orders which I retain in my power to deliver to Your Lordship personally at our first meeting. I send Your Lordship this advance notice along with the news that I arrived today at Balize, that I am continuing my voyage toward the city, and that it will give me great pleasure that all be to your satisfaction and contentment. I beg Your Lordship please to take the measures which on this occasion you consider to the best service of both Majesties, and corresponding to the object of my commission, granting me at the same time opportunity to

manifest my good will. God keep Your Lordship. On board the *Volante,* 20 July 1769. Respectfully, Your Lordship's most obedient servant Don Alejandro O'Reilly. Mr. Philippe Aubry."

The officer who carried this letter left the Commander's frigate at dawn on the 21st. On the night of the 24th he reached New Orleans where the governor received him very courteously and told him that he was ready to deliver the province to the Spanish and that if the inhabitants wished to make any opposition, he with his troops and his partisans would join the Spanish to punish their audacity. He said this same thing to the inhabitants and merchants whom he called together the following day, as a result of which the people, seeing the danger which they were in and after some debate, decided to name three representatives to pay their respects to the general and to beg his clemency. For this purpose Messrs. La Frénière, Marquiz, and Millet were named. These representatives returned with the officer who had carried the letter and in 40 hours they reached the frigate of the Commander to whom Mr. La Frénière made the following address:

"Mr. Marquiz, former commander of the Swiss Company and planter, Mr. Millet, lieutenant of militia and merchant, and I, King's Attorney General and planter, have been chosen to come to assure Your Excellency of the submission of the colony to the orders of His Most Christian Majesty and of His Catholic Majesty and of its respect for the virtues and military talents which have placed Your Excellency in the high place you occupy. We are charged with assuring Your Excellency of the colony's profound respect for His Catholic Majesty, its love for His Most Christian Majesty and for all the august Bourbon family. The colony has never intended to be found wanting in any way in the profound respect which it professes for the great monarch whom Your Excellency represents. The harshness of temper of Don Antonio de Ulloa and the subversion of the privileges assured by the act of cession have been the sole cause of the revolutions which have taken place in this colony. We beg Your Excellency not to look upon it as a conquered country. The orders which Your Excellency bears are sufficient to take possession of the country and to produce better effects in our hearts than a show of arms. The French are docile and accustomed to being governed gently. On your arrival Your Excellency will see all obedient to the orders of both Majesties. Of Your Excellency's favor the colony begs its privileges and of your fairness, sufficient delay for those who wish to emigrate."

Don Alejandro O'Reilly heard this address without interruption with all the seriousness and nobility of his character and replied with these or similar words: "Gentlemen: It is not possible for men to judge things without first informing themselves of the antecedents. As soon as I reach the city I shall take special care to inform myself fully of everything. You may be sure that my greatest pleasure will be to act justly and that I shall deeply regret finding myself obliged to do harm to anyone. I shall be the first to provide you with means to justify yourselves. Calm the whole people and assure them of the favorable attitude to which my nature inclines me. I look with pleasure upon the decision you have taken, for, had it been otherwise, you may be sure that I would have made my King's flag respected and that nothing would have been capable of stopping me. Such was my determination, and I would have gone up the river as far as the Illinois if it had been necessary. In delirium men do not reflect, nor do they see how inconsequent their actions are. Have you imagined yourselves capable of resisting the forces of one of the most powerful kings of Europe? And could you have thought that the Most Christian King, united by ties of blood and by the closest friendship to the King my master, would ever have supported or given heed to the cries of a seditious people?" At this word "seditious" Marquiz tried to allege some reasons. The General answered him gently, "I have already told you, gentlemen, that at the proper time I will hear your reasons with pleasure. Thanks to God, I am free of prejudice and I am not unaware that often things which seem black from a distance are usually seen to be white when one approaches."

When these representatives departed, the General sent with them several officers to prepare the barracks and quarters for the troops. Seeing that haste was important and that the calms and contrary winds were greatly delaying him, he set all the troops to work and by their diligence it was brought about that the whole convoy came in sight of the city on the morning of the 17th and from this day, the *Diary* will be followed.

18 August. At dawn all the vessels which now occupied in good order the front of the city put down their gangplanks for the landing.

Shortly afterwards the French governor and his officers came to pay their respects to our Chief, who came ashore with this retinue and went to the house assigned to him. But before noon he re-

turned on board to give the orders concerning the landing which was accomplished in the following manner:

At 5 o'clock the flagship fired a cannon which was the signal to dress ship and for all the troops to disembark promptly, simultaneously, and in good order. This was done, each group occupying the place assigned to it in the Plaza de Armas, which forms three sides of a rectangle; the fourth side (which is one of the two greater) is the river where the landing was made.

Facing the river was the town hall and in front of it a flagpole with the few veteran French troops drawn up with the militia of the country on the left.

On the shorter side of the Plaza, to the right of the French troops, the column of the Lisbon regiment formed; on the side opposite the French were formed the artillerymen, mountain fusiliers, dragoons, and the three militia companies (Whites, Mulattoes, and Negroes), which were in the center according to the precedence proper to each one.

The Havana regiment (closing the square) occupied the left side of the French troops, opposite the Lisbon regiment. An opening was left allowing entry into the street where the church is and in which the Havana cavalry troop was drawn up.

In the street at the head of the Lisbon regiment and at the side of the town hall were placed the troops of the battalion to be formed for this garrison. They came up in squads assigned to replace the French troops at the gates and other guardposts of the city.

In the middle of the square in front of the town hall was the French governor with the leading persons of the Council and of the town who went to receive our commander when he landed. At that time he was saluted by the flagship whose crew and those of the other vessels, who were already at the yards and mastheads, shouted five times "Long live the King."

As His Excellency entered the square he was given the honors of Captain General of the province. He made his way with his retinue and the French to the foot of the flagpole where he presented to the Governor the orders of His Most Christian Majesty concerning the cession which he made of the said province to His Catholic Majesty and the powers which authorized His Excellency to take possession in the name of this sovereign. As a consequence of this the governor made public announcement that all were now free of the oath of faithful vassalage to the first of the mentioned

monarchs. After this ceremony the flag of Spain was raised on the flagpole, at the four gates of the city, and in front of our general's house. The French (directed by their governor) cried five times "Long live the King." Our troops gave the shout three times, together with a volley simultaneous with the salvo of the flagship.

Immediately Lieutenant Colonel Don Luis de las Casas (elected sergeant major of this city) departed with the officer who until that time had held the post, and they conducted the troops assigned to change the guards and to keep custody of the powder and artillery.

When the foregoing was carried out our commander went with the corps commanders and the above named French to the church where he was received with the pallium and the accustomed solemnity. The priest or vicar general made His Excellency a very pathetic address in the name of the people with the most tender protestations of fidelity. The General replied eloquently and concisely offering to protect religion, to cause the ministers of the sanctuary to be respected, to maintain the authority of the King and the honor of his arms, to attend to the public good and to maintain justice for all.

After this act they entered the church where the *Te Deum* was sung, at which time the troops and the frigate repeated their salutes in an act of thanksgiving.

At the end of this pious act, His Excellency returned with the above mentioned retinue to review the parade of the troops who broke up the square, going to their respective barracks and saluting His Excellency as they passed him.

19th. His Excellency invited the French governor, other persons of distinction, and the corps commanders to dine. These courtesies and the events of the preceding day did not prevent His Excellency's beginning to take secret depositions about the past events and to examine personally all the instruments he could gather together conducive to this purpose.

20th. Without abandoning said task, he went to visit the French governor with the whole corps of our officers.

21st. In the morning he summoned to his house nine of the principal citizens of the city, ordering at the same time that three others of lower rank be arrested in the town hall.

He charged them with the conduct which they were said to have pursued at the time of the conspiracy formed for the expulsion of

Governor Ulloa and other Spaniards who were in this province. He spoke to them with touching and convincing expressions and concluded by telling them that they were accused of having formed the conspiracy, because of which he looked upon them as prisoners of State, that they were going to be tried, that their defenses would be heard, that quick and honest justice would be given them, that all was carried out by order of the King, a very merciful sovereign but one who maintains his honorable authority and the decorum of his subjects, that His Excellency would take no other part in this case (whose judges were there present and he pointed them out) than that which was conducive to favor them, that he desired that all might be able to justify fully their conduct, that meanwhile they would be under arrest and their property sequestered. The inventory of this property would be witnessed on behalf of each one by the person that each might wish to name, who would also witness the examination of all the papers that might be found.

By virtue of the preceding each one named whom he wished, note being taken then and there of the persons chosen.

Afterwards His Excellency ordered the accused to surrender their swords and, each one accompanied by two of our officers who took him by the arm, they were placed between two companies of grenadiers who placed them in solitary confinement in a well guarded house, in the King's frigate, and in two of the other largest vessels of the convoy, leaving at each place the proper guard for the safekeeping of these unhappy men so that they have no communication while their depositions are being taken and while rooms in which they may be more comfortable and secure are being readied.

22nd. There was published solemnly a proclamation in which pardon in the name of the King is granted to all the inhabitants of this province who were enticed and deceived by the authors of the sedition.

This pardon calmed the hearts of this community that had been dismayed by the news of the preceding day.

23rd. In public edicts the inhabitants of this city and its environs were summoned to appear on the 26th at 7 A.M. in His Excellency's house to take the solemn oath of vassalage and fidelity to their new sovereign leaving the rest of the province for other days. Those who are most distant will take it in their turn in the presence of the persons who are commissioned.

24th. Another of the principal leaders of the revolt was seized and His Excellency requested the French governor to arrest and secure the person, papers, and property of the commissary of this nation who exercised the functions of intendant and who held in his house the meetings for the expulsion of the Spaniards and who ordered printed the defamatory edict which was then published against us.

The governor carried out immediately what our general asked of him, keeping the commissary in the custody of two officers and 30 soldiers who permit him no communication. The case against him is being prepared, the proper depositions being taken after all his property was sequestered and the papers relative to his office were delivered to his secretary who, it seems, is the person of the greatest trustworthiness.

His Excellency issued several provisional decrees relative to the good administration of justice in favor of these inhabitants, choosing among them the most intelligent and those most accredited with probity to carry them out.

26th. The oath of allegiance was taken, beginning with the ecclesiastics who were followed in order by the rest.

27th. The oath was taken by the Acadians and the Germans who could not do so earlier.

28th and following. The artillery, its supplies and stores, and all that was left on board the vessels of the convoy were unloaded.

The provisions for good government and the trial of the prisoners continue.

New Orleans. 30 August 1769.

DONALD G. CASTANIEN

Northwestern University

Book Reviews

Westernized Yankee: The Story of Cyrus Woodman. By Larry Gara. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1956. Pp. x, 254. Illustrated. $4.50.

American historians have devoted considerable attention to biography writing in recent years with some emphasis upon various minor figures in our local and national history. This work is a volume in a series of biographical studies published by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin dealing with a number of leaders who contributed to the frontier period in the history of the state.

Born in Buxton, Maine, on June 2, 1814, Cyrus Woodman graduated from Bowdoin College in 1836, studied law in Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and after practicing his profession for one year accepted a position as assistant land agent for the speculative Boston and Western Land Company which had extensive holdings in Illinois, Missouri and Wisconsin. Arriving in Winslow, Illinois, a townsite of the company in January, 1840, the twenty-five year old lawyer soon took over the management of the agency which he held until the summer of 1844, when he formed a law and land agency partnership with Cadwallader C. Washburn in Mineral Point, Wisconsin.

Dissolving the partnership in 1855, Woodman sold his home in Mineral Point and the following year toured Europe with his family. Compelled to return to his old home to look after his interests during the panic in 1857, he rented a house and worked in his old office until 1862, at which time he was employed for two years as a land agent for an eastern firm of capitalists with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. He moved his family to Cambridge, Massachusetts in the fall of 1863. He then supervised several railroad construction jobs in Nebraska until he retired in 1870. He died in Cambridge on March 30, 1889. He had married Charlotte Flint, a boyhood sweetheart on January 5, 1842, who bore him six children, two of whom died in infancy.

The story of this Yankee lured to the frontier more than a century ago is a very interesting one and contains much information of value to the student of American frontier history. While Woodman in many ways disliked the crude and rough life in early Illinois and Wisconsin, he was convinced that the West was the land of opportunity and remained there for a period of thirty years. Harassed by timber thieves, a shortage of money and the many other handicaps common to the frontier, Woodman engaged in a wide diversity of work and speculative enterprises. He was ever on the alert for new ways to make money. He made a trip to California during the gold rush and probably would have gone into business there temporarily had it not been for sickness in his family. Although he did not engage in the dubious business practices common to the frontier, he was a successful business man and through hard work and real ability accumulated a modest fortune which enabled him to live well and in his retire-

ment to contribute to those causes he thought worth while. In spite of his dominating and impatient attitudes, he was fond of his family and treated them well. He was energetic and restless throughout his life and after retirement kept "busy doing nothing." His Unitarian religion, unpopular in the early West, seems to have had little influence on him. He was a lonely man and the hard life of the frontier and the fear of becoming old seems to have worried him throughout his life.

It is the opinion of the reviewer that this volume meets the requirements of good biography. There are difficulties involved in handling the life of a man within a narrow compass. It is evident that the author has had access to large amounts of material and that he has handled it in an able manner. He has recreated Cyrus Woodman, revealing his true personality. He presents a complete, accurate and unbiased account of the deeds, experiences and thinking of his subject and in so doing has steered a middle course between meagreness and redundancy. He has included those details that are necessary in giving his subject vitality. Perhaps most important of all, the writer has related the person to the history of the period which helps to give human meaning to the history of the middle western frontier. The volume is well written and documented with carefully chosen illustrations. The index could have been improved.

HAROLD E. BRIGGS

Southern Illinois University

La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin. By Robert S. Maxwell. State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1956. Pp. viii, 271. Illustrated. $4.50.

It is not easy to write objectively about Robert M. La Follette. Almost everyone who has written about him has made evident either a dislike for or an admiration of the well known political leader, or politician, as you prefer, from Wisconsin. However, and perhaps fortunately for Robert S. Maxwell, this work was not intended to be a biographical treatment of La Follette but rather an analysis of the relationship of La Follette to the progressive movement in Wisconsin. Hence, much that relates only indirectly to La Follette has been presented to the reader, who sees La Follette only as an actor, albeit an important one, in Wisconsin politics, from about 1900 to about 1915.

Dr. Maxwell has industriously searched far and wide for his reference material, as the many pages of detailed notes and bibliographical references indicate. The result is an appraisal of the primary election law in Wisconsin, the regulation of utilities and railroads, the taxation of railroad property, the regulation of insurance companies, the civil service code, the state income tax, the corrupt practices act and many other pieces of legislation that combined to form what was referred to as "the Wisconsin Idea." Much attention is directed to the assignment of power to the Railroad Commission, created

in 1905. Other commissions, created in order to regulate insurance companies, to regulate industry in general in the state and to equalize taxes, were approved by the state legislators. These commissions did many things previously done either by the legislature or by the governor, and ordinarily, at least, did them better than they had previously been done.

After having served three terms as governor, and after assuring himself that the progressive movement was safely launched in the state, La Follette entered the Senate of the United States in 1906. However, he retained his influence and power in Wisconsin, with the result that the political machine that he had built, continued to function. Even though state government expenses doubled between 1900 and 1913, state revenues rose from about five million dollars to over fourteen million dollars during the same period, thereby enabling the state to meet its obligations.

Chapter Nine, entitled, "The State and the University" is helpful in enabling one to understand how La Follette utilized the staff and the facilities of the University of Wisconsin in furthering the progressive movement. Helpful information is given, too, concerning the extremely important Legislative Reference Library placed under the direction of Charles McCarthy in 1901. The reasons for La Follette's break, in 1909, with his wealthy sponsor, Isaac Stephenson, are not made too clear, but the factors which prevented La Follette from achieving nomination on the Republican ticket in 1912 are well, even though briefly analyzed.

Although La Follette was to remain in the Senate until his death in 1925, his basic work for his native state was completed by 1912. By that date he had perfected the progressive machine and overthrown the conservative organization. He had brought the progressive movement in Wisconsin to national attention. His was the important personality in Wisconsin politics. His ideals and prejudices, his strength and his weakness were reflected in the progressive movement in Wisconsin.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

Revolution in America. Confidential Letters and Journals 1776–1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces. Translated and annotated by Bernard Uhlendorf. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J., 1957. Pp. xv, 640. Illustrated. $9.00.

When it is realized that nearly half of the imperial regulars fighting to repress our Revolution were the twenty thousand German auxiliaries, it is at once clear that their State archives could throw considerable light on the progress of that conflict. Hesse–Cassel in particular contributed over fifty per cent of the German component. Her group alone of the six contingents retained its independent organization and command during the eight year combat. Her Adjutant General remained throughout the war at general headquarters in the vicinity of New York. This gentleman—and he was that—reported to his sovereign with military regularity. It is

his confidential letters that are here translated and expertly edited for the American reader.

The papers now reside in the William L. Clements Library of the University of Michigan. Most of them are now printed for the first time. All have an intimate bearing on the progress of the action. They have the stamp of official exactness, remarkable consideration for ally and enemy, and unusual objectivity. Moreover their author indicates a contact with colonial cross-currents that corroborates and sometimes improves our understanding of that complex period. He makes clear, for example, how our military possessed exceptional foreknowledge of British designs, whence we were able to outdo our opponents in psychological tactics and occasionally to undermine their own organization. His reports, too, light up the British war potential of that period. In the summer of 1775 George III had at the most eighteen thousand effective land troops in the various garrisons of the homeland, and recruiting found no sympathy or interest. Overseas her units lay dispersed in negligible strength. But on the sea itself she sailed the world with mastery. The Yorktown campaign, with French De Grasse in unbreakable blockade, was a highly exceptional maritime setback. Her men of war—and her commercial bent—made the sea her home. The land war in the broad stretches of the colonies found her in need of foreign aid.

Major Baurmeister does not question the propriety of mercenary services. He and his men were acting on military orders of an eighteenth century tone. Nor does he question the policy. His viewpoint is entire loyalty to the top command. He shares the British amazement in that subjects should disobey their rulers. When he remarks the problem of learning British intentions, of the waste and possible peculation before General Carleton took over control of operations, he nevertheless details the events of the contest as an English effort. In this he naturally fails to appreciate colonial successes. Thus he chronicles with thoroughness the capture of numberless prizes by the strong arm of the service, the navy under Howe and Hood, and it is only in his letter of April 13, 1783, that he speaks of our threat on the sea in this significant clause: "Since ships can now make the trip to Europe in safety."

Washington's generalship merits constant approbation, as does his magnificent personality, though this regard is seriously strained in one case of threatened punishment of a Hessian refugee who committed a serious crime. Other colonials are recorded as the record ran: the Conway affair, New England's separatism in point of tax-collections and recruiting of soldiers, Pennsylvania driving Congress to Princeton, Indian barbarities ripping up the western front, Loyalists up and down the line. For Congress his mood vacillates between the adjectives "great" and "villainous." From the outset he sees the rebellious people preparing their own destruction in their divisions of opinion and the wasting of the countryside before the advancing Redcoats. In early 1777 he hopes for victory and an early return home, and the mood never changes. No matter if the defeat of Cornwallis cleared the whole central sector from further threat, he still

finds the great fleet able to turn the issue. Calmly his last letter, from Portsmouth, England, he reports the trip homeward.

From these letters and their revelations of the military mind, it is plain that the conflict with the Thirteen Colonies was only part of a far wider struggle, the drive for complete mastery of the seas with its connotation of commercial development by sea-control and of imperial holdings. And the great wars of the French Revolution are already begun in the royal navy's first interest of destroying the Bourbon fleets, garrisons, harbors and naval stations in the heart-land of that day, the Caribbean Sea.

W. Eugene Shiels

Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio

The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England. By Samuel Eliot Morison. New York University Press, New York, 1956. Pp. x, 288. $4.95.

The Legend of the Founding Fathers. By Wesley Frank Craven. New York University Press, New York, 1956. Pp. vi, 191. $4.50.

The reprinting of Professor Morison's *The Puritan Pronaos* under its new title is most welcome. In the near quarter of a century since this book first appeared, the study of American intellectual history has become an increasingly erudite and sophisticated craft. Thus this book does not equal in nuance and complex analysis the studies of *The New England Mind* by Professor Morison's younger colleague, Professor Perry Miller. This study is, nevertheless, an indispensable reconstruction of the framework of Puritan intellectual activity. Concentrating on the institutional and material elements of this framework, Professor Morison briefly sketches in the English and religious inheritance of the colonies. From here in a quick but concrete fashion he retells the story of the colleges, the public and grammar schools, private and public libraries, the sermons, the historical literature, and finally the scientific curiosity of the Puritan generations of the seventeenth century.

Professor Morison's sense of the appropriate detail gives this book its great value. Here one learns not only of the legal beginnings of Harvard College but also that the steward of the college was frequently required to accept as fees "firewood, lumber, tallow, wax, turnips, and live goats. . . ." Again the content of the Grammar schools curricula is supported by a list of the "Books Owned by the Pupils in the Boston Latin and Other New England Grammar Schools." Similarly it is intriguing to be reminded that the Boston bookseller John Usher could supply his customers with such books as Coke's *Reports, The Boatswaine's Art, or the complete Boatswaine,* Hannah Woley's *Queen-like Closet, or rich Cabinet, stored with all manner of rare Receipts for preserving, Candying, and Cookery. Very pleasant and beneficial to all Ingenious persons of the Female Sex;* and for light reading they could take home *The English Rogue, comprehending the most eminent Cheats of both Sexes.*

Professor Morison's book is not distinguished by its explicit interpretative analysis. He is content to deny the myths which have presented the Puritans in a dark and unattractive image. The myth he prefers is identified in his last sentence where he concludes, "Primitive New England is the porch to the temple; a puritan *pronaos* as it were to the American mind of the nineteenth century, and of today."

The purpose of Professor Wesley Frank Craven's book is to trace historically the development and ramifications of the varying myths concerning our Puritan ancestors from the days of the Puritans themselves until the time of historians like Professors Morison and Miller. It is Professor Craven's view that Puritans have successfully defeated the Revolutionary fathers in their bid to become the favorite ancestors in America's dreams concerning its origins and destiny.

In recounting this tale he offers an explanation for the failure of Virginia to rob the New Englander's of their exalted position. He observes also that the Revolution celebrations of the Fourth of July at first tended to depress interest in the New England founding fathers. Eventually these aroused new and intense interest in this beginning of what was construed as the source of the Revolutionary tradition. In mid-nineteenth century, Southern writers and statesmen once again challenged the Yankee distortions of history. To protect the Puritan legend John G. Palfrey brought up the heavy guns of his *History of New England,* of which the first of five volumes was published on the eve of the Civil War. In the decades following the Civil War, New Englanders and Virginians were no longer alone in their pursuit of America's unique beginnings. New organizations such as the Sons and Daughters of the Revolution had to bear the competition of patriots enlisted in The American–Irish Historical Society. Of the two societies perhaps that created by the Hibernians proved the more tolerant. For as one of its earliest chairmen, Thomas J. Gargan, declared: "We respect the Germans, the French, the Italians, and the genuine Scotchman; but for that masquerading misnomer, the Scotch–Irishman, who claims no ancestry and no country as his own, we have only contempt; and he will go down to posterity as he deserves, 'unwept, unhonored, and unsung.' "

In the period following the First World War the professional historian became the primary custodians of the New England legacy. Professor Craven has delicately assessed their employment of this high trust. He himself is definitely on the side of the professors, for he concludes his book with a plea that patriotic societies exhibit a little restraint in pouring money into historical reconstructions and instead give some for the training of graduate students in American history. The value of Professor Craven's book, like that of Professor Morison's, lies in the wealth of detail and narrative skill. His interpretations are unlikely to evoke either patriotic or scholarly ire.

Edward T. Gargan

Loyola University, Chicago

Worship and Work. By Colman J. Barry, O.S.B. St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1956. Pp. 447. $5.00.

It has often been stated that the history of American Catholicism cannot definitely be presented as a whole until countless smaller areas of endeavor have been adequately searched out. It is in this latter respect that Father Colman Barry has made a definite contribution. Anniversary books can sometimes be as unhistorical as Herodotus in his wilder moments, and not nearly as interesting. The author of the present volume has tried hard to tell his story *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* and at the same time make the matter interesting. We think he has succeeded to an admirable degree in both.

The main purpose of the book is to tell the story of St. John's Abbey from the time of its foundation to the present. The coming of the Cassinese Congregation of Benedictines to the United States under Father, later Abbot, Wimmer, their settling in Pennsylvania, the Minnesota foundation and its early struggles are all dealt with in turn. Interesting pages treat of the missionary activities of the Benedictines, their aid rendered to the farmers in agricultural affairs, their interest in the liturgy and the work of men like Father Virgil in promoting liturgical-mindedness among Catholics. Of special interest to educators will be the sections dealing with the beginnings of St. John's College and its development into an outstanding school of higher learning. Here it should be pointed out that Father Barry has taken the attitude that the truth if properly told will not hurt. Good pioneers are bound to be men of strong wills; and strong wills sometimes bring about misunderstandings. The Minnesota Benedictines had their share of sturdy pioneers. Their misunderstandings—specifically the Abbot Alexius incident—are treated candidly and yet in such a way that in the end one can only sympathize with the hardships of the pioneers and admire them for the good they accomplished in spite of their little human failings.

Worship and Work would be worth while if it told only the story of St. John's. However it does more than that. It throws interesting light on Catholic, particularly German Catholic participation in early American life. Throughout the book such items as bigotry, lay trusteeism, early schooling and social life in general are touched upon. A glimpse is given of the westward movement from Minnesota into the Dakotas and the steps to the Pacific coast. The work of Catholics among the Indians of the early West is not neglected.

The book has a few faults that grate just a bit. For one thing it gives the impression of being slightly repetitious at times. Again, the remark about Brother Patrick, "who did not have any beer at hand, drank too much water and became sick," (P. 29) is somewhat on the homely side. Furthermore, most readers of the book will perhaps be sufficiently acquainted with the Abbey grounds, buildings and landmarks to recognize them on the pictures. A complete stranger has to rely on captions; and while the captions are marked, the pictures though excellent in themselves are not.

Father Barry has supplied us with a well written account of the Bene-

dictines in Minnesota. The broadness of its concept will make the book interesting to most readers; natives of Minnesota and points west will find it particularly so.

HERMAN J. MULLER

The University of Detroit

The Journals of Welcome Arnold Greene: The Voyages of the Brigantine Perseverance 1817–1820. Edited by Howard Greene and Alice E. Smith. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1956. Pp. vii, 221. Illustrated. $5.00.

There are two manuscript journals and a mass of correspondence of Welcome A. Greene in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin which have long been waiting the pleasure of Mr. Howard Greene for publication. Now, with the capable aid of Alice Smith, grandson Greene has edited the journals and many letters of grandfather Greene in very good print and format. Among the illustrations, which include an artistic endsheet map of the journeys, is a facsimile of the title page in beautiful script, reading: "Journal of a Voyage in the Brig Perseverance of Providence R.I. kept by Welcome A. Greene for his own amusement. Commenced 17th of the 4th Month 1817. Ended 21st of 10th Month 1818." It is very surprising to find a youth of twenty-one writing shrewd, interesting observations in an accurate and at times in a very literary style.

What the young Quaker Welcome wrote about may not be of world-rocking import, but his letters and journals may be quite interesting to seafaring men of the merchant class and to students seeking information on conditions during the period of the Latin American revolts from Spain and Portugal. The young commercial agent sailed on a rather unseaworthy brig out of Providence for Hampton Roads where he loaded a cargo composed of 105 hogsheads of tobacco, 18,700 white oak barrel staves, 7,032 hogshead staves, and 108 coils of cordage. It was his business to sell these in Europe in the face of considerable competition from other merchants and to buy sundry products as fish, liquor, lime, in Norway for disposal in Gibraltar and Cádiz, and in these latter places to buy wine, salt, Spanish gold coins, and other items for sale in Brasil and the Plata area. There he purchased dried beef for the return voyage by way of Havana where sugar, rum, and molasses were taken on for Rhode Island. Welcome received two per centum commission. The costs of repairing the brig at every port and losses of parts of the cargoes due to water getting into the salt and lime, or rats gnawing holes in the wine or molasses casks, or beef decaying, and burials of members of the crew, each cut down on the profit from the ventures. Welcome returned from Havana on another ship and when the *Perseverance* finally limped into Providence the Arnold Company "saw no inducement to fit her out immediately for another voyage." Neither did Welcome ever more find any inducement to get out on the high seas.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

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Notes and Comments

Peter Masten Dunne – In Memoriam

Peter Masten Dunne, S.J., well known for his writings on the missions and missionaries of the Pacific Slope, passed away on January 16, 1957, in the sixty-seventh year of his life. He was at the time chairman of the department of history at the University of San Francisco and two weeks before his death he had completed a year as president of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association. Though in the final stages of cancer he undertook the journey to the meeting of the Association during the Christmas holidays to read his address, knowing fully the short span of life that remained for him.

Father Dunne was born April 16, 1889, at San Jose, California, and received his undergraduate degree from the University of Santa Clara. He entered the Jesuit Order on July 20, 1906, at Los Gatos where he spent the first five years of his religious training. These years were followed by seminary courses in philosophy and the arts leading to a master's degree at Gonzaga University, and by several years teaching at the high school level. He was sent to Hastings, England, for his courses in theology. There he was ordained on August 24, 1921, after the third year of his studies. In 1923 he was instructor in history at the Los Gatos Seminary. This was followed by a year's study in history and education at Columbia University, a year as instructor at the University of Santa Clara, and five years instructorship in the Jesuit Seminary at Los Gatos. He joined the department of history of the University of San Francisco in 1931. He was given leave of absence in 1934 and 1935 to pursue his studies in the graduate school of the University of California, Berkeley, which conferred on him the doctor's degree in 1935.

In the course of his thirty years as professor he had occasion to visit many of the Latin American countries to gather materials for his lectures and scholarly writings. His articles have appeared in MID-AMERICA and in other historical magazines. His ten published books include a series on the advance of the Jesuit missions from Sinaloa, Mexico, to Arizona. These are: *Pioneer Black Robes of the West Coast* (1940), *Pioneer Jesuits in Northern Mexico*

(1944), *Early Jesuit Missions in Tarahumara* (1948), *Andrés Pérez de Ribas* (1951), *Black Robes in Lower California* (1952), *Jacobo Sedelmayer, Missionary, Frontiersman, Explorer in Arizona and Sonora* (1955). His *A Padre Views South America* (1945) had the distinction of being banned in two of the South American countries whose dictators did not relish Father Dunne's promotion of the North American idea of the party system, compromise and tolerance of the opinions of others, so notably lacking in the said countries.—J.V.J.

* * * *

The Cavalry of Christ on the Rio Grande, by Bernard Doyen, O.M.I., published late in 1956 by Bruce in Milwaukee, is a nugget of pure ore pointing up a phase of the great story of western expansion in America. The field is the extreme south of Texas, the triangle bounded by Galveston, San Antonio and Laredo as the northern base, and its apex the Brownsville area. The time is from the end of Lone Star Republic days to 1883. The actors are a significant religious force—the Oblates of Mary Immaculate—who in 1849 sent their first detachment to join in the building of frontier society. From Brownsville they radiated their energies into Mexico for 100 miles along the lower Rio Grande and southward as far as the neighborhood of the capital. North of the great river they spread light and mercy throughout the triangle in a struggle against raw human nature that had no sizable interest in faith or worship until these redoubtable missionaries fenced them in and tamed them into responsible citizens.

Turner in his famous study noted the tendency of the frontier toward vulgarization, or, more simply, toward a loss of culture. The documentary picture painted in this volume shows the need in that society for what Theodore Roosevelt called "some civilization." Indeed the Oblates had no notion of themselves as significant historical forces nor even as agents of culture. Their aim was more direct, for they were dedicated men of God. Yet a careful reading of the text enforces that universal moral of the civilizing power of honest religious living.

Doctor Doyon presents a tale drawn completely from first-hand materials. He describes the call of Bishop Odin for helpers, and the response from the Marseilles Congregation with outposts in Canada. In our northern neighbor these Fathers opened up history

in many a broad area, and if they had not been so intrepid and courageous they would never have sent part of their complement of men so far south as the wild environs of the triangle of Texas. Once there life was most precarious, and its risks came partly from their own insecurity of possession and the difficulty of satisfactory communication with headquarters in southern France. Almost at the point of extinction, authorities turned in their favor and after 1883 they were to enjoy decades and excellent success down to our day.

For a student of the frontier, it must be obvious that the support of so highly organized a religion as the Catholic Church is almost impossible in the days of early settlement. Men with vows of poverty have no economic ground to walk on. They can claim no range with their guns, nor do they take out time to run thousands of cattle on even the meagre hope of selling them somewhere and from the profit endowing their ministerial efforts. And unless they are part of a large and closely-knit organization, they cannot call for or get the aid on the spot that is necessary to survival. How the Oblates ever made out will puzzle the historian, unless he understands thoroughly the type of man he is studying and the determination and sense of mission held by these unique characters. They met the test, and they are still masters of the field.

This book is well written, and carefully annotated. Nevertheless it has need of closer relevance to the church history of Texas and the West. As it is, it constitutes rather the material for part of a larger history than a treatise standing by itself. There is, too, a somewhat overdue attention to the special spiritual message of the Congregation, and perhaps too little stress on what the mission did to make the church on the frontier. But there is no doubt that the work will be brought under contribution by later studies of the broader subject. W. E. Shiels.

* * * *

The first hundred years of the life span of St. Francis Seminary, Milwaukee, have been described by The Right Reverend Monsignor Peter Leo Johnson in *Halcyon Days 1856–1956.* Long associated with the faculty as professor of history, editor of *The Salesianum,* and director of the Historical Studies and of the archives Monsignor Johnson is exceptionally well qualified to write this centennial

volume in an authoritative and sympathetic manner. Since his original appointment to the faculty in 1920 he has been witness to the growth of the institution and has been scrupulous in collecting documentary materials pertaining to its rise and its influence, to its alumni, of whom thirty-four became bishops and six archbishops, and the trials and works of most of the clergy of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.

The Salesianum, as St. Francis Seminary was first known, was born of the pressing need in the third and fourth decades of the last century to supply priests for the spiritual needs of the thousands of German Catholics streaming to the land of their adoption in the middle-west. During the years 1844 to 1864 well over 200,000 Catholics arrived in Wisconsin, the majority from Germany. These, as Monsignor Johnson shows in his introductory chapter, were almost without religious services or attention owing to the paucity of German speaking clergy in Europe and in America and to the lack of vocations in the middle states. Bishop Henni during his episcopate at Cincinnati was unable to establish a seminary especially designed to train a native, bilingual clergy, nor was he able to make much progress during the first ten years of his incumbency as Bishop of Milwaukee. By 1854, however, he had laid the cornerstones by establishing academies and preparatory seminaries and by getting promising students from the German and Irish settlers and from the old countries. With German and Austrian financial aid the great day of the laying of the cornerstone of the special seminary, July 15, 1855, witnessed civic and religious celebrations in the German and English tongues. Classes were opened under an unfinished roof in January, 1856. Ten years of struggle through the times of the Civil War conclude the first six chapters of the volume, chapters full of interest for students of pioneer days in Wisconsin and particularly Milwaukee.

The remaining thirteen chapters follow a topical order tracing the developments of the curriculum, the library, the academic societies, oratory, the stage and drama, the philosophical and theological studies and faculties, the spiritual training in both preparatory and major seminaries, the several war interruptions and programs, the finances, the administration, the building programs and constructions, the alumni, and a chapter on the great help of the Sisters of St. Francis in their care of the domestic economy. The chapters are dotted with short biographical sketches of men most prominent in the developments. Thus, in some four hundred pages and with

many illustrations, Monsignor Johnson fills out in a pleasing style a well-rounded picture of the training of the Wisconsin clergy over the century. The publisher is Bruce of Milwaukee and the list price is five dollars.

* * * *

The Land Called Chicora, by Paul Quattlebaum, has a more descriptive subtitle, "The Carolinas Under Spanish Rule, with French Intrusions, 1520–1670." The author, a native of South Carolina, compresses the fruits of his long years of research into this volume of 152 pages, of which 120 pages are devoted to the history of explorations and settlements along the southeast coast of the United States. In this readable history interest is centered upon the colonizing expedition of Lucas Vásquez de Ayllón in 1526, which immediately involved the author in the problems of locating the site of the settlement, the site of Chicora, and the river which was called the Jordan.

For the solution of the problems Quattlebaum turns to a study of the documents published by Woodbury Lowery and Navarrete and the contemporary accounts in Oviedo and Peter Martyr to find clues. He scans the old charts and maps, four of which are reproduced. Occasional references are made to secondary writers, but chiefly as authorities in areas not directly pertinent to his study, as Lowery for the Florida scene, Lanning for the Georgia mission area, and Lewis and Loomie for the early Virginia story. Besides, he employs some plain common sense and his long observation of the region to good advantage. After all details were assessed and evaluated he gives cautiously the most probable and most plausible locations. The River Jordan, the first aim of the Ayllon expedition, seems to be the mouth of the Cape Fear River. The landing was made at present Southport, North Carolina, whence by land and sea the colony moved west to South Carolina, then turned southwest to the tip of Waccamaw Neck across from present Georgetown, South Carolina. There the doomed settlement was made and called San Miguel de Gualdape, on the east shore of the Gualdape River (now the mouth of the Peedee-Waccamaw) and not far from the northern shore of Winyah Bay (nor far from the present Hobcaw Barony home of Bernard M. Baruch, Quattlebaum thinks). Chicora, Ayllón's tragic grant, embraced the two Carolina's.

The general history describes the coastal explorations, the Spanish and French conflicts, and the arrival of the English, while a closing chapter gives a brief description of the Indians and their mores in Chicora. There are three illustrations and an excellent endpaper map of the general and particular coastal areas. Six Appendixes precede the Bibliography and Index. The University of Florida Press, the publisher and printer, has presented a fine format and type. The list price of the work is $3.75.

* * * *

In 1953 Stephen B. Sarasohn submitted his doctoral dissertation to the faculties of Columbia University and when it was approved had it filmed by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, under title of "The Regulation of Parties and Nominations in Michigan: The Politics of Political Reform." He joined the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University. Dr. Sarasohn was busy preparing another work based upon his dissertation when he died at the age of thirty in January, 1955, leaving his research unfinished after 1952. His wife, Vera H. Sarasohn, also a member of the same Department of Political Science has outlined the plan and has brought the story of Michigan politics to 1956. This year, 1957, it has been published in paper cover as one of the Wayne State University Studies as *Political Party Patterns in Michigan* and is available at the Wayne State University Press, Detroit, for a dollar and seventy-five cents.

The seventy pages of text in the book describe the development of Michigan politics during this century from the period of dominance by factions of the votes for state governor and United States senator to what now appears to be a two-party system. From the end of the last century such powerful factions as the McMillan Alliance, the Green Alliance, the McKay-McKeighan-Barnard Alliance, and the Summerfield Alliance controlled the Republican Party, the nominations, the appointments and the legislation. In the 1940's and 1950's the Democrat Party supported by the Van Wagoner Organization and the CIO-liberal Alliance and now more recently by the combined automotive interests and workers seems to have the upper hand. Disregarding the higher offices and the state and national candidates the UAW–CIO have put their power and

resources behind the election of local candidates and have concentrated on the policies and promises of social and economic benefits. The sources for the information in the book are almost entirely newspapers of Michigan, particularly those of Detroit.

* * * *

Scholars and readers who like to have proof for statements made in books will look with raised eyebrows at what seems to be a revolt against footnotes in *The Early Jackson Party in Ohio,* by Professor Harry R. Stevens of Duke University. In the Bibliographical Note we read: "Documentation in this volume has been kept to a minimum. The nature of the information in it usually points to the general area in which the source may be found." He explains that all the present bibliographical aids and library facilities seem to remove footnote obligations on scholarly publications. Besides it is more costly to print footnotes; manuscript depositories are listed in the preface and published sources can be found in major research libraries. The result is that there are 48 footnotes in the 164 pages of the text, only two of which cite published books, three in number. This is not to say that the author lacks authority. Rather, his nine years of research on this subject are evident in the vast amount of factual data compressed into the volume, though scholars would prefer to know more about the contents of many of the manuscript files from which the data were culled. In particular, one would wish more information on the following: "One of the most exciting adventures was the discovery of the secret archives of an important Tammany lodge, archives long thought never to have existed at all." (P. 166.)

The preface must be read if one is to understand what seem to be important omissions in the book. Dr. Stevens restricts himself to the formation of one political party, in one state, to the organization of the Jackson party beginning with 1821 and ending at the end of July, 1824, without reference to the election following, or to the organization of the Clay and Adams parties. While the subject is a political party, the story is not exclusively political, but concerned with men of Ohio who were of a variety of non-political occupations. This fact led the blurb writer to characterize the volume as "A story of striving, frustration, blunders, of the com-

bined efforts of many differing personalities often at cross purposes, leading at last to . . . the creation of our national political party system."

The personalities are first the interesting Moses Dawson who escaped the hangman's noose in Belfast, arrived at Philadelphia to be an organizer of Lancaster schools, and in 1817 became a teacher in the Lancaster Seminary in Cincinnati. Next are General "Tippecanoe" Harrison and lawyer James Gazlay, rivals for the seat in the state senate until the failure of the Miami Bank in Cincinnati. Appearing on the financial and political scene were Elijah Hayward, David Wade, Judge Hooker, John Piatt, and General Findlay, The political individualism, turbulence, lack of focus and aims throughout the state through the election of 1820 are made quite clear in the opening three chapters. The rest of the book is devoted to the Jackson part formation and in conclusion Chapter XIII is a neat summary of Dr. Stevens' findings and reflections. The list price of the book is $4.50 at Duke University Press.

* * * *

The Strait of Anian is a thirteen page brochure accompanying "An exhibit of three maps in the James Ford Bell Collection at the University of Minnesota, portraying sixteenth and eighteenth century concepts of the waterway between Asia and America, which is now known as the Bering Strait." The three maps most important to the history of the search for and the discovery of the narrow passage separating Siberia from Alaska are Camocio's map of western North America, drawn between 1562 and 1565, Zaltieri's map, dated 1566, and Captain Vitus Bering's map of his expedition of 1725–1730 across Siberia to Bering's Strait. These three maps are beautifully reproduced, the latter in color. It is the only copy known to have come to America and is one of the two outside Russia to bear the Romanoff coat of arms.

* * * *

A new journal to be called *Victorian Studies* is to be published by Indiana University under the editorship of Philip Appleman, William Madden, and Michael Wolff. The quarterly which is to

begin in the Autumn of this year has as its purpose the examination of Victorian culture in all of its forms, and it will carry articles in any of the humanities, arts and sciences, as well as notes, comments, and queries. It intends to effect a coordination of the various academic disciplines toward an examination and appreciation of the period. Besides the book review section it will publish an annual bibliography and will have pages given to a forum for discussing controversial issues. The subscription rate will be five dollars a year in this country and thirty-five shillings in England. Manuscript contributions and all communications should be addressed to The Editors, *Victorian Studies,* Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

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The Decline of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1911-1914

The long period of Progressive domination in Wisconsin, marked by the personality of Robert M. La Follette and an imposing battery of reform legislation, was brought to an abrupt halt in 1914. The election as governor of Emanuel Philipp, a refrigerator car magnate who had long been closely associated with the major Wisconsin railroads in opposition to the Progressives, most decisively signaled the end of the era. Philipp was described by La Folette as late as 1913 as "an out and out corporation man."[1] Along with Philipp, an anti-Progressive majority assumed control of the legislature. At the same time, the electorate decisively rejected ten constitutional amendments supported by the Progressives, including proposals for initiative, referendum and a modified recall. Nor was the Progressive setback an accidental, highly transitory thing. Though La Follette secured reelection in 1916, so too did Philipp and his conservative cohorts in the legislature. It was not until 1920, after World War I had buried old issues and scrambled factional lines that the pro-La Follette group regained any substantial share of power.[2]

The significance of the 1914 defeat has been minimized in the most recent scholarship. Fola La Follette writes: "The split in the progressive Republican forces had enabled the Stalwarts to nominate Philipp for governor, although the official returns showed that

[1] Robert M. La Follette, *La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences,* Madison, 1913, 229.

[2] Herbert F. Margulies, "Issues and Politics of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1906–1920," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1955, 378–415.

out of 125,000 Republican votes he had received only a third. All the other state officers were renominated over their reactionary opponents. . . ."[3] Robert Maxwell joins in placing Philipp's victory solely in the context of Progressive division.[4] They are referring, of course, to the deep split in the ranks that occurred when Governor Francis E. McGovern and Senator La Follette came into open conflict at the 1912 Republican National Convention. While both authors recognize that the Progressives suffered a serious blow in 1914, they apparently do not appreciate just how serious it was.[5]

It is quite true that Philipp's nomination resulted in part from division among men who had been known as Progressives. But Progressive division does not explain the results in the Democratic party primary, in which the rabidly anti-Progressive John C. Karel won the nomination for governor against the more liberal John A. Aylward.[6] Nor can internal division explain the repudiation of the constitutional amendments, or the election of an anti-Progressive legislature. Finally, the very poor showing of John J. Blaine, La Follette's independent candidate for Governor, remains to be explained.

Nor is it even true, as Miss La Follette and Dr. Maxwell contend, that a majority of the votes cast in the Republican gubernatorial primary were "Progressive" in any meaningful sense of the word. One of the five candidates who divided the "Progressive" vote, Henry Roethe, had been a Progressive of the most dubious sort. Roethe, a small town editor who polled over twelve thousand votes, was the first of the candidates, including Philipp himself, to raise the conservative cry against taxes, extravagance and commissions. In June of 1914, he addressed the very anti-tax, anti-spending convention that nominated Philipp.[7] A State Senator who served with him on the finance committee considered Roethe "a dyed in the

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[3] Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette,* 2 vols., New York, 1953, 1, 506.

[4] Robert M. Maxwell, *La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin,* Madison, 1956, 192–193.

[5] Of course, Miss La Follette's attention is centered on the national events with which Senator La Follette was preoccupied. Her statements bearing on the Wisconsin situation are therefore of a relatively casual, background nature.

[6] The Progressive versus Stalwart contest so dramatically waged within the Republican party had its counterpart in the Democratic party through the years. Democratic factionalism has not been closely studied only because the Republican party was dominant in the state. Nevertheless, the Democratic primaries were often as reflective of public sentiment as the Republican.

[7] *Wisconsin State Journal,* June 23, 1914.

wool Stalwart."[8] and the Wisconsin Society of Equity, a Progressive farmers organization, omitted his name, along with Philipp's, from a list of acceptable candidates.[9]

Andrew Dahl, William Hatton, Merlin Hull and Bruce Utman had stronger claims than did Roethe to the label "Progressive." With the exception of the little-known Utman, however, these claims were based more on their records prior to 1914 than on their statements during the 1914 primary campaign. Analysis of the campaign planks of the serious "Progressive" contenders, Dahl, Hatton and Hull, reveals that they acquiesced in many of the conservative complaints lodged most persuasively by Philipp. Distinctively progressive issues were available, but of all the candidates only Utman, a political outsider who polled the fewest votes, campaigned largely on these issues. The campaign appeals of the so-called Progressives is, in fact, the most striking testimony to the strength of conservative sentiment in 1914. The election of Philipp was not merely the result of Progressive division. On the contrary, it reflected a far graver wound. A majority of Wisconsin voters had become thoroughly disillusioned with Progressivism.

This disillusionment revealed the basic limitation of Progressivism in Wisconsin. In a sense, the reservations held by a majority of the electorate towards some phases of the Progressive movement, by setting permissible limits to reform, gave definition to the movement itself.

Certain underlying weaknesses in the Progressive phalanx had already been revealed in the period 1906 through 1909. The Progressives had fought for and become committed to the direct primary, along with the repudiation of conventions, caucuses and all other marks of "boss rule." But this commitment seriously hurt the La Follette forces when they sought to themselves achieve unity. Another limitation was the nationality appeal, directed especially to the Norwegian-Americans of the state. The successful revolt of James O. Davidson in 1906 exposed the flimsiness of that reed. Finally, the strategy of constant political warfare, which La Follette deemed essential, was not approved by a large number of other Progressive Republicans, who desired party unity. However, these and lesser disabilities were overcome by the fact of rising living

[8] Henry Huber to H. E. G. Keup, September 24, 1915, Henry Huber Letterbooks, Wisconsin Historical Society Library. (All manuscript collections cited are at the same repository.)

[9] *Janesville Gazette*, August 22, 1914.

costs together with new issues generated on the national scene. Thus, in 1910, the Progressives scored one of their greatest victories.[10]

The new lease on life gave some of the Progressives the opportunity to develop aspects of reform that had previously been only latent. As they did so, new elements of discord within the movement gradually became apparent. To some extent, the renewed factionalism that plagued the Progressives increasingly after 1912 was truly the result of a clash of personalities and ambitions. But the personal factor was only a part, and probably a lesser part, of the overall story. Basic to the internal discord and general weakening of the Progressive movement in the state was the fundamental division of opinion within the Progressive faction itself as to the very nature of the movement. Some of this conflict of view had been evident prior to 1910. Much of it did not become apparent until after 1911.

The elements of weakness pointed to in the earlier period contributed to the deterioration of Progressive strength. The problem of the primary continued unsolved, despite enactment of a law allowing a second choice vote. Progressive failure to unite in 1914 was due in part to lack of a formal mechanism for achieving unity. Progressive votes were indeed divided, to the advantage of Philipp, though to a lesser degree than some have claimed. The nationality question was not so obvious a source of embarrassment as it had been, largely because the Stalwarts, for reasons of their own, abandoned James O. Davidson without replacing him with an equally popular Norwegian. But, as Gerd Korman has demonstrated, the German-Americans remained quite nationality-conscious, and when some of them allied with La Follette, it was on their terms, not his.[11] Opposition to La Follette because he created discord within the party, an important issue in 1906 and 1908, was also less prominent, but only because newer complaints occupied the minds of disgruntled voters, both Stalwart and Progressive. Paradoxically, the political resurgence of the Stalwarts resulted from the new legislative achievements of the Progressives. Rather guilelessly, as it developed, the Progressives dug their own political graves.

The cost of living question, which had aroused voter discontent and promoted Progressive revival in 1910, gave impetus to several

10 Marguilies, "Issues and Politics," 139–178.

11 Gerd Korman, "Political Loyalties, Immigrant Traditions and Reform: The Wisconsin German–American Press and Progressivism, 1909–1912," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, XL (Spring, 1957), 161–171.

economic reforms. The newly created Board of Affairs advanced many grandiose schemes for cooperatives of several sorts in the context of the cost of living problem.[12] The *Milwaukee Free Press* remarked ruefully "The unrest, the dissatisfaction of the times, the eagerness of so large a portion of the people for all sorts of subversive or at least dubious experiments and panaceas in government are largely assignable to the constantly mounting cost of the necessities of life."[13] For some of the most influential Progressives, however, the cost of living complaint was but a convenient excuse for reforms deemed desirable for other and more fundamental reasons. The spirit of optimism and the desire for change permeated the American intellectual community during the Progressive years and informed the La Follette movement in Wisconsin.

Madison's State Street was a much used thoroughfare during the Progressive era, for it connected the University of Wisconsin with the state capitol building. Traffic moved in both directions. John R. Commons, Balthasar Meyer, Richard T. Ely, Charles R. Van Hise and many other University scholars gave advice and sometimes administrative service to the state. La Follette and many of his most trusted lieutenants, in turn, were devoted alumni of the University, who tried to use their governmental power to help the alma mater and to make fullest use of the services of University faculty and students in the business of government. The relationship became so well known that it gained a name, the Wisconsin Idea.

The thinking of Professor Richard T. Ely was both influential and representative. Ely studied economics under Karl Knies in Germany. From Knies, he drew the institutional approach, rejecting Adam Smith's Newtonian view of the economic system as an unchanging entity governed by immutable laws. Ely and the new institutionalists, organized into the American Economic Association in 1885, suggested that changing historical circumstances rendered obsolete all *a priori* systems. Specifically, they rejected the Smithian idea that government interference in the economy is invariably a bad thing, or that labor unions unduly interfere with the law of supply and demand.[14]

The intellectual leaders of the Progressivism that developed under Governor Francis E. McGovern in 1911 took new views on

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[12] *Milwaukee Free Press,* October 30, 1912.
[13] *Ibid.,* June 14, 1912.
[14] See especially Richard T. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet,* New York, 1938.

many issues. Unlike their purely Jeffersonian colleagues, men like Charles McCarthy, McGovern, President Van Hise, John R. Commons and Ely, among others, were not wedded to direct democracy, small government, or free competition. Their view on the subject of trusts perhaps reflected much of their thought. These men all flirted with Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism in 1912, as opposed to the more traditional reform views of Wilson and Brandeis. As McCarthy expressed it, "The policy of bursting combinations is a mistaken one." Even if effective, he argued, trust-busting would deny to society economies of scale. Not anti-trust action but governmental price fixing on monopoly-produced articles was McCarthy's solution.[15]

Probably the best statement of the new Progressivism was contained in McCarthy's book *The Wisconsin Idea.* McCarthy, dynamic chief of the Legislative Reference Library, began by outlining the situation that had aroused Henry George, the simultaneous growth of progress and poverty. This process, he felt, sprang inevitably from industrialism. It would surely bring the liquidation of the middle class, in a classical Marxian sense, but for one factor, the growth of intelligence. Salvation would be achieved if the power of the State, guided by intelligence and reason, mobilized against the sinister forces of concentrated capital and industry. McCarthy pointed to Germany as the prime example of what could be done through the union of intelligence and state power. Wisconsin was his Exhibit B.

The key idea in McCarthy's system was that of the non-partisan commission of experts. "Why should not the state be the Efficiency Expert?" he asked. Already, McCarthy found that the state was harnessing the best brains to the service of the people through regulatory commissions. He looked forward to even wider state service directed toward generating still greater intelligence and efficiency.[16]

These ideas were in accord with those of Governor Francis E. McGovern, who always maintained a close and friendly collaboration with McCarthy.[17] The new governor was a forty-four year old University alumnus from Milwaukee. Acutely aware of the

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15 Charles McCarthy to Herman Ekern, November 7, 1911, Herman L. Ekern Papers; Van Hise's views were presented in his book *Concentration and Control*, New York, 1912; McGovern's Marketing Commission bill was constructed in conformity with this outlook.

16 Charles R. McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea*, New York, 1912, 1–20.

17 Francis E. McGovern to John M. Nelson, February 28, 1912, Francis E. McGovern Papers.

new industrial problems that had emerged so suddenly,[18] he was eager to find new solutions. He sought ideas from a wide range of sources, including the newly formed Saturday Lunch Club, where he met with men like Charles R. Van Hise and Edward A. Ross,[19] and the annual Governors' Conference, where he became impressed with his scholarly colleague from New Jersey, Woodrow Wilson.[20] Unafraid of innovation, McGovern did not shy away from McCarthy's notion of a positive, service state. In this respect, McGovern differed somewhat from La Follette. While La Follette was chiefly concerned for the preservation of democracy, and saw economic issues as means towards that end,[21] McGovern subordinated political to economic reform. "Perfection in political machinery is indeed important and vital," he told the 1911 legislature, "principally because by making the government more representative, it paves the way for laws, social adjustments and civil institutions which are calculated to secure and maintain desirable conditions in the daily life and occupations of men."[22]

Members of the 1911 legislature, too, were influenced by the new ideas abroad in the land. An unprecedented number of the legislators, fifty-three, constituting forty-three percent of the whole, had some college training. By contrast, in the conservative 1915 legislature, only thirty-one members, twenty-seven percent, had comparable college background.[23] Charles McCarthy was especially influential with the legislators. Two veteran Progressives recalled as late as 1954 the eagerness with which assemblymen and senators listened to the lucid McCarthy's enthusiasm over reforms worked in New Zealand or Australia, Germany or Denmark.[24]

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[18] Between 1900 and 1910, Wisconsin's population grew 12.8 percent, but the urban centers scored more impressive gains. Milwaukee, center of the growing young foundry and machine-shop industry, advanced thirty-one percent in the decade. Agricultural output jumped from an annual rate of $115,000,000 in 1900 to $200,000,000 in 1910, while industrial output rose from $360,000,000 to $600,000,000. *Wisconsin Blue Book, 1913,* 48–109; *The Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910,* 5:486, 548;9:1322.

[19] Herman Ekern to Charles J. Bushnell, March 12, 1912, Herman L. Ekern Papers.

[20] Leslie R. Fort to Charles McCarthy, January 6, 1911, Charles R. McCarthy Papers.

[21] Robert M. La Follette to Otto Bosshard, January 6, 1906, Robert M. La Follette Papers; *La Folette's Autobiography,* 21.

[22] *State of Wisconsin Assembly Journal, Fiftieth Session,* 27, January 6, 1911.

[23] Howard J. McMurray, "Some Influences of the University of Wisconsin on the State Government of Wisconsin," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1940, 34.

[24] Interview with Charles Rosa, January 15, 1954; Interview with William Kirsch, January 18, 1954.

"You have greater opportunity than any Governor in the state's history to do big things," Alfred T. Rogers, law partner and political lieutenant to La Follette, wired Frank McGovern as the vigorous Milwaukeean took office.[25] McGovern was more than ready. The seed was sown in other years, he told the new legislature, this was the time for the harvest.[26]

The 1911 legislature, enthusiastic, optimistic and buoyed up by the Progressive landslide of 1910,[27] enacted an unprecedented number of important reform proposals in both the political and economic spheres. Some of the political reforms were in the direct democracy tradition, already so well exploited and revitalized by La Follette and his cohorts in their campaigns for the direct primary and against the rule of corrupt bosses. The second choice vote in the primary was finally adopted. So too were constitutional amendment proposals for initiative, referendum, recall of non-judicial officials, and liberalization of amendment procedure. Home rule for cities was advanced by several laws. The woman suffrage question was referred to the people. Moving in the other direction in the political sphere, the office of Insurance Commissioner was made appointive instead of elective.

Probably more significant than the political reforms, in many ways, were the economic. The legislature passed a workmen's compensation law, established an Industrial Commission, regulated hours for women and children, and created an Industrial Education Board. The legislature also enacted a state income tax, provided liberal aid to highway construction, and created a Highway Commission. It passed a comprehensive law for conservation of water power and another setting up a forest reserve and a new commission to match. Wisconsin entered the insurance business with the creation of a state insurance fund to back state-granted life insurance and annuity policies. Rural problems were attacked by laws authorizing the formation of cooperatives, permitting counties to loan credit to settlers for the purpose of improving farm lands, and authorizing counties to borrow money to establish schools of agriculture and domestic economy. As part of the same program, the legislature made civic centers of public school buildings.

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[25] Alfred T. Rogers to Francis E. McGovern, January 2, 1911, McGovern Papers.

[26] *La Follette's Magazine*, 3:2 (January 14, 1911).

[27] John E. McConnell to John J. Esch, February 20, 1911, John J. Esch Papers.

Among the most important new governmental agencies created was the multi-purpose Board of Public Affairs. The board was to modernize the state's financial practices. In addition, however, it was authorized to investigate a wide range of subjects and make recommendations to the governor and legislature. Soon after its creation, the board launched studies of the public school system, community credit and cooperative marketing problems, city planning ideas, the problem of settling unoccupied farm lands and the subject of prison labor.[28]

McCarthy took the view that the Progressive reforms and philosophy of 1911 were extensions of the original movement, not additions to it. He traced the idea of regulatory commissions, the use of experts, and the idea of the positive state to the La Follette administration. Events were to show that McCarthy and his colleagues were overly optimistic. Probably the most significant fact about the reaction that quickly developed against reform and reformers was this: It was infused with ideas and attitudes that had previously served the Progressives.

McCarthy was partly correct in associating La Follette with the new reforms. Although the Senator differed from the McCarthy-McGovern group on the subject of trusts and in placing democracy before economic questions, he did share many of the new views. In fact, it was La Follette himself who first proposed creation of the Board of Public Affairs, the darling of both McCarthy and McGovern.[29] Though greatly devoted to Jeffersonian democracy and the yeoman farmer, La Follette was no enemy to a strong state, labor legislation or the use of reason and "science" in the process of government.

Yet La Follette was himself unrepresentative of many of his fellow Progressives, as James O. Davidson had amply demonstrated when he won the governorship against La Follette's opposition in 1906. To many who supported the Progressive movement in the early days, the new welfare measures, increased state regulation, the proliferation of appointive officials and commissions, and rising state expenditures had little appeal. The renewed conservative drive

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[28] The legislation of the first McGovern administration is well presented in Maxwell, *La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin*, 153–173. A concise summary is contained in Harry C. Wilbur to Medill McCormick, December 4, 1912, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.

[29] Charles R. McCarthy to George E. Scott, August 4, 1914, McCarthy Papers.

begun in 1912 would have been unsuccessful and insignificant but for the fact that it appealed so strongly to the voting backbone of Progressivism.

The focus of conservative attention in 1912 was the new state income tax law. The Wisconsin Manufacturers' Association, in which Democratic politician Harry Bolens was prominent, lobbied against the state income tax bill in 1911.[30] After the bill's adoption, the Association linked forces with other conservatives in urging repeal.[31] The issue proved an excellent vehicle for unification of several important strands of discontent. The new tax involved forty appointive officials, responsible to the Tax Commission, as well as confusing forms to be filled out. Inevitably, the question of undemocratic, inefficient bureaucracy was raised. The tax also suggested the question of state expenses, and served as a springboard for attacks on the growth of commissions and the rising cost of government.

Tax assessments were to be made in July, 1912, on the basis of information provided by the taxpayer during the winter. But as early as February, 1912, speeches were being made in conservative Rock county attacking the income tax and the University, the latter largely because of increased appropriations. These speeches were widely reported and the same lines of attack were followed elsewhere. In March, anti-tax disgruntlement increased as the people began to grapple with the tax forms.[32] In June, Attorney General Levi Bancroft condemned the administration and the income tax, arguing that the tax drove capital from the state, encouraged perjury, and humiliated and degraded citizens by submitting them to inquisitorial procedure.[33]

The Democrats swung into action in July. Judge John C. Karel, a former University of Wisconsin football star from Milwaukee who made friendship his hobby and was active in fraternal, church and civic circles,[34] launched his gubernatorial candidacy with the charge that the state income tax was "obnoxious and inquisitorial" and that "extravagance has run riot in the administration of state

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30 Otto Falk to Harry Bolens, June 2, 1911, Harry Bolens Papers.

31 Wisconsin Manufacturers Association to Theodore Kronshage, September 15, 1912, Theodore Kronshage Papers.

32 Edward E. Browne to Francis E. McGovern, March 28, 1912, McGovern Papers.

33 *Milwaukee Free Press*, June 17, 1912.

34 L. Albert Karel, *The Story of a Friendly Man* (n.p., n.d. [1939]); *Milwaukee Journal*, December 5, 1938.

affairs."[35] His liberal opponent, A. J. Schmitz, defended the tax, but condemned extravagance. The party's primary platform called only for amendment of the tax law, not repeal, but condemned unnecessary commissions and appointive officers as subversive of popular and economical government.[36] The entire conservative attack intensified during the election campaign of 1912. Karel, who had won his party's nomination, led the way, calling the income tax the "most pernicious law that was ever put on the statute books of Wisconsin."[37] The law served the interests of political self seekers, he charged; Stalwart Republican papers like the *Janesville Gazette* and the *Fond du Lac Reporter* agreed.[38]

Harry Bolens, Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, concentrated on the popular outcry against state expenses. He pointed out that in 1901 La Follette had viewed with alarm the recent increase in state expenses.[39]

A Milwaukee lawyer concisely brought together the strands of another popular theme when he wrote:

> The people are tired of this paternalistic, Progressive probing into their private and personal affairs; they are tired of being governed by the university clique; they are tired of theorists, socialists and sociologists. They want to return to a safe and sane government by the people.[40]

Though Progressive defection did not reach dangerous proportions until 1914, there was much evidence as early as 1912 that skepticism about some features of the Progressive movements was not confined to the old guard conservatives. Merlin Hull, a Progressive editor from rural Jackson county, had inveighed against increased spending at the University as early as 1908.[41] The Progressives, in their 1912 campaign, showed a hearty respect for the growing popularity of the economy appeal.

Reforms directed at improving the conditions of laboring men proliferated in 1911. Still, farmers, the voting backbone of Wisconsin Progressivism, were reserved on the whole subject of labor legislation. A serious student of the matter judges that Wisconsin farmers balked at such legislation because they feared the cost to

35 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, July 4, 1912.
36 *Janesville Gazette*, July 12, 1912.
37 *Racine Times*, November 5, 1912.
38 *Janesville Gazette*, October 10, 16, 1912.
39 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 26, 1912.
40 *Janesville Gazette*, October 1, 1912
41 Merle Curti and Vernon Carstensen, *The University of Wisconsin*, 2 vols., Madison, 1949, 2, 179.

taxpayers and, as employers, feared regulation of hours, wages and safety conditions. It proved impossible to pass such bills as the workmen's compensation act, the child labor law, and others until farmer employers were exempted from the provisions of the laws.[42]

Some Progressives could not swallow one of the key ideas of the new Progressivism, that in the interests of scientific efficiency and the short ballot, many officers should be appointive rather than elective. George Cooper, a staunch pro-La Follette editor, and Merlin Hull, were among the opponents of the bill to make the office of Insurance Commissioner appointive. Cooper wrote to Herman Ekern, the Insurance Commissioner, who was actively backing the bill: "If the logic for a change of the office to an appointive one is carried to a conclusion, it will eventually do away with all state elective officers except that of governor."[43] But McCarthy, in *The Wisconsin Idea,* espoused the very thing that Cooper could not even contemplate seriously, conversion of the offices of Secretary of State, Treasurer and Attorney General into appointive positions.[44]

However consistent the ideas of efficiency and democracy may have appeared to McCarthy and McGovern, less sophisticated men saw contradictions. A Progressive county judge from Waukesha wrote Herman Ekern, "I am very much disappointed in you after learning that you campaigned the state, recommending the primary law and the nomination of public officers directly by the people . . . , and then bringing about such legislation as to make your office an appointive office and extending your term, within a very short term after the people were kind enough to elect you."[45]

The Progressives showed their respect for the force of their opponents' arguments in their own 1912 campaign strategy. Instead of taking the offensive, by outlining new reform proposals, the Progressives took up defensive positions and tried to answer the arguments of their foes. McGovern, Tax Commissioner Nils Haugen, Republican Chairman George E. Scott, and Progressive papers like the *Wisconsin State Journal* and the *Superior Telegram* stoutly defended the income tax. They argued that it was lower than the old property tax, but had the advantage that it would be

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42 Gertrude Schmidt, "The History of Labor Legislation in Wisconsin," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1933, 89, 119, 147.

43 George Cooper to Herman Ekern, May 26, 1911, Ekern Papers.

44 McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea,* 90.

45 David W. Agnew to Herman Ekern, October 14, 1912, Ekern Papers.

collected. Haugen denied that the tax cost a great deal to administer or required a large staff. McGovern charged that the opposition came from tax-dodgers and predatory interests bent on undoing all the Progressive accomplishments in the state.[46]

The Progressives showed great sensitivity to the extravagance issue, also. Secretary of State James Frear released several statements from his office during October, claiming that the department was being efficiently and economically run, and that the state tax for the coming year would be over a million dollars less than in 1912.[47] Assistant Treasurer Henry Johnson, candidate for State Treasurer, brought figures from his office to refute Harry Bolen's charge that the taxpayers were paying five million dollars annually for the salaries of state employees.[48] La Follette and the Republican State Central Committee pounded on the same argument. La Follette denied that state expenses had risen from three to thirteen million dollars annually in the previous decade. He pointed out that some of the "disbursements" were merely transfers from one fund to another, and that over three million dollars were turned over by the state government to local governments and associations. According to La Follette's calculations, 1912 state expenditures amounted to roughly seven million three hundred thousand dollars.[49] The State Central Committee backed him up in charging the Democrats with exaggeration on the extravagance issue.[50] The chief Progressive organ, the *Wisconsin State Journal,* advertised the fact that the Industrial Commission amply justified its cost in the money it saved citizens by eliminating costly litigation.[51]

The ticklish question of experts in government was frankly faced by La Folette. The Senator argued that experts and commissions were necessary in readjusting to new conditions. The method had been used successfully, had not brought ruin to business, and had purified democracy, he claimed.[52]

The Progressives retained one key weapon. They were able to raise the old cry against the vested interests, ravenous corporations.

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46 *Racine Times,* October 23, 1912; *Wisconsin State Journal,* October 1, 19, 1912; *Green Bay Semi-Weekly Gazette,* October 30, November 2, 1912; *Superior Telegram,* October 24, 1912.

47 *Wisconsin State Journal,* October 2, 1912; *Green Bay Semi-Weekly Gazette,* October 30, 1912.

48 *Wisconsin State Journal,* October 13, 1912.

49 *Green Bay Semi-Weekly Gazette,* October 26, 1912.

50 *Wisconsin State Journal,* October 5, 1912.

51 *Ibid.,* October 18, 1912.

52 *Ibid.,* October 22, 1912.

La Follette, McGovern and other Progressives argued that the cost of commissions was far less than the price unprotected consumers and workers would have to pay the predatory pack.[53]

The hue and cry against the interests had not yet abated on the national scene. The Progressive tide swept Wilson into the Democratic presidential nomination, Roosevelt into a third party effort, and inundated Taft in the election. The tariff and the high cost of living remained in the public eye.[54] Not the advisability but the method of dealing with monopoly emerged as the leading issue in the presidential race. Reinforced by the national trend of thought, the Wisconsin tradition of wariness towards large corporations constituted a substantial obstacle to the conservative drive.

Even so, the election results revealed that the political fruits of the new Progressivism in Wisconsin were less tasty than the promise. While the Progressives had won out in a landslide in 1910, the 1912 results were so close that the outcome in the race for governor remained in doubt for some days. Finally, McGovern was declared the winner. He received 179,317 votes to 167,296 for Karel.[55] The rest of the Republican ticket did somewhat better, winning by from twenty-one to twenty-four thousand votes.[56] Despite the speaking campaign of Mrs. La Follette, woman suffrage was turned down, 227,024 to 135,545.[57]

Again in 1913 and 1914, the tax issue spearheaded the conservative campaign. This time, however, the issue emerged in a virtually unbeatable form. An extraordinary tax levy, resulting from the precarious condition of the state's finances, was announced late in October, 1913. Here at last was the key the conservatives needed. With it, they opened the door to voter attention and displayed a full and attractive stock of ideological goods. Anti-extravagance, anti-bureaucracy, anti-intellectualism and anti-radicalism were all aggressively marketed.

A combination of circumstances induced the disastrous tax imposition. A remission of $1,900,000 in 1912 put the state in a vulnerable position. When the 1913 legislature appropriated roughly $25,000,000 for the next biennium, and corporation and

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53 *Ibid.*, October 5, 18, 19, 1912; *La Crosse Tribune*, October 11, 21, 1912.
54 *Janesville Gazette*, July 11, October 21, 1912; *La Follette's Magazine*, 10:5 (May, 1918).
55 *Wisconsin Blue Book, 1913*, 260.
56 *Ibid.*, 261–264.
57 *Wisconsin Blue Book, 1942*, 215.

inheritance taxes failed to meet expectations, the state was forced to seek new funds.

Several factors combined to raise state spending. The automobile age came suddenly, and highway construction was not cheap. The 1911 legislature bound the state government to pay one-third of the cost of all highway construction undertaken by county and local units. $350,000 was set aside for the purpose, but applications for aid totaled $800,000. The 1913 legislature appropriated the extra $450,000 and $1,200,000 in addition, as an annual appropriation.[58] New buildings for the University, normal schools and charitable and penal institutions added to the appropriation load.[59] The University appropriated for 1913-14 exceeded two million dollars, over nine hundred thousand more than in 1910-11. The appropriations for 1900-01 had been under three hundred thousand dollars.[60] Another important factor in boosting state expenses was the new budget system. It made appropriations more systematic and definite, but by producing omnibus appropriations bills late in the session, the new system curtailed the governor's power to veto unnecessary items.[61] County and local expenses and taxes rose along with those of the state, as a result, chiefly, of extensive road building, but the leaders of the state government absorbed most of the blame.

The first murmurs of discontent were heard the day after Governor McGovern signed the record appropriations, as the *Milwaukee Free Press* condemned the "appropriations orgy."[62] The announcement, at the end of October, 1913, that an extraordinary general purpose tax levy of a million and a half dollars would be necessary, occasioned further protest.[63] By the end of January, 1914, McGovern's chances for election to the Senate seemed dim to a *Janesville Gazette* political reporter. "McGovern has got to answer for this high tax proposition," he observed, "and there is the whole trouble in a nut shell. Taxes, taxes, taxes." Political friends of the governor ruefully agreed. There always have been such complaints at tax paying time, one of them observed to McGovern's

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58 Wisconsin Highway Commission, Bulletin No. 3, *The State Highway Aid Law,* Madison, 1913, 7, 52.

59 Circular to the county clerks from the Department of State, October 27, 1913; John S. Donald to A. R. Kempter, November 10, 1913, John S. Donald Papers.

60 Curti and Carstensen, *University of Wisconsin,* 2, 606.

61 *Milwaukee Free Press,* August 8, 1914.

62 *Ibid.,* August 9, 1914.

63 *Janesville Gazette,* October 28, 30, November 1, 1913; *Wausau Record-Herold,* October 28, 29, 1913.

secretary, Harry Wilbur, but "it seems that the people quite generally are of the opinion that the last legislature was too extravagant."[64]

Amidst a general fanfare of protest, led by conservative newspapers and syndicated Wisconsin columnist Ellis B. Usher, whose weekly words were carried by such papers as the *Janesville Gazette,* the *Wausau Record-Herold,* the *Beloit Free Press,* and the *Oshkosh Northwestern,* the conservative campaign began to take form in February. Two conventions, ostensibly representing farmers and businessmen from three southern counties, laid the groundwork for the formation of the Home Rule and Taxpayers League.[65] Charles Pierce of Janesville and T. C. Richmond of Madison, conservative lawyers who had long been politically active, took the lead in the new organization. Behind the scenes was Emanuel Philipp.[66] Conservative organization moved a step further when the Home Rule League met in Madison on May 6 and resolved in favor of a pre-primary convention, to organize the anti-administration campaign.[67]

Though the Home Rule and Taxpayers League was ostensibly non-partisan, and included conservative Democrats in its leadership, the new organization was soon turned to the advantage of Emanuel Philipp. The league decided to back Philipp for Governor,[68] and was instrumental in bringing about a Republican pre-primary convention on June 22, in Madison.[69] Charles Pierce represented the league at the convention and delivered an address denouncing the extravagance of the previous fourteen years and the meddling of the University in politics. Meanwhile, a platform was gone over and approved in committee. Within three hours of convening, the delegates had adopted a platform, nominated Emanuel Philipp for governor, as head of a complete slate of conservative Republican candidates, and adjourned.[70]

Philipp's speeches in the 1914 primary campaign, with those

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64 *Janesville Gazette,* January 31, 1914; George Thompson to Harry Wilbur, February 27, 1914, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.

65 *Janesville Gazette,* February 13, 16, 28, 1914.

66 Harry Wilbur to D. B. Worthington, February 25, 1914; Wilbur to Percy Ap Roberts, March 12, 1914, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence; *Milwaukee Journal,* November 21, 1914.

67 *Milwaukee Journal,* November 21, 1914.

68 *Janesville Gazette,* May 25, 1922. The story, an obituary of Charles Pierce, reports that the decision to back Philipp was made in an office in the Janesville City Hall.

69 Philipp was apparently chief mover in bringing about the convention, for he bore the expense of it, $562.82. Statement of expenses of Emanuel Philipp . . . November 3, 1914, Emanuel Philipp Papers.

70 *Wisconsin State Journal,* June 23, 1914.

of the other conservative candidates and speakers, together with the platform of the Madison convention, blended with the background music provided by the conservative press and the Taxpayers League to constitute the anti-Progressive symphony of 1914. The themes, like those of 1912, were strikingly modern. They bore a greater similarity to the anti-New Deal chorus than to the anti-La Follette tunes of earlier years. Here was a new conservatism, to meet the new Progressivism.

Conservative argument, like Progressive, centered on two main areas, economic and political. The economic argument involved personal gain or loss for the voter, while the political argument turned on the question of democracy. In the earlier days, the Progressives had much the better of the ideological warfare over these issues. In the economic sphere, the conservatives had warned that Progressive measures would drive industry from the state. But the years were prosperous ones and industry actually expanded. In the political sphere, the conservatives charged La Follette with "boss rule." This argument served the purposes of anti-La Follette Progressives like James O. Davidson, but it could hardly benefit Starwart candidates; La Follette effectively counter-charged that his enemies had opposed and continued to oppose the primary, while supporting the discredited convention system, symbol of boss rule.

With the 1912 and 1914 campaigns, the conservatives moved to higher ground. The conservative attack was disastrous to the Progressives because it utilized arguments that the Progressives had themselves used in their successful appeals to the voters. The conservatives attacked on the question of equitable taxation, as the Progressives had done in early days, when taxation of railroads and other corporations had aroused voter attention. The conservatives now asked for economy in government, as the Progressives had done when they attacked corruptionists for wasting and misusing taxpayers funds.[71] The conservative assault on commissions and theoreticians was in the name of popular government, the issue that had been basic to Progressive criticism of boss rule and appeal for the direct primary.[72]

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[71] The Scofield cow incident is a case in point. When the then Governor Scofield franked a cow, with other belongings, to Madison, the Progressives publicized the event in their press and hammered on it in speeches as an example of waste and favoritism,

[72] On the early days of Progressivism in Wisconsin, see especially Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Folette, *La Folette* and Albert O. Barton, *La Follette's Winning of Wisconsin*, Des Moines, 1924.

It has frequently been remarked that many men who had been known as Progressives in the days of Theodore Roosevelt's presidency emerged as arch foes of Franklin Roosevelt. In Wisconsin, at least, the break from Progressivism can be traced as far back as 1912 and 1914, for many. No real inconsistency is involved. For the Progressivism of the McGovern administrations, with its pro-labor, welfare bias, its emphasis on experts, its expansion of taxation and spending, while very similar to phases of the New Deal, was dissimilar in many respects to the Progressivism of the turn of the century. Small wonder that the tenuous Progressive coalition of the early days began to break up when some of its disunities became evident to all.

The argumeut of the conservatives was a neat and potent package, a fusion of the two main issues into one. Government by commission, the alleged retreat from democracy, was blamed for "extravagance" and high taxes. But, though attacks on commissions, experts and the University had priority logically, politically it was the "bread and butter" issue of extravagance and taxation that supported the entire ideological edifice.[73]

The increase in state expenses since 1900 was the major theme of Emanuel Philipp's opening campaign address, which provided the material for his subsequent speeches. He said that expenses had risen from four million dollars in 1900 to thirteen million in 1913. Here was the basic evil used by the conservatives to enlist the attention of the voters. The Taxpayers League, which was active during the campaign, owed its very existence to the issue of extravagance. The conservative papers, led by the *Milwaukee Sentinel,* gave prime attention to that issue.[74]

Heralded by the extravagance issue, the question of democracy came forth in full panoply. T. C. Richmond of the Taxpayers League gave voters a foretaste of campaign fare in February. "A few years ago we had in Wisconsin something like a democracy," he wrote the *Madison Democrat.* "Now all that is changed... The people are no longer trusted to manage their own affairs... Real democracy is gone. Bureaucracy has taken its place...."[75] Months

[73] Charles McCarthy to Charles R. Crane, March 7, 1914, McCarthy Papers; Oscar Schoengarth to Harry Wilbur, May 16, 1914; D. O. Mahoney to Wilbur, May 19, 1914; Guy A. Benson to Wilbur, May 23, 1914, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.

[74] *Milwaukee Sentinel,* July 7, 10, 29, August 24, 1914; *Wausau Record-Herold,* August 14, 19, 1914; *Beloit Free Press,* August 20, 1914.

[75] Copied in the *Janesville Gazette,* February 17, 1914.

later, the Taxpayers League issued a pre-primary statement to the voters in which it posed the issue as one of local self-government or rule by experts." "To put it briefly, do you want a democracy or a bureaucracy," it asked rhetorically.[76] Emanuel Philipp stressed the same issue, but more elaborately. He listed the increases in appropriation and pointed out that the major ones occurred not in the regular departments but in the commissions and the University. Taking off from this prosaic statistical springboard, the rotund businessman soared to the heights of oratory, history and philosophy. "This is not a mere campaign for office," he assured his Waukesha auditors. "It is a fight for constitutional representative government, as opposed to the delegated powers which build up a dangerous bureaucracy." The history of human progress, the candidate argued, had been a battle against usurped powers and burdensome taxation.[77]

The bulk of Philipp's campaign speech, as of the entire conservative campaign, consisted of elaboration on the closely linked extravagance-bureaucracy issues. The University emerged as the chief whipping boy of the conservative campaign. It was charged with causing increased spending and bureaucracy both directly and indirectly. Philipp said that the cost of the University had risen from $587,773 in 1910 to $2,389,959 in 1913 and the budget for 1914 called for $2,863,320.[78] While the University was getting more than its fair share, Philipp said, rural schools were being slighted. He argued also that the University was the spawning ground for commissioners, "experts," and socialists. He criticized University personnel for mixing in politics and not devoting full time to teaching. As at least a partial remedy for some of the evils he described, Philipp proposed that a single board be created to apportion money among the various state institutions of learning.[79]

Linked with the University and commissions in a bureaucratic conspiracy to control state government, in Philipp's view, was the Legislative Reference Library. Charles McCarthy's organization, he charged, had insidiously expanded its functions beyond that of providing information, and practically controlled the Legislature. It should be abolished, he said.[80]

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[76] *Milwaukee Sentinel,* August 24, 1914.
[77] *Ibid.,* July 16, 1914.
[78] He ignored the fact that part of the 1913 and 1914 figures were covered by University income. In 1910, this money was spent directly by the University and did not pass through the hands of the state government.
[79] *Milwaukee Sentinel,* July 16, 1914.
[80] *Loc. cit.*

The conservative Democrats found no difficulty in mastering the new issues. It was they, after all, who led the way in 1912. The arguments about liberty, oppressive bureaucracy and taxation were congenial to at least one phase of their Jeffersonian tradition.

The group led by John C. Karel outnumbered the liberal Democratic faction at the party's pre-primary convention and secured the designation of a full conservative slate for the primary contests.[81]

After conferences with Joseph E. Davies, committeeman and liaison with President Wilson, the liberal Democrats put up a slate of their own, headed by John A. Aylward for Governor and State Senator Paul Husting of Mayville for Senator. Aylward's platform, however, was scarcely that of a rabid reformed. The Madison attorney denounced high taxes, and promised to reduce commissions from forty-five to fifteen, cut the state payroll a million dollars, cut the highway tax a million dollars, keep the University out of politics, and make the reference library the servant, not the master of the people. He named a number of commissions that he would eliminate, including the Board of Public Affairs. Finally, he promised to reduce University appropriations and keep the state out of the insurance business.[82]

However, it was the Progressive Republicans themselves who delivered the most eloquent tribute to the strength of the anti-Progressive arguments. In a desperate effort to retain the support of voters, they acquiesced in many of the chief arguments of the Stalwarts. Setting the pace, to the consternation of many, was Senator Robert M. La Follette. That La Follette should oppose the senatorial ambitions of Governor McGovern was not surprising, considering the mutual suspicion that existed between the two. But that he should condemn the work of McGovern's administration was astonishing. The administration was, after all, representative of "Progressivism," as La Follette had himself recognized in 1912 when he urged his supporters to overlook factional differences and back McGovern against Karel. Nevertheless, on July 25, the cover of *La Follette's* carried the following signed editorial:

> The American people as a body, whether in Wisconsin or elsewhere, do not complain without cause. They do not always protest, even when there is crying need for protests.
>
> There is complaint of high taxes in Wisconsin this year. There is reason for it. The annual appropriations for the University and Normal school building was excessive.

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81 *Milwaukee Sentinel,* July 15, 1914.
82 *Ibid.,* August 7, 1914.

The appropriations for highways were much beyond the amount which can be wisely and economically expended.

These appropriations doubtless carried with them others which are justly open to criticism.

Such a course begets waste and looseness in administration. . .

And upon whom should fall the responsibility of this wrong to a great cause and a great commonwealth?

The executive office is the clearing house on appropriations. There is focused detailed information on all legislation pending and passed, there the appropriations are listed, there the aggregates are known. And there is lodged the final power in one hand to insure the passage of an appropriation or to smite it with a veto, that makes an end to it. . . .[83]

McGovern immediately replied to La Follette's attack by attempting to shift the blame for appropriations to the La Follette leader, Senator George Scott, who had presented the appropriations bills.[84] Scott in turn denied that he had been in contact with La Follette and put the blame on McGovern.[85]

La Follette's remarkable statement was the culmination of a strategem that had been developing since March. Heated factional hostilities approached the boiling point as the 1914 primary approached. The La Follette leaders were determined to block McGovern's elevation to the Senate. Increasingly, they utilized the popular conservative arguments against McGovern. This development evidenced, of course, the extremes to which internal strife had led the Progressives. Yet more important, it reflected the attractiveness of the anti-extravagance appeal to which the La Follette men resorted.

Pursuing the new strategy, La Follette's first lieutenants gathered in Madison at the end of March, 1914, and decided to petition the governor to call a special session of the Legislature to effect economies.[86] In June, Secretary of State John S. Donald, a La Follette man, urged Tom Morris, La Follette's chosen candidate against McGovern for the Senate nomination, not to alienate Stalwarts. Old differences no longer mattered, Donald wrote.[87] Even Richard Lloyd Jones, usually an uncompromising Progressive, took conservative ground in backing Morris in his paper. The *Wisconsin State Journal* argued that Morris had sought to curb spending, had

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[83] *La Follette's Magazine*, 6:30 (July 25, 1914).
[84] *Milwaukee Sentinel*, July 26, 1914.
[85] *La Follette's Magazine*, 6:32 (August 8, 1914).
[86] Harry Wilbur to Hans M. Laursen, April 4, 1914, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.
[87] John S. Donald to William Bell, June 8, 1914, Donald Papers.

been involved in the movement for a special session, and was a protective tariff man.[88]

During the campaign for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, La Follette's choice, Andrew Dahl, made much of the fact that he was not implicated in recent extravagance, and pressed an attack on the administration very similar to Philipp's. The veteran Progressive's campaign statement echoed the charges and demands made by Philipp and Karel. Dahl first listed and praised the past achievements of the Progressive movement. Getting to the issues of 1914, however, he attacked the extravagance of the previous administration, asked for reduced highway appropriations and greater local control, and called for a reduction in University and Normal school building programs. Dahl attacked the Legislative Reference Library, calling it a "bill factory," and advocated the abolition of the Board of Public Affairs. He made no mention of the initiative, referendum or recall, nor of marketing or cooperatives, the major really Progressive issues of the time.[89] Dahl began his speaking campaign in New Glarus on August 3 with an attack on the Board of Public Affairs as the cause of higher expenses. His lines remained the same at the end of the month.[90]

In greater or less degree, the other major Progressive candidates for governor also acquiesced in the issue of extravagance. Merlin Hull claimed, with some truth, to have been an early advocate of economy.[91] Even William Hatton, himself a member of the Board of Public Affairs, took cognizance of the issue. He pledged efficiency and economy and stressed his success as a businessman.[92]

Despite some belated Progressive efforts to draw a sharp line between themselves and Philipp, the dominant tone of the gubernatorial primary was conservative. It was perhaps fitting, therefore, that Emanuel Philipp won out. He polled 43,733 votes to 27,619

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88 *Wisconsin State Journal*, June 15, 1914.

89 *Ibid.*, June 22, 1914. The implicit attack on Charles McCarthy was not surprising. McCarthy was never close to La Follette and his friends. He was, on the other hand, in close sympathy with McGovern and his measures. Moreover, he had helped to draft Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party platform in 1912, and La Follette and his friends retained considerable bitterness towards Roosevelt. By 1914, a number of La Follette leaders were hostile to McCarthy. See, for instance, Crownhart to McCarthy, June 27, 1914; George E. Scott to McCarthy, August 7, 1914, McCarthy Papers; Dahl to A. W. Sanborn, July 15, 1914, Robert M. La Follette Papers.

90 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, August 4, 24, 1914.

91 *Ibid.*, August 11, 1914.

92 *Milwaukee Free Press*, August 4, 1914.

for Dahl and 23,275 for Hatton. Roethe drew 12,411 votes, Hull 10,841 and Utman 6,734.[93] Few voters used the second choice vote, despite the high hopes of the Progressives.[94]

The Republican platform of 1914 was carefully tailored to the shape of voter sentiment. Patterned by shrewd political experts, the platform represented an attempt to recognize and placate all of the major elements of political strength in the state. It endorsed the past achievements of the Progressives, and favored the general idea of regulation of business by the state. It did not include the anti-primary plank espoused by Philipp earlier. But it did support economy, in education, road construction and elsewhere, elimination of non-essential commissions, and constitutional government, as well as greater local control in road matters.[95]

In an effort to convert their headlong flight of the primary campaign into an orderly retreat,[96] Progressives of various factions put on independent candidate into the field. Efforts to persuade La Follette to make the race for Governor failed,[97] and the hopeless task fell to State Senator John J. Blaine of Boscobel. As a strong Wilson Democrat in 1912, he was expected to win liberal Democratic support.[98] Blaine made a strong and forthright campaign. He tried to show that "The contest is between stalwarts and half-breeds, just as it was in the beginning."[99] He also supported the amendments for initiative, referendum and recall, which the La Follette men considered highly important.[100] La Follette, after some delay in Washington, finally took the stump for Blaine and the amendments on October 29. Richard Lloyd Jones had been a prime mover in bringing Blaine into the field and gave him cordial support in the *Wisconsin State Journal*.[101] Such pro-La Follette

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93 *Wisconsin Blue Book, 1915*, 234-5.

94 *La Follette's Magazine*, 6:32 (August 8, 1914). The magazine claimed that the second choice vote guaranteed Philipp's defeat.

95 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 1, 1914.

96 Herman Ekern to Robert La Follette, October 14, 1914, Ekern Papers; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 2, 6, 1914.

97 Memo on conversation between Charles McCarthy and Richard Lloyd Jones, September 12, 1914, McCarthy Papers; Ekern to La Follette, September 24, 1914, Ekern Papers; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 5, 1914; Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *La Follette*, 1, 506–509.

98 *Milwaukee Sentinel*, October 6, 1914.

99 *Ibid.*, October 15, 1914.

100 Herman Ekern to George A. Anderson, October 26, 1914; Ekern to C. B. Ballard, October 26, 1914, Ekern Papers; *La Follette's Magazine*, 6, 42, 44 (October 17, 31, 1914). Judge Charles Rosa of Beloit, a strong La Follette man, conducted a campaign for the amendments.

101 *Wisconsin State Journal*, October 7, 1914.

papers as the *La Crosse Tribune, Eau Claire Telegram* and *Lancaster Teller* also backed him.[102]

Nevertheless, Blaine's effort was simply token resistance. The candidates on the state ticket remained loyal to Philipp, as did many Progressive Republicans, including Andrew Dahl and D. O. Mahoney, President of the Wisconsin Society of Equity.[103] Progressive Republican papers like the *Merrill Herald, Superior Telegram, Racine Times, Oshkosh Northwestern* and *Neenah News* supported the straight Republican ticket.[104] Nor did Blaine secure Democratic support. The national Democratic administration favored party harmony,[105] and Senate candidate Paul Husting, leader of the liberal Democrats, was dependent on national financial help for his campaign.[106] In the end, Blaine polled only 32,940 votes, against 119,567 for Karel and 140,835 for Emanuel Philipp, the new governor.[107]

The weakness of the Blaine candidacy evidenced another important, though rather intangible factor in the Progressive decline. The widespread, crusading zeal that animated Progressivism in the early days seemed to have been dissipated to a considerable degree by 1914. The young men who had rallied to La Follette with such enthusiasm in the nineties had grown more cautious with the years. Charles McCarthy, as enthusiastic as ever, noticed that while many young Progressives were backing Blaine, the older ones, those who retained leadership, supported Philipp.[108] McCarthy's thoughtful friend William Hatton, looking back on the downward path, remarked on the same general factor. "... Many who had fought the good fight became more and more imbued with the desire to retain or gain public office," he wrote. "The spirit of sacrifice for principle's sake, which had been a marked characteristic of the movement in its earlier days, disappeared to no small extent. What also hurt," Hatton continued, "was the fact that many men whose chief idea was to be on the winning side were attracted to the move-

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102 *La Crosse Tribune,* October 8, 1914; *Milwaukee Journal, October* 9, 11, 1914.

103 *Milwaukee Sentinel,* October 8, 1914; Charles McCarthy to William Hard, October 8, 1914, McCarthy Papers.

104 Reported in the *Milwaukee Journal,* October 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1914.

105 Paul Husting to Burt Williams, October 1, 1914, Paul Husting Letterbooks.

106 Husting to Joseph E. Davies, September 18, 1914, Husting Letterbooks.

107 *Wisconsin Blue Book, 1915,* 222.

108 Charles McCarthy to William Hard, October 8, 1914, McCarthy Papers.

ment by its very success, and they, too, aided in weakening its morale. Selfishness largely displaced unselfishness. . . ."[109]

The decline of vitality and enthusiasm had proceeded less perceptibly than the other major factors of weakness. Its course is not subject to historical description. But though inconspicuous, the factor of declining enthusiasm was not insignificant. Again in 1916, it was very evident.[110]

At long last, the downfall of the Progressives, for which hard-bitten Stalwart campaigners had so long prayed and worked, had been largely encompassed. Jealousies among Progressives, the toll of time, limitations of the direct primary mechanism, among other things, all played important parts. But most important of all in halting the Progressives was the basic conservatism of the electorate itself. Old Isaac Stephenson, who broke with the Progressives in 1908, apparently expressed the views of a great many when he wrote, "In Wisconsin the old railroad-corporation crowd, the inner ring which controlled party affairs to the exclusion of all others, had fairly routed and some good laws were placed on the statute books. There the task ended for me."[111]

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109 *Milwaukee Journal,* November 24, 1914.

110 C. C. Gittings to James A. Stone, January 28, 1916; A. W. Sanborn to Stone, February 14, 1916; Charles Crownhart to Stone, March 7, 1916; John P. Lewis to Stone, March 16, 1916, James A. Stone Papers; Frank B. Gesler to Merlin Hull, March 18, 1916, Merlin Hull Papers.

111 Isaac Stephenson, *Recollections of a Long Life,* Chicago, 1915, 239.

Ignatius Donnelly and the Greenback Movement

On January 20, 1876, Ignatius Donnelly published in his newspaper, the *Anti-Monopolist,* the call for a National Independent party convention to be held in Indianapolis, Indiana, and by so doing, formally created the Greenback party in Minnesota.[1] For the greenback movement in the state, his actions meant the acquisition of nationally recognized leadership, and for Donnelly, it meant a dramatic break with the past. This reversal on his part reflected a revolution in the thinking of agrarian leaders and reformers during the preceding two years. Viewed as a case study, Donnelly's greenback activities indicate that the movement is in need of reappraisal, for they reveal that much that has been written concerning the appeal of greenbackism, the sources of the movement and its dynamics, and especially its relationship to subsequent reform is out of focus.

Although the greenback issue had been long in coming to Minnesota, it had not been slow to mature after the Civil War. The United States had been utilizing paper money since 1862 and, although the Republicans had tended to favor a speedy return to specie more than the Democrats, hard times and political expediency had forced the maintenance of the greenbacks in circulation.[2]

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[1] The *Anti-Monopolist* was published in St. Paul, Minnesota. Donnelly's political career prior to this time had been quite checkered. A Buchanan Democrat in Pennsylvania before moving to Minnesota, he became a Seward Republican in 1857. He was elected lieutenant governor of Minnesota in 1859 and 1861 and served as one of the state's congressmen from 1863 to 1869. He lost his congressional seat after an intraparty struggle for the United States senatorship. In 1872 he became a Liberal Republican, and he led the Granger cause in Minnesota from 1873 to 1876. See John D. Hicks, "The Political Career of Ignatius Donnelly," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* VIII (June, 1921), 80–132, and Martin Ridge, "Ignatius Donnelly and the Granger Movement in Minnesota," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XLII (March, 1956), 693–709. For Donnelly's later career as a Democrat see Horace S. Merrill, "Ignatius Donnelly, James J. Hill, and the Cleveland Administration Patronage," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXXIX (December, 1952), 505–518.

[2] The Far West, California in particular, remained on a coin economy during most of the period. For the legislative history of the greenback see Don C. Barrett, *The Greenback and the Resumption of Specie Payment, 1862–1879,* Cambridge, 1931.

But when the Democratic party won the Congressional elections of 1874, the Republicans in the lame duck session which followed experienced what came to be called their "death bed" repentance and passed the Resumption of Specie Act. The measure had three parts: one provided that gold would be paid for greenbacks after 1878; the second called for the reduction of the number of greenbacks from $382 million to $300 million; and the third specified that there would be a substitution of five dollars in national bank notes for every four dollars in greenbacks retired from use. This meant that $102 million in national bank notes would replace $82 million in greenbacks. Despite this seeming introduction of more money into the economy, the nation was aware that the administration had embarked upon a policy of deflation.[3]

Since most Americans favored a specie economy, supporters of the greenbacks were at a disadvantage. There had been instances and areas where "soft money" had found its advocates, but the tide of thought had been the other way. For the few, then, who came to accept the utility of the greenback, there was a marked period of transition. This was clearly evident in Ignatius Donnelly's case. As late as 1874, when he was lecturing before Granger audiences, Donnelly had condemned the greenback as inflationary and dangerous to the economic welfare of the farmers. However, as the nation sank into the long depression of the 1870's, and farm prices appeared to plunge downward faster than those of the services which they purchased, Donnelly began to change his mind. In April, 1875, he wrote an editorial on what he called the "muddle of currency." At that time he did not take exception to the principle of deflation but to the extent and speed with which the administration was carrying it out.[4] His correspondence and his exchanges with other editors and politicians, especially J. A. Noonan of the *Industrial Age,* probably did more to change his views than anything else.[5] When Donnelly attended the Minnesota Democratic

[3] The Resumption of Specie Act also laid the national banks open to renewed criticism because of the provision which allowed them to purchase interest-bearing government bonds and then use these same bonds as security for interest-bearing loans of their own currency. Advocates of the greenback were quick to point out that this was a vast currency monopoly for which the people were forced to pay twice: once in legitimate interest and again in taxation. For a thorough analysis of this phase of the greenback movement see George L. Anderson, "Western Attitude Toward National Banks 1873–1874," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIII (September, 1936), 205–216.

[4] St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* April 22, 1875.

[5] J[ames] A. Noonan to Donnelly, April 26, 1875, Donnelly Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul Minnesota.

convention in the summer of 1875, he was enough of a greenbacker to introduce two resolutions critical of the administration's money policy.[6] The first called for the maintenance of the existing number of greenbacks in circulation while the government increased its gold reserves. The second condemned the policy of substituting national bank notes for greenbacks as subterfuge taxation of the poor. But the "old guard" Democrats, who would have nothing to do with such proposals, mustered enough votes to defeat them, and the Republican press rejoiced that at least the Minnesota Democracy had not gone over to the greenback heresy as had some other Democratic state organizations.[7]

The fact that Donnelly's resolutions had failed to receive endorsement only served to provoke a debate on them during the state elections of 1875. Severely criticized as a wild inflationist, Donnelly sought to define his position. In an editorial he explained that he did not advocate any expansion of currency unless it could be demonstrated that the United States had less money per capita than other civilized nations or that the expansion was needed by the business community. He did insist on continuing the greenbacks in circulation while the gold reserve was increased rather than diminishing the number during the process of gold acquisition. Donnelly still did not oppose a dollar based upon gold, but he was outspoken in his disapproval of a deflation which compelled the debtor class to pay thirty per cent more in goods and services than it had borrowed. "Who cares whether the medium of exchange is paper or gold?" he asked rhetorically; "what the nation wants is *prosperity.* Money is a mere incident—a means of exchange."[8]

Despite his growing enthusiasm for the greenback cause as he understood it, Donnelly was reluctant to join the new political movement which embraced it. Perhaps his restraint was based upon what had happened to the Liberal Republicans in 1872. In any event, he feared that "Wall Street" would gobble up the movement and his position as an anti-monopolist would be jeopardized.[9] Nevertheless, when it became clear during the Minnesota legislative session of 1876 that the coalition which he had forged into a Granger party was unable to effect anti-monopoly reforms, Donnelly felt that there was no place left for him except in the greenback fold.

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6 St. Paul *Pioneer Press,* July 8, 1875.
7 *Ibid.*
8 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* July 19, 1875.
9 Ebenezer Ayres to Donnelly, August 25, 1875, Donnelly Papers.

The state greenback organization which Donnelly spearheaded was called the Independent Anti-Monopoly party. It sought to recruit from all groups and made no special overtures toward the Democrats.[10] *The New York Tribune* took sarcastic notice of these doings in Minnesota when it stated that "Ignatius Donnelly is going to assemble himself in a convention again. He does it every year and the result is the same—nothing; and yet he never gets discouraged."[11]

In a way the *Tribune* erred; Donnelly did tend to become discouraged with greenbackism. Neither his dramatic speeches nor his actions were effective in behalf of the party. The state convention which he organized consisted of a pathetically small group.[12] Despite the poor showing, Donnelly continued to use the columns of the *Anti-Monopolist* to defend the party while his own views on the money question matured. By the late spring of 1876, he advocated the repayment of government bonds in greenbacks.[13] After all, he argued without subtlety, the government should not be compelled to pay a premium for gold to satisfy its creditors.

It is evident that Donnelly's national reputation as an orator and public figure preceded him to the party's national convention in Indianapolis. More than likely, also, the delegates overestimated his influence because he was named temporary chairman. It is well worth noting that his major address did not lay stress upon financial theory. He told his audience that 1876 was a centennial year, that the founding fathers had created a nation where the man should "outweigh the dollar," that it was absurd for Congress to haggle over the future of Jefferson Davis, and that the major parties were engaged in a colossal diversion while the real issues were obfuscated. The greenbackers were not afraid of live issues; they were not "pampered aristocrats" like Charles Francis Adams and the hard money liberals of New England; they were willing to deal with the real problem of economic opportunity for all classes.[14]

The platform of the Indianapolis convention reflected the opinions of the various economic and geographic groups present. The midwestern farmers insisted upon an end to railroad subsidization, while eastern labor advocated a drastic change in the government's

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10 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist*, March 9, 1876.
11 Quoted in the St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist*, March 23, 1875.
12 *Ibid.*, April 13, 1876.
13 Oliver H. Page to Donnelly, April 10, 1876, Donnelly Papers.
14 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist*, May 25, 1876.

monetary policy. Both elements favored the repeal of the Resumption Act and the sale of government bonds to Americans for paper rather than to Europeans for gold. The anti-monopolists probably demanded the plank rejecting the substitution of silver for paper as fractional currency. This group tended to view the remonetization of silver as the creation of a money monopoly which would favor the "silver interests." For this reason too, the convention voted down the recommendation that silver be reintroduced as a medium of exchange.[15]

The national convention had not stirred much enthusiasm for the greenback cause in Minnesota. At first Donnelly had difficulty convincing many of the reform groups in the state to ally themselves with it. Few were eager to join a party which promised so slim a chance for victory.[16] Most of the work was done by a hardened corps of newspaper editors and politicians. It was this element which insisted that Donnelly lead a crusade, much as he had in behalf of the Grange only three years before, and arouse the people of Minnesota to the evils of deflation.[17] Donnelly courageously undertook the task by planning an extensive speaking tour, a series of articles in the *Anti-Monopolist,* and the publication of thousands of handbills. He regretted being a candidate for public office, but at the insistence of his party he accepted the nomination for Congress in Minnesota's Second Congressional District. With defeat a foregone conclusion, Donnelly sought, unsuccessfully, a possible fusion with the Democrats.[18]

As his campaign progressed, Donnelly's ideas about the money question underwent changes. He advocated the remonetization of silver, arguing that silver had been used to purchase government bonds during the war and that the government should be able to repay in the same commodity which it had borrowed. He recognized that this was far from valid, but he was becoming more and more a believer in a controlled currency and he felt that a return to

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15 The platform of the party quoted in *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia,* 1876, 781. Hicks, "The Political Career of Ignatius Donnelly," MVHR, VIII, 97. St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* May 25, 1876. Chester McArthur Destler, *American Radicalism 1865–1901,* Ann Arbor, 1948, 60–62. Carl C. Taylor, *The Farmers' Movement 1620–1920,* New York, 1953, 185–187.

16 W[illiam] Brown to Donnelly, July 21, 1876, Donnelly Papers.

17 N. C. Martin to Donnelly, August 21, 1876, *Ibid.* See also Ridge, "Ignatius Donnelly and the Granger Movement in Minnesota," MVHR, XLII, 693–709.

18 F. A. Davis to Donnelly, August 14, 1876 and Henry Poehler to Donnelly, September 29, 1876, *Ibid.* The St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* September 14, 1876, and November 2, 1876.

silver was one step in that direction.[19] The entire appeal of the greenbackers scarcely influenced the voters of Minnesota. That Donnelly received more votes in the Second District than Peter Cooper, the party's presidential nominee, did in the entire state bears witness not only to the lack of greenback feeling among the people but also to the fact that Donnelly's name was associated with other causes.

This election proved that the greenback issue standing alone was unable to attract a real following. Having attached himself to it, Donnelly had been isolated and defeated. His sole hope for political survival rested upon a vigorous reassertion of his role as an anti-monopolist reformer. He was still a member of the Minnesota State Senate and his behavior during the 1877 session indicated his awareness of this situation. He fought to establish a State Commissioner of Agriculture empowered to grade the quality of wheat.[20] He demanded that efforts be made to secure federal aid for Minnesota farmers who were suffering the effects of a locust plague. And he waged a struggle for the passage of a usury law. He gained state-wide publicity when the Republican newspapers misinterpreted and misrepresented the measure to the people implying that it was radical and dangerous.[21] But the bill passed. Donnelly considered this measure a great victory because it not only outlawed the charging of interest in excess of twelve per cent but also established a strict punishment—cancellation of the obligation—upon the violator. He felt that this was the end of Minnesota's chattel mortgage Shylocks. "No more thrashing machines will be sold for three dollars each!" Donnelly announced, and the locust-plagued farmers in the western part of the state appreciated him for it.[22] His reputation received another boost when the decision in the Granger Cases was made public. The Supreme Court had upheld the concept of railroad rate regulation for which he had been pilloried in the press. "Who will talk of communism and agrarianism now?" he asked the readers of his newspaper as he reminded them of past denunciations of him.[23]

Although his rise in public estimation brought him satisfaction, Donnelly was genuinely alarmed and troubled by the serious effects of the depression. Almost three million workers were unemployed

19 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* August 24, 1876.
20 St. Paul *Pioneer Press,* January 11, 1877.
21 *Ibid.,* February 1, 1877.
22 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* March 8, 1877.
23 *Ibid.*

and wages seemed to lead prices downward. In July, 1877, came a series of violent strikes in which soldiers were used against the workers. The conservative newspapers of St. Paul, filled with stories of mobs and incendiarism, exhibited an inability to distinguish between a spontaneous outcry and a genuine revolution. "The commune is here," cried the St. Paul *Pioneer Press*. Donnelly took sharp and public exception with this interpretation of the strikes. He had a politician's distrust of violence, even noting the July events as a "horrible labor insurrection," but he could not condemn the workers.[24] "Whenever a man attempts to defend his rights now-a-days he is called a communist," he wrote in the *Anti-Monopolist*. "When a starving populace clamor for work or bread they are called communists." And then he added caustically, "the communists of Europe want everything in common;—the communists in America are enjoying nothing in common—and plenty of it." Stop berating workers who want a living wage and farmers who want a fair profit, he warned the conservative press, the producer is entitled to all he can get, and it is the function of government in a republic to help him get it.[25]

As the depression deepened a feeling grew among both Republicans and Democrats that expediency called for some change in monetary policy. This was clearly evident in Minnesota when William L. Banning, a leading Democrat and banker, convinced the St. Paul Chamber of Commerce, of which he was a member, to pass a resolution endorsing bimetalism.[26] "Hard money" advocates in both parties denounced the "silver money maniacs" while denying emphatically that silver had been the "dollar of our fathers." The double standard they charged was outright repudiation.[27]

This upswing in interest in the greenback was a source of alarm for Minnesota Republicans. Donnelly's independent party had been smashed, but if a fusion with the Democrats took place, it might be a real threat. Perhaps their worst fears were realized when William L. Banning accepted the greenback nomination for governor and proceeded to capture the Democratic endorsement as well. The Democratic platform, however, called for a greenback redeemable in coin.[28]

This fusion of greenbackers and Democrats came none too soon

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[24] Donnelly Diary, July 25, 1877, Donnelly Papers.
[25] St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist*, August 23, 1877.
[26] St. Paul *Pioneer Press*, April 11, 1877.
[27] *Ibid.*, September 22, 1877, and November 28, 1877.
[28] *Ibid.*, October 18, 1877.

for Donnelly. His seat in the State Senate had always been contingent upon Democratic support. With this aid again available, albeit reluctantly given, Donnelly was reelected despite the overwhelming defeat of Banning by John S. Pillsbury the Republican incumbent. Donnelly was enthusiastic after surveying the national scene in 1877 because he felt that the greenbackers had won startling victories, especially in wooing Democratic support.[29] Although he was unable to attend the party convention in Toledo, Ohio, Donnelly welcomed approvingly its platform including many pro-labor planks. Unlike some of the more inflationist-minded greenbackers, he did not reject the platform for its failure to endorse fiat money.[30]

In the state legislative session which followed the election, Donnelly continued to espouse the anti-monopoly cause. He did introduce a resolution instructing Minnesota's congressmen to support the Bland Silver Purchase Bill, but he focused most of his attention on a textbook measure championing the cause of free books published by the state. Despite angry cries of socialism which were once again raised, Donnelly claimed credit for saving economical education for Minnesota's youth.[31]

An odd turn of events made Donnelly a significant figure in the election of 1878 and gave the greenback cause a final test in Minnesota. A struggle within the Republican party for the nomination in the Third Congressional District led to the defeat of the incumbent Dr. J. H. Stewart, and the victory of William D. Washburn, a wealthy lumberman and miller. Since Washburn had been one of Donnelly's longtime political foes, a living symbol of all that anti-monopolism denounced, a movement was put underway to draft Donnelly to run against him. One of St. Paul's leading newspapers, the *Globe,* began the campaign by asserting that Donnelly was as much a resident of the Third as the Second Congressional District because he owned a farm and a newspaper in it.[32] On that same day, William L. Banning asked Donnelly to be a candidate, "against the slab of lumber put up by the pine land ring,"[33]—an obvious jab at the none-too-clean reputation of the Minnesota lumbering interests. The *Globe* pursued the same path by quoting the Minne-

29 St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* December 20, 1877, and June 18, 1878.
30 Destler, *American Radicalism 1865–1901,* 64–65.
31 Minnesota Legislature, *Senate Journal,* 20th Session, 26. St. Paul *Pioneer Press,* January 17, 1878, February 25, 1878, and March 8, 1878. Donnelly Diary, March 2, 1878, Donnelly Papers.
32 July 20, 1878.
33 William L. Banning to Donnelly, July 20, 1878, Donnelly Papers.

apolis *Lumberman,* a trade journal, to the effect that the lumbering interests were responsible for his nomination because they wanted "an able and zealous advocate in National Halls. . . ."[34] Donnelly, the *Globe* informed its readers, "being a frontier farmer . . . knows the needs of the frontier. His sympathy and voice have been on the side of the working man."[35]

Despite assurances from Banning of a "first rate chance of being elected," Donnelly shrank from the opportunity.[36] The Third District included both St. Paul and Minneapolis, it was the focal point of Minnesota's great interests: railroads, milling, and lumbering. To win would mean a strenuous campaign, an efficient organization and a thick purse. But offers of assistance came from many quarters. E. A. Cramsie, vice-president of the Workingmen's Union of Minneapolis, assured him that he could count upon the support of leading Republicans and labor men.[37] William L. Banning pledged the aid not only of the St. Paul Democrats but also of the party's national committee.[38]

The Greenback party in the Third District, dominated by organized labor, eagerly pressed Donnelly to accept the nomination. He was afraid that the greenbackers would nominate him, but the Democrats would fail to do so. If this happened, the results would be tragic. He would have to be a candidate with no chance of victory or abandon the campaign and risk losing the friendship of labor which had been turning steadily toward the Greenback party for its advocacy of the eight hour day and the abolition of child labor as well as because of Donnelly's attitude toward unions during the strikes of 1877.

Donnelly's fears were not realized. The Greenback-Labor party nomination was speedily seconded by the Democrats. It is worth noting that Donnelly told the Democratic convention that he was fighting to prevent the common laborer and producer from being driven into poverty and that he was seeking to save the country from an economic condition in which a dictator might arise.[39] He had told the greenback convention that he hoped to bring the two parties together on the money issue.[40]

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34 July 20, 1878.
35 July 22, 1878.
36 William L. Banning to Donnelly, July 23, 1878, and Donnelly Diary, July 24, 1878, Donnelly Papers.
37 Donnelly Diary, *Ibid.*
38 William L. Banning to Donnelly, July 27, 1878, *Ibid.*
39 *St. Paul Globe,* September 7, 1878.
40 *Ibid.,* September 6, 1878.

But this plan to make the greenback and, in a sense, the depression prime issues in the campaign was overturned almost immediately. The price of wheat and how it was established became the issue for the farmers in the area. For years Minnesota farmers had been smarting under the criticism of such public figures as Henry Ward Beecher who asserted that the farmers had "too many eggs in one basket; farmers should grow something besides wheat. . . ." Every Minnesotan realized that the prairie farmer could not plant "broom corn" or *"ruta bagas,"* as Donnelly put it and make a profit.[41] Since diversified agriculture was virtually impossible in the region, the problem, as the farmers saw it, was not one of production but marketing.

There was no grain exchange in Minnesota. Its place was taken by the Minneapolis Millers' Association. The farmers were not so much irritated by the Association's price fixing, because prices did have to conform to the world price, as they were by its absolute control over grading and quality of the grain since quality determined price locally.[42] The quality was fixed by filling a two quart brass kettle and weighing its contents. The wrath of the farmers was stirred when it was discovered that the weight could be altered markedly by manipulating the filling process. "The lying little kettle" became the symbol of the dishonesty of monopoly and the corruption of the Republicans.[43]

The fact that William D. Washburn was a member of the Millers' Association attached the twin evils of monopoly and corruption to him. "Down with Washburn and the swindling brass kettle!" boomed the Democratic press. Donnelly was informed that this battle cry was a "regular Krupp gun. It is one of the most damaging projectiles that was ever shot off in any political campaign."[44] Before long the greenback question and the depression had all but been forgotten. Even Donnelly could not make currency a magnetic question. The farmers wanted to know about the brass kettle, the usury legislation and the textbook measure which he had espoused. Labor seemed satisfied with this attack upon business

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41 Quoted in the St. Paul *Anti-Monopolist,* August 22, 1878.

42 Henrietta M. Larson, *The Wheat Market and the Farmer in Minnesota,* New York, 1926, 91, 133, and 149.

43 Harlan P. Hall, *Observations: Being more or less a history of Political Contests from 1849 to 1904,* St. Paul, 1904, 228.

44 *St. Paul Globe,* October 15, 1878. Thomas G. Mealy to Donnelly, October 20, 1878, Donnelly Papers.

dishonesty and his pro-labor tradition. It was the Republican newspaper press which argued currency and radicalism.

> Is there a spirit of agrarianism, he is its embodiment. Has Kearneyism a following in Minnesota, he is its prophet. Are there communists, they are for Donnelly. He reflects the bad purposes and bad passions which are either dormant or avowed in our State. The 'tramps' of course, follow his banner; and the communists of society, by instinct, will give him their support. . . . If there are those who desire a revolution in government and society, Donnelly is their representative and hope.[45]

When the votes were tallied, Donnelly found that he had been defeated by almost 3,000 votes out of roughly 39,000 votes cast. At the insistence of his friends, Donnelly contested the election charging numerous frauds and irregularities. When many of his charges were sustained, the House decided not to award Washburn his seat but neither was Donnelly seated. Ironically enough, James B. Weaver, the Greenback-Labor party presidential standard bearer in 1880, voted against Donnelly in the elections subcommittee vote.[46]

With Donnelly's defeat the Minnesota greenback movement virtually collapsed. The brass kettle was abandoned, at least temporarily, by the millers. Farm prices rose in the face of poor European harvests. Industrial development was revived with railroad activity. The depression was drawing to a close.[47] Donnelly, like many other greenbackers, was discredited by this return to prosperity.

Donnelly and the Minnesota greenback experience confirm and deny some current interpretations of greenbackism. For one thing, the oldest, and most generally held opinion, that the greenbackers were western farmers seeking to escape mortgage indebtedness through inflation, appears invalid in Minnesota.[48] The farmers not only failed to generate the movement but they would not accept it in 1876. Even when the greenback was supported by the Democrats and linked with popular suggestions which were anti-monopoly

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45 St. Paul *Pioneer Press*, October 29, 1878.

46 *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 46th Congress, 1st Session, No. 9. Frank J. Mead to Donnelly, November 7, 1878, Donnelly Papers. *St. Paul Globe*, April 5, 1880.

47 Rendig Fels, "American Business Cycles, 1865–1878," *The American Economic Review*, XLI (June, 1951), 348.

48 Orin G. Libby, "A Study of the Greenback Movement," *Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy* XII (1899), 530–543. Libby's statistics are very valuable and his generalizations about crop diversification and the greenback were confirmed in part by Clyde O. Ruggles, "The Economic Basis of the Greenback Movement in Iowa and Wisconsin," *Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association* (Cedar Rapids) VI (1913), 142–165.

or anti-trust in nature, it still was not sustained. It can be suggested that a good reason for farmers to reject the greenback was the availability of money for loans in the Midwest at steadily declining interest rates during the period after 1873 because eastern investors saw greater security and returns in the farm mortgage field.[49] Another explanation may be found in the tendency to extend the reasoning which had been so current in the Granger Era that middle men were siphoning off the profits. It was therefore simple to shift the guilt from railroads to millers as was done in the case of the brass kettle. There is also evidence to indicate that Donnelly and other greenback leaders had overdrawn the picture of the disparity between farm and non-farm prices. The farmer was in a depression but he may have been relatively better off than the politician and the rural press seemed to indicate.[50]

Another generally expressed view is that the greenback was very popular among non-farm labor by 1878.[51] The Minnesota evidence tends to support this position, but a reservation should be added that non-farm labor in Minnesota appeared more interested in the peripheral program of the party and in the nature of its leadership. By 1878 greenbackism embraced the major demands of union labor and this should not be under-rated.

In many ways the most keenly argued opinion in regard to greenbackism is that it was neither agrarian nor western in origin, that it possessed a complete and radical economic theory, and that it was reshaped through contact with the western farm problem.[52] Donnelly's case indicates that the greenback was hardly indigenous to Minnesota. He was deeply influenced by the press—and some of it urban press at that. His reshaping of the idea, if it can be called that, was to deepen its anti-monopoly bias. But as for the idea that greenback theory was complete and radical in its expression, this was not true in Minnesota. In fact, if Donnelly is typical

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49 Allan B. Bogue, *Money at Interest*, Ithaca, 1955, 82. Bogue also implies that the frontier farmer's use of the mortgage has been misinterpreted when historians seek to relate mortgages to political unrest.

50 O. V. Wells, "The Depression of 1873–79," *Agricultural History*, XI (July, 1937), 237–249, indicates that farm and non-farm prices were much closer together than during the Granger period.

51 Reginald McGrane, "Ohio and the Greenback Movement," MVHR, XI (December, 1924), 533–534. For a detailed analysis of the role of labor in the movement see Destler, *American Radicalism 1865–1901*, 50–77, and John R. Commons and Associates, *History of Labor in the United States*, New York, 1926, II, 240–251.

52 Destler, *American Radicalism 1865–1901*, 50-66.

of midwestern greenbackers, they had no monetary theory at all, unless it can be argued that the demand for legislation in the field of currency as a means and not an end in itself can be termed a monetary theory. Certainly Donnelly's views were far from static or consistent.

The last of the significant views of greenbackism conceives of it as an indication of a lack of faith in the "greater capitalism" which was emerging during the nineteenth century.[53] Donnelly's role appears to vindicate this opinion. The system of economic rewards and profits was not directly challenged by the greenbackers but their emphasis was placed on utilizing government's power to bring a more honest functioning of it. Viewed in this light, perhaps the historical significance of the movement is most clear. It served as a vehicle of social criticism. With irony one might call attention to Henry D. Lloyd's oft-quoted condemnation in 1896 of the money issue as the cowbird in the nest of reform—in the 1870's the money issue was the nest itself.[54] Because of this, Donnelly and the other greenbackers helped create in the public consciousness the idea that the morals of business and government were in need of reappraisal, and by so doing, helped to formulate the mood that was progressivism.

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[53] Solon J. Buck, *The Granger Movement 1870–1880*, Cambridge, 1913, 311. See also, Samuel Rezneck, "Distress, Relief, and Discontent in the United States During the Depression of 1873–1878," *Journal of Political Economy*, LVIII (December, 1950), 508.

[54] Caro Lloyd, *Henry Demarest Lloyd*, New York, 1912, I, 263.

Bryan and the Urban Progressives

The Progressive Era was a period in which the nation seemed to awaken from slumber as a new dawn chased away shadows of venality and selfishness from political and economic life. He who does what is true, reasoned Americans, comes to the light, and they were ready to believe that the rosy tints sweeping over the landscape emanated from the light that shone more and more unto the perfect day. The dawn symbolized progress, for progress was as pervading and as inevitable as the dawn. Progressivism was not peculiar to any single element of American society. It was a mass movement transcending Populistic agrarianism and urban humanitarianism, rural radicalism and respectable middle class reform. The philosophy of the movement could not be expressed in neat, consistent, logical formulae; it was the product of a faith without dogmatic structure if not without dogma.[1]

Admittedly the Progressive Movement, with its heterogeneous ideological content, defies generalization. Yet it does lend itself to classification, and at least two categories of Progressivism can be identified and described with some degree of accuracy: one influenced chiefly by the agrarian inheritance, and the other resulting from what were primarily urban developments. As Professor Richard Hofstadter has shown, much of the impetus of the Progressive Movement was urban in origin.[2] But agrarian influences in the reform movement were not entirely negligible, and William Jennings Bryan served admirably as a Progressive spokesman for rural America.[3] To contrast Bryan with urban Progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt, therefore, is to contrast one type of Progressivism with another, and one of the supreme ironies of the Nebraskan's career as a political leader is that he found himself in opposition to men with whom he had much in common. In spite of similarities between urban and rural branches of the Progressive

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[1] Ralph Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought,* New York, 1956, 360.

[2] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform,* New York, 1955, 131–134. The basis for the transition from Mugwump to Progressive is also indicated in Alan Pendleton Grimes, *The Political Liberalism of the New York Nation,* "The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science," XXXIV, Durham, N. C., 1953.

[3] Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, *Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900–1939,* Madison, Wis., 1951, 32–33.

Movement, however, differences did exist, and Bryan's place in American history is set in this context.

The Commoner's thought was based primarily upon his emotions rather than upon his intellect; leaders of the urban Progressives were more inclined toward rationalism. Insofar as he followed the dictates of his heart rather than his mind, Bryan was romantic, and his ready acceptance of the sturdy yeoman's cause in the Populist period indicates a romantic temperament. He did not offer proof that the "gold ring" or the "money power" had deliberately set out to bilk the farmer of his just rewards. He only saw that the stout-hearted pioneer men and women who had braved the elements in establishing homesteads on the plains were suffering, and relying on his intuition, he concluded that much of their suffering was the result of heartless and callous exploitation. Bryan was always sensitive to social wrongs; but often without taking the time to analyze the specific causes of injustice, he advocated remedies and reforms based upon the assumption that the urban, financial centers of the East were the source of all evil. The Progressive leaders of these urban centers could not, of course, accept this assumption with such ease. Theirs was a realistic rather than a romantic approach. The city with its universities and its well-educated and respectable reformers encouraged painstaking investigation and fact finding.[4] Urban Progressives were, for the most part, members of the intelligensia; unlike Bryan and his agrarian followers, they distrusted emotion and placed their faith in reason. In the preface to his little book, *Sin and Society,* which had great appeal for the urban Progressive, Edward Alsworth Ross wrote:

> This book deals with sin, but it does not entreat the sinner to mend his ways. It seeks to influence no one in his conduct. It does seek to influence men *in their attitude toward the conduct of others.* Its exhortation is not *Be good,* but *Be rational.* To modify conduct one touches the heart. To modify the judgments on conduct one speaks to the intellect. The latter is the method of this book. Its aim is to enlighten rather than to move.[5]

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[4] Grimes, *The Political Liberalism of the New York Nation,* 43–45. In describing the views of such reformers, Grimes writes, "Rational men would weigh the characters of contending candidates in the scales of virtue and register a reasoned choice in favor of morality and learning." And again, "... the aim of the respectable reformers was to give to the 'virtuous and educated greater weight in political affairs than the 'machines' permitted."

[5] Ross, *Sin and Society,* New York, 1907, vii. Whether or not Ross himself should be considered an urban Progressive is debatable. A native of Iowa, he had been a disciple of Henry George during his undergraduate days at Coe College. He became a well-known sociologist and a member

Bryan preached a message of love and taught that America would progress to the fulfillment of her mission when the love of man for man became universal. The urban Progressives espoused a scientific humanism. "Your pious leanings are not in accord with the progressive reform and regenerative movement of the age," wrote one of Bryan's correspondents.[6] Such men believed that progress would come through the exercise of man's rational faculties, that if social evils were to be eliminated it would be as the result of scientific investigation.

Bryan and the urban Progressives, therefore, developed differing conceptions of reality. When the latter undertook the investigation of slum conditions, the frauds perpetrated by political machines, the manipulations of financiers, the widespread vice that flourished in rapidly growing cities, they came to the conclusion that evil doing was universal. For them reality was, as Professor Hofstadter has put it, "the bribe, the rebate, the bought franchise, the sale of adulterated food."[7] Reality was the sin of society; the virtues of American life seemed fictitious, unreal. Bryan, with his invincible faith in the common man, believed that wrong doing was the work of a vicious few. Reality for him included the dignity of those who earned their bread by the sweat of the brow on the one hand, and on the other the utter depravity of a few conspirators of great wealth and power who had contrived to appropriate the worker's bread for their own selfish purposes. Drawing upon this view of reality, Bryan dashed off his comment upon Thomas Lawson's widely read muckraking series on the operations of the stock market, "Frenzied Finance":

> Mr. Lawson's phrase, "Frenzied Finance," is too mild. Conscienceless finance is a more accurate description of what goes on in Wall street. "Frenzied" would imply an excitement so intense as to temporarily suspend the operation of the reason, but some of the Wall street transactions are *deliberately contrived schemes* for deception and pillage.[8]

The rapid industrialization of the United States after the Civil War brought a train of abuses deplored by both urban and rural Progressives and figuring prominently in their respective concep-

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of LaFollette's brain trust at Wisconsin. Although he imbibed some of the ideas of urban Progressives, his association with the radical agrarian tradition left its mark upon him.

[6] H. G. Day to Bryan, January 24, 1901, Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.

[7] Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform,* 200.

[8] *The Commoner,* January 20, 1905. Italics mine. See Thomas Lawson, "Frenzied Finance; The Story of Amalgamated," *Everybody's,* XII, XIII, XIV (January, 1905–February, 1906).

tions of reality. Just as these views on the nature of reality differed, so also did urban and rural reactions to post war economic developments differ. The nationalizing of business was accompanied by a status revolution in which the urban gentry of long established wealth and social position saw itself being replaced by the new captain of industry as a controlling power in American life.[9] While the urban Progressives thus felt the pressure of a status revolution, the rural Progressives believed that they had already experienced one. The yeoman farmer of the Jeffersonian tradition had disappeared; at least, the most important population groups were no longer agrarian. The Populist crusade represented, in part, an attempt to regain what farmers thought had been lost as a result of the machinations of the "money power."[10] In other words, the appeal of the urban Progressives was to those who still had something to lose; the rural Progressives, heirs of the Populists, believed they had already lost something—their birthright.

This sense of loss was perhaps most apparent in the nativist tendencies of both the Populists and the rural Progressives. The influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe came at a time when industry was expanding rapidly and when farmers were agitating against malpractices of industrialists. It was inevitable that industrialism and immigration should be linked together. With immigrants pouring into congested industrial areas, farmers believed themselves not only exploited but outnumbered. The pre-Civil War animosities arising from the South's conception of itself as a minority gave place to fears and hatreds stemming, in part, from the minority consciousness of "native American" farmers in both the West and the South.[11] Yet the foundations of nativism

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[9] Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, 137.

[10] *Ibid.*, 33–35, 70–81. See also Hallie Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X (1924), 406–427; Roger V. Clements, "The Farmers' Attitude Toward British Investments in American Industry," *The Journal of Economic History*, XV (1955), 151–159. "No one can confuse in his own mind," said Bryan in a passage which reflects the Populist influence, "the difference between buying wheat or oats or corn because he has immediate need for them or is in a position to store them for future use, and the purchase for speculative purposes of grain which he does not expect to receive, or the sale for speculative purposes of grain which he does not expect to deliver," And yet, he concluded, it was the refusal to observe this distinction that had brought about the "ruin of so many fortunes, and the wreck of so many lives." "The Next Awakening," *Public Opinion*, XXXVIII (May 27, 1905), 806.

[11] This tendency toward nativism is most pronounced in the career of Tom Watson. See C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel*, New York, 1938, especially Chapters XXII and XXIII. But nativism among agrarian groups was by no means confined to the South.

were religious as well as economic. When the church of the immigrant happened to be Catholic, as was the case with many of those who came from southern and eastern Europe, the latitudinarianism of American Protestantism seemed threatened. It was then an easy matter for rural Progressives to extend their distrust of the "money power" to the immigrant, and their suspicion of the immigrant to the hierarchy of his church.[12]

This is not to say that urban Progressives were not also troubled by the immigrant, his outlook, and his institutions. Huddled in urban slums, immigrants were easy prey for machine politicians, and Progressives of the cities enlisted in the effort to facilitate Americanization of newcomers. The great gulf fixed between immigrants and reform groups in industrial areas was difficult to bridge, however, for it was a gulf between two types of ethos. The immigrant regarded political relationships as personal rather than institutional, and he remained indifferent to the rationalistic appeals of urban Progressives.[13] Efficiency, system, order, balanced budgets, improved administration, and lower taxes were rejected by the immigrant. He wanted humanity, not balanced budgets; sympathy and assistance, not efficiency and order; mercy without justice, not justice without mercy.[14] Thus Progressives of the metropolitan areas never established rapport with immigrant groups, but the trend of urban Progressivism was in the direction of at least a theoretical acceptance of the newcomer.[15] The new immigration created difficulties, of course, but they were difficulties that could be met scientifically. The attitude of the urban Progressives seldom took the form of religious bigotry.

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12 The attitude of the immigrant toward his church was conservative. Religion was a way of life, providing continuity with the past. Permanence of form offered some security in his world of uncertainty. See Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted,* Boston, 1952, 119, 142; Marcus Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History,* Cambridge, Mass., 1942, 91. This conservatism ran counter to the mainstream of American church history, which has resulted in an emphasis on moralism rather than on dogma. In this connection the work of Professor Sidney Mead is suggestive. See his "Denominationalism: The Shape of Protestantism in America," *Church History,* XXIII (1954), 291–320.

13 Handlin, *The Uprooted,* 218–221.

14 Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform,* 183–184. For all the graft and corruption associated with city machines, this much can be said for them: they did understand the immigrant mind and they did provide help when help was needed. "I stick to my friends high and low, do them a good turn whenever I get a chance, and hunt up all the jobs going for my constituents," said George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. Here was an approach the immigrant could comprehend. See William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall,* ed. Roy V. Peel, New York, 1948, 63.

15 Eric Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny,* New York, 1953, 78, 84.

Where the Populist tradition was strong, nativist ideas were widely received and voters were led to accept tenuous evidence as proof of conspiracy against their way of life. The election of 1908 provides an illustration of the complications arising from aroused ethnic and religious sensitivities. Willam Howard Taft, while serving as civil governor of the Philippines, had helped to solve a problem concerning the disposition of lands formerly held by Spanish friars. To do so, it had been necessary for him to negotiate directly with the Vatican, and when Taft became the Republican nominee, those negotiations were recalled as indicative of his friendliness toward Rome.[16] "The Republicans are making an effort to reach our Catholic Democrats," Bryan wrote Henry Watterson, "but we are planning to meet this, and will, I think succeed measurably well, although I would not be surprised if we lost a little in this direction."[17]

When the returns were in, many who had supported Bryan were convinced that he had lost more in that direction than anyone had anticipated. Correspondence in the Bryan Papers relating to this election is voluminous, and the letters he received suggest a widespread belief that the Papacy had interfered with American democratic processes, that the election of Taft was part of a twentieth century popish plot.[18] Bryan made extensive inquiries, and for several weeks printed letters in *The Commoner* under the headline "Solving the Mystery of 1908." But in spite of his efforts the mystery remained unsolved, and the degree to which Catholic influence caused defections from the Democracy was an enigma that plagued the Commoner the rest of his days.[19]

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16 The problem is thoroughly discussed in Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, New York, 1939, I, 220–231.

17 Bryan to Watterson, August 17, 1908, Watterson Papers, Library of Congress.

18 See the Bryan Papers, especially those for November, 1908. The following observations are typical: "We are in the grasp of Rome. And no man who is not a sympathizer with the Catholic can be elected." "I want to call your attention to the two greatest sources of danger to our country, viz. *catholocism* [sic] and *foreign immigration*.... I am not a member of any church, nor am I an infidel, therefore am not a church fanatic, but *I am an American* with the deepest concern for my country." "There seems to be no doubt about the Catholics having had their instructions from Rome to vote for Mr. Taft...." "The Catholics have paid the Republican party for what they have done for them in the P.I."

19 It was the degree to which the Catholic Church influenced the election that puzzled Bryan. He was convinced, however, that defections did occur. During the campaign of 1912, he wrote: "We need to do something to bring back the catholics [sic] who voted for Taft in 1908 and who will vote for him this year. *That is the one weak point* in our fight this year." Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, n.d., stamped "Answered, July 31, 1912," Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

While Bryan's correspondence did not enable him to arrive at conclusions that were entirely satisfactory, it does contain evidence of considerable nativist backing. And this nativist support begs an even more important question: what influence did such persons and groups have upon his thought and activities? During the period from 1896 to 1912, when Bryan served as his party's most effective leader, he resisted nativist appeals. He hoped to win back Catholic voters, rather than proscribe them. Entreaties to form a "native American" party left him unmoved. His basic interest throughout these years was that the Democratic party should adopt the reforms he advocated and serve to make them effective. The accomplishment of this objective required political sagacity as well as political realism, for it demanded that a party composed of heterogeneous elements be persuaded to take united action. Bryan, like the urban Progressives, was not successful in winning support for his reforms among immigrant groups.[20] Yet he was able to retain the fealty of many who opposed and feared the immigrant, and in so doing he was in no small measure responsible for keeping "sons of the wild jackass" inside the Progressive corral. Just as city bosses understood the immigrant and won his allegiance, so Bryan understood rural America and commanded its support. Perhaps the most significant difference between Bryan and the bosses lies in his acceptance of reforms that made the bosses writhe in anguish. But a not insignificant difference between Bryan and the urban Progressives developed from his attitude toward realistic democracy, and the pragmatic leadership he gave his party.[21]

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[20] Handlin, *The Uprooted*, 218; Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, 92–95. Hansen points out that the sons of immigrants were more inclined to accept reform. They lost the conservatism of new property holders and they were far more ready to join in placing economic restrictions upon individuals than their fathers had been.

[21] References to Bryan as a demagogue and to his political insincerity are legion, and are not by any means confined to urban Progressive writings. Taken together they indicate a general unwillingness on the part of his opponents to recognize Bryan's skill as a practical politician. At any rate, Populists such as Henry Demarest Lloyd, conservatives such as Grover Cleveland, and urban Progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt could have agreed with H. L. Mencken that "if the fellow was sincere, then so was P. T. Barnum." *American Mercury*, VI (October, 1925), 159. Representative of the views expressed by urban Progressives and their followers was a letter from William Allen White which doubtless pleased Roosevelt immensely. In commenting upon the differences between the Progressivism of Roosevelt and Bryan, White observed that they were "so entirely technical, so nice in their adjustment, that it will strain democracy to the utmost to furnish public wisdom to see the truth and keep the demagogue's foot off the scales." White to Roosevelt, October 16, 1908, White Papers, Library of Congress. Roosevelt himself thought Bryan disingenuous, to

Although Bryan's fame rested in large part upon his oratory, his weekly newspaper, *The Commoner,* was as important an organ as his matchless voice in the exercise of political leadership. And newspapers and magazines—particularly the latter—were also vital for the urban wing of the Progressive Movement. The relationship between editor Bryan and the urban journalists known as muckrakers is therefore necessary to an understanding of the relationship between the urban and rural Progressives.

The primary concern of the muckraking periodicals was in accurate and objective description. And the literature of exposure, which is as old as the bawdy planet, took on a new intensity when magazines such as *McClure's, Everybody's, Cosmopolitan,* or *Collier's* served up dishes that were not so dainty to set before fact-hungry readers. Few would deny that the muckrakers became interested in securing reforms. They nevertheless believed that exposure of evil was a necessary prelude to reform. No one more clearly stated the position of the muckraker than did Ray Stannard Baker during a conversation with Jack London. When London asked him why he was not a socialist, Baker replied:

> You see, I'm not a reformer. I'm a reporter. I have only begun to look at the world. I want to see it all more clearly and understand it better, before I pledge myself to any final solution for the evils we both see. I'm not sure yet that if either you or I made over the world, it would be any better than the one we now have. We don't know enough.[22]

In the minds of its purveyors, muckraking was thus an expression of the urban Progressive impulse: scientific, objective, unbiased, suggesting few specific solutions or answers and no sweeping alterations in the American social and economic system.

The contents of *The Commoner,* in contrast to the muckraking journals, were almost exclusively editorial, for Bryan thought it his principal duty to present his point of view on every issue and event. He perhaps could not have adopted the muckrakers' approach even had he so desired; his resources were too limited. He did not, however, feel any need to engage in muckraking. While the muck-

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say the least. "What an insincere canvass our opponents are waging this year," he wrote when Bryan campaigned for Alton B. Parker. Roosevelt to Ed Crumpacker, October 12, 1904, Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. And in 1908, he urged Taft to "hit them hard, old man!" Then he added, "Why not call attention to Bryan's insincerity in saying he was my heir. . . ." Roosevelt to Taft, September 1, 1908, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

[22] Baker, *American Chronicle,* New York, 1945, 139.

raking magazines were devoted to facts, *The Commoner* was devoted to arguments. The people, thought Bryan, were like jurors who should be presented with arguments on both sides of a question before making any decision.[23] He was committed to the principle that "truth is born of conflict" and, as he conceived it, his function as editor coincided with his function as leader of the political opposition.

Although Bryan frequently made use of the findings of the muckrakers, he did so to buttress his arguments. Again and again he was able to point to their articles as proof of what he had been saying since his entry into public life. To the muckrakers, the exposures were so sweeping that existing abuses seemed attributable to society as a whole. "We all are doing our worst," said S. S. McClure, "and making the public pay."[24] Bryan, uncompromising, never gave up the idea that the "money trust" was responsible for the evils in American life. "The thimbleriggers at a street fair," he wrote, "are engaged in more honorable business for they cheat those who are foolish enough to risk money on a game known to be dishonest, but these thimbleriggers of high finance rob the helpless and the dependents under the guise of doing an honest business."[25] Working from this assumption, it was easy for Bryan to suggest a program for the reform of abuses; it is always easier to pass laws preventing the misdeeds of a few than to legislate for a whole people.

The interaction between Bryan and the muckrakers in the journalistic sphere therefore parallels the interaction between the rural and urban wings of the Progressive Movement in the realm of political action. The urban Progressives, feeling the pressures of a status revolution, demanded reform and through the muckrakers provided concrete evidence of evils in American society. But the urban Progressives were reluctant to suggest specific policies for making reform effective. The rural Progressives started with a program they had inherited from the Populists, and this program, modified, seemed to meet the problems which troubled the urban wing of the movement. Thus it would not be too much to say that the two wings of Progressivism were complementary; the urban group demonstrated the need for a change, while the rural group

[23] *The Commoner*, November 28, 1902.
[24] *McClure's Magazine*, XX (January, 1903), 336.
[25] *The Commoner*, July 14, 1905.

led by Bryan produced a program which became the basis for change. Roosevelt's adoption of plank after plank from the Bryan platform becomes intelligible when it is seen as the result of this dialectic at work within the Progressive Movement.

Nevertheless Roosevelt was at heart conservative, and were it not for his desire to thwart radicalism by correcting some of the evils of the status quo, he might never have become a Progressive at all. Even as a Progressive, he made a habit of balancing good and evil: the good trust as opposed to the bad trust, for example.[26] Roosevelt's equivocation served to mitigate what had originally seemed a radical program; in his hands the Bryan planks were cut and planed and used to construct a moderate platform. To say with Vachel Lindsay that T. R. aped Bryan is to voice a partial truth; but equally accurate would be the observation that Bryan aped T. R. It took no keen perception to see that Roosevelt was immensely popular with voters, and before long Bryan was taking pains to point out that he, too, was fundamentally conservative.[27] By 1908, the *New York World* thought Bryan had become an entirely new personality: "The old-time impulsiveness has utterly vanished and exaggerated caution has taken its place."[28] And in his speech accepting the Democratic nomination that year, the Commoner said, "I have such confidence in the intelligence as well as the patriotism of the people, that I cannot doubt their readiness to accept the reasonable reforms which our party proposes, rather than permit the continued growth of existing abuses to hurry the country on to remedies more radical and more drastic."[29]

After his defeat, Bryan's supporters consoled him by pointing out that in a constitutional government the political opposition may sometimes be credited with more significant achievement than the

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26 "T. R. saw the machine; he did not see the system," thought Lincoln Steffens. "He saw the party organization of the politicians; he saw some 'bad' trusts back of the bad politics, but he did not see the good trusts back of the bad trusts that were back of the bad machines." *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, New York, 1931, 505.

27 "Not only is the reformer the real defender of property rights, but he is the best friend of the very persons who abuse him," Bryan wrote in 1905. "Just as that physician is the best one who points out to his patient the dangers of the disease from which he suffers and proposes the best remedy, no matter how severe, so those are the best friends of the rich who attempt to restrain excesses and correct abuses." *The Commoner*, July 7, 1905.

28 *New York World*, July 5, 1908.

29 *The Campaign Text Book of the Democratic Party of the United States, 1908*, 243.

party in power.[30] Certainly Bryan's opposition had some share in bringing about the positive results of the Progressive Era. At the same time the very success of a modified Bryan program tended to make the Commoner himself more moderate and respectable, and, toward the end of Roosevelt's administration, less effective as a leader of political opposition. Success in failure was accompanied by failure in success. But the last acts of the tragedy were yet to be played. In his later years, Bryan became identified with the nativist demands he had once resisted. Personal defeat and ridicule took their toll, he lost contact with the pulse of the nation, and he was mocked where he had once been praised. A sense of loss overtook him, and in its shadow he was embraced by the Ku Klux Klan.[31]

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[30] See William J. Gaynor to Bryan, November 13, 1908, Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.

[31] Marietta Stevenson, "William Jennings Bryan as a Political Leader" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1926), 269–275; Paxton Hibben and C. Hartley Grattan, *The Peerless Leader, William Jennings Bryan*, New York, 1929, 381–387.

Thomas P. Gore and the Election of Woodrow Wilson

William F. McCombs, William G. McAdoo, and Walter Hines Page received a great deal of support from lesser politicians in their successful movement to make Woodrow Wilson President of the United States. One of the most important of the second echelon of leaders in the 1911–1912 presidential contest was Oklahoma's blind Senator, Thomas P. Gore. Except for his part in the belligerent armed ship controversy of the spring of 1916, Gore has been largely overlooked by scholars dealing with twentieth-century politics.[1] The hope of this article is to rescue him from the obscurity inevitably surrounding those in the second rank of any important movement by showing the role he played in the election of Woodrow Wilson.

Elected to the Senate in 1907 when Oklahoma was admitted to the Union, the blind Senator had become nationally known for having risen above his handicap, albeit his influence on legislation during his first few years in the Senate had been limited. When the liberal wing of the Democratic party attached itself to the rising star of New Jersey's Governor Wilson, Gore saw a political opportunity. Soon after the Wilson-for-President headquarters was established in New York in 1911, Gore publicly expressed his hearty accord with the movement. Carefully canvassing the political situation, he had concluded that the Governor was the only prospective candidate who could carry both New York and New Jersey, which he felt necessary for a Democratic victory; therefore, he announced a full year before the Democratic National Convention met that he favored Wilson for the nomination. Although he was later to assert that he had joined the Wilson ranks because he thought it was a shrewd political calculation,[2] at the time he talked in ideological terms. "In respect to legislative policies," Gore said of Wilson, "he is abreast of the times. He is in harmony with the spirit of enlightened and rational progress,

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[1] The only writer who has given Gore more than passing notice is Arthur S. Link, *Wilson, the Road to the White House,* Princeton, 1947, 327ff.

[2] Gore in conversation with Link, August 15, 1942, quoted in Link, "The South and the Democratic Campaign of 1912," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1945), 71.

and yet he is wise enough to know that 'too swift arrives as tardy as too slow.'"[3] Gore became the first figure of any prominence in public office to announce in favor of Wilson.

As a close friend of McCombs, the general manager of the Wilson pre-convention campaign, Gore gave sound advice. McCombs later expressed his opinion of Gore's work when he wrote, "We obtained the most valuable acquisition that I know of in the entire campaign in Senator Thomas P. Gore."[4] When the Democratic National Committee met on January 9, 1912, to select a city in which to hold the nominating convention, McCombs, following Gore's suggestion, was able to have Baltimore named as the site. Gore and McCombs favored Baltimore over New York City because they did not want Wilson's candidacy to have the appearance of being Tammany-dominated.[5] When Byron R. Newton, publicity agent for pre-convention activities, clashed with McCombs, he was discharged, and McCombs accepted Gore's suggestion, Thomas H. Owen of Oklahoma, as the replacement.[6] As the pre-convention struggle intensified, the sickly McCombs leaned more heavily on Gore. "It was to him, more than any other person," McCombs recalled, "that I turned in the most difficult moments."[7]

As Wilson's campaign gained momentum a counter-campaign developed. Gore's role became that of spokesman to the press to reassure the public of Wilson's uprightness. In January, 1912, when the Wilson managers were doing their best to bring their candidate and William Jennings Bryan together politically, the *New York Sun* published a letter written by Wilson to Adrian H. Joline in 1907 expressing an uncomplimentary attutide toward Bryan. Writing that he would like to "do something at once dignified and effective to knock Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat," Wilson had agreed with Joline's opinion that Bryan's proposal for government ownership of the railroads was socialistic. The publication of this letter was well-timed, as one of the bitterest anti-Bryan and anti-Wilson newspapers in the country endeavored to drive a wedge between the Commoner and the Governor. The reason for the printing of the letter was apparent to most observers. Gore's com-

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[3] Gore to Henry Breckenridge, May 25, 1911, quoted in *Vinita Weekly Chieftain* (Oklahoma), June 2, 1911.

[4] William F. McCombs, *Making Woodrow Wilson President,* New York, 1921, 80.

[5] Maurice F. Lyons, *William F. McCombs: The President Maker,* Cincinnati, 1922, 41.

[6] McCombs, *Making Wilson President,* 106.

[7] *Ibid.,* 80.

ment was accurate when he said that it had "two designs, both sinister. First—to put Wilson and Bryan asunder, to divide progressive Democrats and conquer them. Second—to inflame the animosity and resentment of Mr. Bryan's faithful friends and followers and cause them to desert Wilson."[8]

A week after the publication of the Joline letter, the Wilson candidacy, apparently recovering from the thrust of the *Sun,* received another blow that for a time threatened to thwart Wilson's presidential ambitions entirely. George Harvey, editor of the conservative *Harper's Weekly* and an early advocate of Wilson's candidacy, disliking the New Jersey Governor's alliance with the young progressives, tried to hinder Wilson's prospects. Implying that the Governor was ungrateful for his magazine's support and financial connections, Harvey published a misleading announcement stating that Wilson had suggested that Harvey's aid was injurious to his candidacy.[9] When this announcement appeared in the January 20 issue of *Harper's Weekly,* Wilson's opponents rejoiced. Exploiting the Wilson-Harvey break unmercifully, the conservative papers of the country outdid themselves in attacking Wilson as an ingrate for refusing to accept Harvey's support.

Assisting the Wilson managers in their attempt to prevent these attacks from becoming effective, Gore jauntily declared the whole incident "a bubble, not a billow."[10] He defended Wilson by challenging the critics to tell the public frankly whether their candidates would accept a financial obligation similar to the one the Governor declined. "I would rather see Governor Wilson defeated and his heart an open book, 'that all who run may read,' " he declared, "than to see him triumphant with a skeleton in his political closet which had been concealed from the eyes of a confiding people."[11] He also helped ease the situation by persuading Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, himself a possible presidential candidate, to declare his

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[8] *Daily Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City), January 16, 1912.

[9] For details of the controversy, see Link, *Wilson,* 359–78. Before the announcement was published, Wilson had written letters to Harvey, trying to smooth over the misunderstanding, but to no avail. See Wilson to Harvey, December 21, 1911, and January 11, 1912, Woodrow Wilson Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

[10] *New York Evening Post,* January 19, 1912. This statement was for press consumption. Actually the Wilson managers thought the affair to be not only a billow, "but a cyclone and hurricane all rolled into one." When Harvey's statement was published, Gore, McCombs, and Thomas J. Pence spent three days in Washington "trying to steady the boat." Gore in conversation with Link, August 15, 1942, quoted in Link, *Wilson,* 373.

[11] Lyons, *McCombs,* 52–53.

support of Wilson. This unhesitating support on the part of Gore and other important Democratic leaders was quite effective in rehabilitating Wilson's political fortunes.

Having considerable political power in Oklahoma, Gore undertook to foster and organize the pre-convention Wilson campaign in his home state. In this endeavor he received the assistance of a loyal and able lieutenant, William H. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray.[12] J. Robert Gilliam and Washington Sorrel, president and secretary respectively of the state organization, established Wilson clubs in strategic towns, including Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Enid, Guymon, Shawnee, Ardmore, and Muskogee.[13] Progressive newspapers, led by the influential Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman,* lent their support to the Wilson boosters. But a number of the state's political leaders, notably Governor C. N. Haskell, favored the candidacy of Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the Democratic leaders in the state, sentiment was about evenly divided between Wilson and Clark. For fear of offending the adherents of other candidates, Gore based his advocacy of Wilson on the alleged fact that he was the only candidate who could marshal the independent vote.[14]

In January, 1912, Gore arrived in Oklahoma to give finishing touches to the campaign organization. Abstaining from making an open fight for his candidate, he nevertheless traveled extensively throughout the Sooner State in an attempt to rally his friends for Wilson. When it was rumored that the Clark managers had threatened Gore with political annihilation if he spoke for Wilson in Oklahoma, Gore denied that his opponents had issued the ultimatum.[15] To prove that he had not been intimidated, Gore spoke in Oklahoma City on February 9, but he spoke concerning the general Democratic situation and his remarks regarding Wilson were mild. In this speech he defended his right to freedom of speech and presidential choice.[16]

The Republicans refused to allow the Democrats the appearance of unity, and four days later the *Muskogee Daily Phoenix* published the contents of the purported threatening letters from the Clark men to Gore. The Senator negated any effect this move might have had by his actions at the Oklahoma Democratic con-

12 *McAlester News-Capital* (Oklahoma), January 27, 1912.
13 *Daily Oklahoman,* January 14 and February 4, 1912.
14 *Ibid.,* September 3, 1911.
15 *Ibid.,* February 4, 1912.
16 *Ibid.,* February 10, 1912.

vention two weeks later. With the county conventions selecting a majority of Wilson delegates for the state convention, thus assuring the Gore faction of complete control at the meeting, he generously suggested that the Oklahoma delegation to the Baltimore convention be evenly divided between Wilson and Clark.[17] Clark's Oklahoma manager, United States Congressman Scott Ferris, accepted the offer. But when the state convention met, the other Clark adherents, who had been assured of the support of candidate Judson Harmon's Oklahoma followers, determined to fight for control of the convention. Faced with this situation, Gore called a caucus of the Wilson delegates on the eve of the convention, at which time his followers voted to regard the Gore-Ferris agreement as binding.[18] With the Wilson men in control of the convention, the Clark supporters were defeated by a comfortable margin (314½ to 285½). The two factions then agreed to divide the delegation, with the provision that if either Clark or Wilson withdrew from the national convention contest, all the delegates would vote for the other candidate.[19]

These developments indicated that the rift in the Democratic ranks as publicized by the Republican press had been real. But Gore had shrewdly healed the breach by insisting that the national delegation be divided evenly. With apparent victory in his hands on the state level, Gore was aware that his candidate might not win at the national convention. Success in carrying all Wilson delegates to the convention would then be a Pyrrhic victory for Gore. By splitting the votes he felt that he had nothing to lose and everything to gain. If Clark ultimately won the nomination, Gore's support for Wilson would be less distasteful to Oklahoma leaders since he had generously allowed half the delegation to vote for Clark. Further to indicate Gore's political maturity, it must be pointed out that he himself would be running for re-election within two years, and he was wise enough to know that support of a doubtful nominee in 1912 would not help him in his own coming campaign if he alienated important political leaders in his state.

Gore's campaign activities for Wilson before the Baltimore convention did not end with his efforts in Oklahoma. Determined to carry the Midwest in the primaries, McCombs sent Gore in March on a hurricane tour of Wisconsin. But Gore did more than speak;

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17 *Muskogee Daily Phoenix* (Oklahoma), February 21, 1912.
18 *Daily Oklahoman*, February 22, 1912.
19 *Daily Phoenix*, February 23 and 24, 1912.

he helped develop an active publicity agency, and from Milwaukee he directed the organization of a campaign which reached to the smallest precinct in Wisconsin.[20] The national headquarters contributed heavy financial support and vast quantities of literature to that state's organization. These efforts were not in vain; twenty of the twenty-four Wisconsin delegates to Baltimore were pledged to Wilson.

Despite these victories, when the Democratic National Convention met on June 25, 1912, Wilson's future as a presidential candidate was not bright. Without campaigning Champ Clark had led Wilson by substantial majorities in most of the Democratic primaries and state conventions. With only 248 pledged delegates to Clark's 436, Wilson and his followers were disheartened, but they were determined to make the best of it.

The convention was riotous from the first day. The Wilson delegates, including Gore who was a delegate-at-large from Oklahoma, supported William Jennings Bryan in his revolt against conservative Alton B. Parker of New York as keynote speaker. The Clark men voted for Parker, however, and the Judge delivered his speech. At the beginning of the second day, the Committee on Credentials reported that it had not yet completed its work and would not be ready to report on its efforts until 8 P.M. The chairman of the committee suggested that the convention not recess until that time, "for I know those present would like a display of oratory."

Of the eight who "displayed" oratory, Gore was one. In a rousing speech typical of those made on such occasions, Gore loosed his oratorical powers on the receptive Democratic ears. Attacking the Republican party as one which "taxes the toys and joys of childhood; taxes the tools in the hands of the toiler; taxes the rags upon the back of the beggar; taxes the crust upon the lips of the hungry; taxes not only the necessaries and comforts of life, but taxes the cerements and the monuments of the dead," he appealed to the convention crowd. He also cast humorous aspersions in the direction of the Republicans. Suggesting that all articles in the United States be given two price tags, one including a tariff and the other not, he advanced the plan that all who favored a protective tariff pay the higher price while those who believed in a low tariff or no tariff be allowed to buy the articles at the lower price. "That law

20 McCombs, *Making Wilson President*, 96.

is bound to give universal satisfaction," he announced, "because under its operation it shall be done unto every man according to his faith."[21]

In the meantime, Bryan had prepared a resolution pledging the party to nominate no candidate under obligation to "J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." The resolution further demanded that delegates Ryan and Belmont, whom Bryan considered the handmaidens of Wall Street, be expelled from the convention.[22] Bryan's brother called together several Wilson leaders, including Gore, Luke Lea, Cone Johnson, Jerry B. Sullivan, Harvey Garber, and Henderson Martin, ardent Bryan men all, to get their opinion of the proposed resolution. They unanimously agreed that it was too harsh, if not unwise.[23] When none of them volunteered to introduce the resolution, the Great Commoner himself took the step, causing an uproar in the convention. Only after the provision expelling Ryan and Belmont had been struck out was the resolution accepted by the convention.[24]

During the night of June 27 and the morning of June 28, the nominations for President were made. Wilson was nominated by John W. Wescott at 3:25 A.M. after a Wilson demonstration of one hour and fifteen minutes. The nomination was seconded in several brief speeches, one of which was delivered by the Oklahoma orator. Although praising Wilson highly in this speech, Gore stressed the importance of the cause and principles for which the candidate stood. "The proud, arrogant and omnipotent Republican party is today stranded, broken between the rock of Taft standpattism on the one hand and the whirlpool of Rooseveltian radicalism on the other," he concluded. "There must be and there will be a progressive party in the United States. Shall that party be the Democratic party or shall it be the Roosevelt party?"[25]

Besides Wilson and Clark, two other candidates of importance were nominated, Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio and Representative Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama. At seven o'clock in the morning on June 28, the first ballot was taken. The four highest

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[21] *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention . . . 1912,* Chicago, 1912, 50.
[22] *Ibid.,* 129.
[23] Charles W. Bryan in *New York Times,* March 6, 1921.
[24] *Official Report of the 1912 Convention,* 137–38.
[25] *Ibid.,* 183–85.

candidates were Clark (440½), Wilson (324), Harmon (148), and Underwood (117½).[26]

When the afternoon session began, the lines were tightly drawn for the impending battle. The nervous and sickly McCombs was in charge of the Wilson forces. A. Mitchell Palmer bespoke Wilson's interests on the speakers' platform with assistance from William Hughes of New Jersey and Thomas J. Pence of North Carolina. A. S. Burleson was in command of the Wilson delegates on the convention floor, aided by Gore and McAdoo. With little change in the votes during the next eight ballots, the Wilson men knew that the knockout blow was being prepared. On the tenth ballot New York's Tammany boss, Charles F. Murphy, cast his state's ninety votes for Clark instead of Harmon. This gave the Speaker 556 votes, well over a majority, and it was hoped, would provide the signal for the Clark landslide. The Wilson managers, McCombs, Palmer, McAdoo, Burleson, and Gore, scurried over the convention hall pleading with the Underwood delegates not to give their votes to Clark. With North Dakota and Oklahoma refusing to alter their votes, the tenth ballot continued without further significant change in the voting.[27]

On the next ballot the Underwood men knew that they held a trump card. Clark's nomination could be prevented by their holding to their hundred-odd votes, and they were well aware of it. Playing for a deadlock between Wilson and Clark, they hoped that their candidate would become the logical compromise candidate. They were not ready to bargain with the Wilson or Clark forces; they wanted nothing less than the Presidency. The Wilson men, on the other hand, despite Bryan's belated support on the fourteenth ballot, realized that they had to deal with the Underwood delegates if they were to win the nomination. McCombs, Gore, and T. W. Gregory held long conferences with the Underwood leaders and promised that if Wilson should be put out of the race at any stage, they would use their influence to deliver the Wilson delegates to the Alabamian. The Underwood men in return agreed to remain loyal to their candidate. In this way a solid anti-Clark block was formed, and the Missourian ultimately lost the nomination (after

[26] *Ibid.*, 196–98.

[27] When the vote for the Oklahoma delegation was called for, "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, collarless and wiping his face with a red bandanna handkerchief, waved his arms and roared with his frog-like voice, "We do insist that we shall not join Tammany in making the nomination." Quoted in *Official Report of 1912 Convention*, 220. See also Link, *Wilson*, 449.

a total of forty-six ballots) by this skillful maneuvering on the part of the Wilson forces.[28] On the afternoon of July 2 the convention made Wilson the official nominee.

Gore was recognized by his associates as having a significant part in this victory. McAdoo recalled in his autobiography that the Senator was "skillful and active" as one of the floor leaders and praised him for his "great work."[29] McCombs' secretary, Maurice F. Lyons, called Gore "a power on the floor,"[30] and the *New York Times* said, "Senator Gore was referred to by Gov. Wilson just before the deciding ballot was cast at Baltimore as a field general so capable that it would be mere impertinence on his own part to intervene in the situation instead of trusting all to the Senator."[31]

Hardly had the convention excitement subsided before the Wilson leaders began to make plans for the election in November. The most perplexing business was that of reorganizing the Democratic National Committee. Burleson, Palmer, Gore, and Josephus Daniels conferred several times, finally agreeing that McCombs should be recommended as chairman of the national committee.[32] Wilson plainly distrusted the sickly man who was becoming increasingly more difficult to deal with, insisting that McAdoo be made vice-chairman. When the national committee met on July 15 in Chicago, McCombs and McAdoo were chosen as previously agreed, with a strong executive committee to support them. This committee was comprised of original Wilson supporters who had been active in the pre-convention campaign: Daniels, Palmer, Burleson, Gore, Joseph E. Davies, J. A. O'Gorman, Daniel J. McGillicuddy, Robert Ewing, James A. Reed, W. R. King, William Saulsbury, and R. S. Hudspeth.[33] In selecting this so-called "veranda cabinet," Wilson had almost entirely ignored the old guard politicians who had customarily led in the management of Democratic presidential campaigns.

Early in August the Democratic organization's headquarters was established in New York City. Gore, having impressed his fellow

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[28] Link, *Wilson*, 450.

[29] *Crowded Years*, Boston, 1931, 152.

[30] Maurice F. Lyons Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

[31] August 12, 1912.

[32] Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era, Years of Peace—1910–1917*, Chapel Hill, 1944, 68.

[33] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, New York, 1927–39, III, 371. Burleson apparently considered McCombs, McAdoo, Gore, Daniels, Davies, King, and Saulsbury the most important members of the campaign committee. See memorandum in the A. S. Burleson Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

workers with his organizing genius during the pre-convention campaign, was named chairman of the National Bureau Organization.[34] When the Senator took charge he found the party machinery in a state of "utter dilapidation," and it was October before the organization was under full sail.[35] Directing the campaign with extraordinary ability, he perfected the organization to such an extent that it was possible to reach the personnel of the smallest precincts.[36] Distributing a pamphlet giving detailed instructions to local workers on how to form Wilson and Marshall clubs, Gore urged the establishment of these clubs throughout the country, supplying them liberally with campaign literature and buttons.[37] The organization bureau distributed 760,000 packages of campaign material to an estimated 360,000 different individuals. Some 3,300,000 pieces of printed matter were sent directly from Gore's office, and about 2,500,000 were sent from the general supply room by order of his bureau.[38]

In a tactical effort to unite all factions in the Midwest and to counteract Theodore Roosevelt's popularity in that progressive region, Joseph E. Davies, secretary of the national committee, was chosen to head the Democrats' western office at Chicago. In September Gore and Burleson moved the offices of the organization bureau and the speakers' division to Chicago to promote unity of effort.[39] From that vantage point Gore directed his hierarchy-type organization so as to keep even the most humble precinct workers on the job.

The importance of organizational work done by Gore and his subordinates is apparent when the popular vote in the campaign is analyzed. Although Wilson won by a landslide in the electoral

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[34] The directors of the other divisions were Henry Morgenthau (finance), Josephus Daniels (publicity), A. S. Burleson and Homer S. Cummings (speakers' division), Abram I. Elkus (foreign division), R. S. Hudspeth (labor), and John F. De Saulles and Joseph Truesdale (young men's division). Lyons, *McCombs*, 113.

[35] Gore to John J. Raskob, December 15, 1928, Thomas P. Gore Papers (Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library).

[36] Lyons, *McCombs*, 115.

[37] Gore to "My dear Democratic Friend" (mimeographed), October 3, 1912, Josephus Daniels Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

[38] W. D. Jamieson to T. P. Gregory, November 7, 1912, copy in Edward M. House Papers (Yale University Library), quoted in Link, *Wilson*, 482.

[39] M. L. Davies to McCombs, July 26, 1912 (telegram), and Irving Shuman to McCombs, July 26, 1912, Daniels Papers; *Louisville Times*, September 13, 1912.

college, his popular vote amounted to less than 42 per cent of the ballots cast. In an election in which over fifteen million votes were cast, a change of mind on the part of a few hundred thousand voters in critical states would have elected the Bull Moose candidate.[40] In view of this possibility, party organization looms as a significant factor in the election, if for no other reason than the keeping in line of regular Democratic voters.

After Wilson's victory in the general election and with a majority of seventy-three in the House and six in the Senate, the Democratic leaders made their plans from November to March with pleasant yet sober anticipation. Most of their conferences centered around cabinet choices and the program for the next session of Congress. Gore conferred with Colonel Edward M. House in November, at which time the Senator expressed his favorable opinion of Bryan as a possible cabinet member.[41] The following January the Senator was in conference with the President-elect on two separate occasions, the first being on January 8 when he and Hoke Smith conferred with Wilson for three hours discussing cabinet posts and the coming session of Congress.[42]

Rumors were heard that Gore would be given a cabinet position, and it was generally believed in Oklahoma that the Senator could have one if he so desired.[43] There is no indication, however, that he cared to leave his Senate post. Soon to be elevated to the chairmanship of the important Agriculture and Forestry Committee as a result of the Democratic victories, the Senator was on the verge of his most productive years in the Senate. He believed that it would be unwise to leave the Senate at the time his influence was obviously gaining momentum.

As a progressive Democrat from Oklahoma in a period when progressivism was at flood tide in the United States, Gore had been one of the first public officials of any importance to announce his approval of the candidacy of Woodrow Wilson for President. Although Gore himself later indicated that his backing was owing to political opportunism, the fact remains that at the time Gore and Wilson were closely akin in their thinking in a political and social

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40 See *World Almanac*, 1914, 725.

41 House to Wilson, November 28, 1912, quoted in Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Boston, 1926, I, 94–95.

42 *New York Times*, January 9, 1913.

43 *Hollis Post-Herald* (Oklahoma), November 7, 1912; *Mangum Weekly Star*, (Oklahoma), November 28, 1812. The Phoenix *Arizona Gazette*, December 9, 1912, suggested Gore as Secretary of Interior.

milieu permeated by a reform impetus. However, Gore's primary contributions to Wilson's campaign were organizational and tactical rather than ideological. In the pre-convention period Gore was an able assistant to the Wilson men who planned grand strategy. Many of his suggestions were accepted, and his oratory was used to advantage. At the convention itself the Oklahoma Senator aided other Wilson leaders in the all-important struggle for supporters. If firsthand observers are to be trusted, his maneuverings with the delegates as a floor leader were invaluable. In the fall election campaign Gore's role as organizational leader for the national headquarters appears as his largest contribution. His careful attention to detail undoubtedly kept many progressive Democrats in the party fold when the November elections were held.

It may be true that Gore's role in the election of Wilson was not as large as that played by several more prominent politicians, but his contributions were significant. Although he later clashed with his Chief Executive over the war, he nonetheless deserves his place among those who raised Woodrow Wilson to the highest elective office in the land.

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Book Review

Medicine in Chicago 1850–1950. By Thomas Neville Bonner. The American History Research Center, Madison, Wisconsin, 1957. Pp. xvii, 302.

Thomas N. Bonner, with the help of the American History Research Center and the Chicago Medical Society, has contributed a significant special study in localized history. Professor Bonner traces the technical, professional, and social developments of medicine in Chicago from its beginnings to the present. The book reflects thorough research and it is well written. An extensive index enhances the value of the book as a reference work.

Studies of this type are of considerable value. The local historian will find this work raising points for comparison with other communities. The medical historian will find here how local circumstances alter the course of professional development in the local community and in the nation. The general historian will find in this account examples of the many relationships between medicine and the facets of social life more familiar to him.

All historians can turn to this volume with profit. Perhaps none will find it entirely satisfactory. Undoubtedly, a local historian would have appreciated a more thorough treatment of the local, as opposed to the purely individual, factors giving Chicago medicine its peculiar character, which is so well delineated here. Similarly, a medical historian might be disappointed that Chicagoans' contributions are merely described rather than critically evaluated and explained. Or again, a general historian might wish that the contributions of the book had been made more explicitly useful to him. Such complaints would be asking too much of a pioneering venture combining all these interests. Mr. Bonner's book stands out for its contribution to each of these fields and to an understanding of their interrelations. There have been other localized studies of special topics. Many have been of limited value due to their narrow focus and often dull presentation. Professor Bonner has revived the genre by the skill of his writing and the breadth of his learning.

The other parties to this enterprise deserve due credit. The Chicago Medical Society subsidized some of the research, but it allowed the historian to reach his own conclusions, as he must, on "his own responsibility." Although his findings about some of the relations of the profession and the public will probably raise the blood pressure of some physicians, Mr. Bonner has fairly presented materials for an understanding of the doctor's point of view. The Society's history committee has noted its reservations in a preliminary "Statement." "A layman may not always appreciate the power that some esoteric factors such as the Code of Medical Ethics have on the lives of members of the medical profession." In spite of its disagreement with some of the conclusions, the Committee claims, with justifiable pride, that the book is "a new adventure in the writing of medical history." That the volume is available at this time is due to the American History Research Center. The Center is to be commended for publishing such a distinguished study and for presenting it in an exceedingly attractive book.

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The Failure of North Dakota Progressivism

The rise to power in North Dakota of the Nonpartisan League in 1915 has overshadowed the history of the state's Progressive Movement. The League era, with its novel experiments in agrarian socialism and its intensity of political passion seldom equalled in American politics since the slavery controversy, has captured the attention of both scholars and more popular writers. If North Dakota Progressivism has been considered at all, it has been interpreted as only a prelude to the later movement: one phase of a series of protests on the part of North Dakota farmers beginning in territorial days and eventually culminating in the League's efforts at state owned and operated banking, milling, and insurance enterprises.[1]

This assumption of continuity, implicit in the view that all Midwestern reform movements were essentially agrarian, has dominated the general historical writing on the politics of the region.[2] North Dakota provides a significant test of this thesis, for there a successful movement in complete harmony with contemporary

[1] Of the great amount of material on the League the following are a few of the standard works: Andrew A. Bruce, *Non-Partisan League*, New York, 1921; Herbert E. Gaston, *The Nonpartisan League*, New York, 1920; Paul R. Fossum, *The Agrarian Movement in North Dakota*, Baltimore, 1925. A recent scholarly work on the subject is Robert L. Morlan, *Political Prairie Fire, The Nonpartisan League, 1915–1922*, Minneapolis, 1955. Although Morlan is not concerned with Progressive Movement in the state, he recognizes, in passing, its non-agrarian nature and the fundamental differences in character between it and the League Movement.

[2] See, for example, Russell B. Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, East Lansing, Michigan, 1951, which synthesizes a large amount of scholarship on the subject.

Progressive ideas was followed almost immediately by a movement emphatically dedicated to a program of agrarian reform. The example strongly suggests, that even in predominately rural states, Progressivism did not evolve in response to the farmer's demands nor did it concern itself with programs of economic reform for his betterment. Although North Dakota was over seventy percent rural, a state entirely dependent on agriculture, Progressivism there was still fundamentally an urban movement drawing its support from towns and advancing a non-agrarian program.

Not that North Dakota did not suffer from a number of serious agricultural problems. Often acting in collusion, banking, milling, and railroad interests of St. Paul and Minneapolis dominated the state's economy. Inequitable railroad rates meant that it often cost a farmer more than twice as much as in neighboring states to ship a bushel of wheat. Usurious interest rates, charged in violation of state law, frequently ran as high as forty-eight percent. A whole series of marketing abuses—fraudulent grading of grain, excessive dockage for waste, and even dishonest weighing—absorbed a large share of the profit of every bushel of grain sold.[3]

However, the state's Progressive Movement, of the years 1906 through 1912, coincided with a period of general agricultural prosperity when these problems did not seem crucial. The wheat crop of 1905 was the largest in the history of the state and had brought a reasonably high price.[4] Yet the very next year occurred the "Revolution of 1906,"[5] a dramatic overthrow of the Republican machine which had dominated North Dakota almost since the territory was founded. Considered only as a response to agrarian demands, this revolt would be impossible to explain. To be understandable, North Dakota Progressivism must be interpreted as a movement devoted to extending political democracy and to enacting a program of political and social reform in accord with patterns set in other parts of the nation.

Before 1906 the political master of North Dakota was the nearly

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[3] For a convenient summary of the economic abuses which gave rise to the Nonpartisan League, see Morlan, *Political Prairie Fire*, 5–18. Documentary material can be found in *Second Annual Report of the Commissioners of Railroads to the Governor of North Dakota, 1891*, Bismarck, 1892; *Report of the State Grain Commissioners Appointed by the Governor to Serve on the Minnesota Board of Appeals, 1910*, Bismarck, 1910; "Report of the North Dakota Bankers' Association," reprinted in *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, November 23, 1906.

[4] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912*, 143, 152, 576.

[5] The phrase is used by Bruce, *Non-Partisan League*, 28.

legendary Alexander McKenzie.[6] Born in New York in 1850, he had come to Dakota Territory with a Northern Pacific construction gang and settled in Bismarck in 1873. Nearly illiterate, but a man of charm, courage, and ability, he made money in stock and real estate speculations, and, as sheriff of Burleigh county, began to build a successful Republican machine. Over the years, the McKenzie organization became the protector of eastern elevators, banks, and railroads with interests in the state. After 1900, however, as a general demand for reform made itself felt throughout the country, opposition developed to the machine's continued domination. Significantly, the impetus for overthrowing McKenzie came from men who had at one time been very close to him. Two of the major leaders of this revolt were Burleigh Spalding, a banker and lawyer from Fargo, and Martin N. Johnson, a farmer from Petersburg. Spalding had been high in the councils of the party during the 1890's as a member of the state central committee. Twice elected to Congress, he was not re-endorsed by the machine in 1904 and immediately joined the crystallizing opposition. Johnson had been a member of the House of Representatives from 1891 to 1899, but his Senatorial ambitions were thwarted by the opposition of the McKenzie forces in the 1899 session of the legislature. From that time on, he too was a bitter enemy of the machine.[7] During the struggles of the Progressive period, the McKenzie leaders were fond of arguing, with at least some measure of truth, that many of the reform leaders were mere dissatisfied office-seekers, whose adoption of reform principles resulted only from a desire to be in office. The Regular-Republican *Fargo Forum* asserted, for example, "that the sincerity of the motives of the 'insurgents' may well be questioned

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[6] There is no adequate biography of McKenzie, nor is one likely to be written, since he deliberately kept his life and activities as secret as possible. Consequently, the degree of his personal control of the "McKenzie Ring" is open to some argument, but during the political battles of the era, he became the symbol for all the forces of conservatism in the state. The following materials are helpful: William B. Hennessy, *History of North Dakota,* Bismarck, 1910, 628–630; Kenneth J. Carey, "Alexander McKenzie, Boss of North Dakota, 1883–1906," Master of Arts Thesis, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, 1949; Waldemar E. Lillo, "The Alaskan Gold Mining Company and the Cape Nome Conspiracy," Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, 1935; *Grand Forks Daily Herald,* May 25, 27, June 9, 1906. The events leading to McKenzie's downfall in North Dakota are described in Charles N. Glaab, "The Revolution of 1906—N. D. vs. McKenzie," *North Dakota Quarterly* XXIV:4 (Fall, 1956), 101–109.

[7] Hennessy, *History of North Dakota,* 161b–161a, 61b–61a; Bruce, *Non-Partisan League,* 29–30.

when its ranks include so many, so very many, who are disappointed aspirants for political favors."[8]

The most important leader of the Progressive revolt was George Winship, editor of the influential *Grand Forks Herald*. Before coming to Grand Forks from Minnesota in 1874, Winship, who was born in Maine in 1847, had been a stone quarry worker, a soldier in the Civil War, and a printer. A state senator after 1889, he too had been closely associated with the machine but had broken with McKenzie and in 1898 and in 1900 was an unsuccessful reform candidate for governor.[9] Winship was therefore subject to the same type of charge levelled against Spalding and Johnson. The *Bismarck Tribune,* edited by a member of the McKenzie inner circle, sarcastically observed during the campaign of 1906:

> Having long sought political preferment unsuccessfully at the hands of the 'machine' Editor Winship has come through the fire purged and cleansed and, conscious of the happiness that comes through a simple desire for the elevation of the whole human race, is anxious to spread the good tidings and let others be glorified as he has been.[10]

But in the light of the consistency of his views and actions, Winship seems the most sincere of all the Republican reformers in the state. An admirer of the La Follette experiment in Wisconsin, in vigorous, widely circulated editorials he called for enactment of the La Follette program in North Dakota, an end to boss control, and the establishment of truly representative government.

The device upon which these Republican reformers placed their hope for eliminating McKenzie and his henchmen was the direct primary. Each session after 1896 they presented their demand for the measure to the legislature. In 1904 a direct primary plank was written into the Republican platform. But after a bitter fight in the legislature the next year, the machine leaders were able to modify the measure so that it applied only to county officials and to members of the state nominating conventions, not directly to state officials.[11] Nevertheless, the Progressives[12] were determined to

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[8] *Fargo Forum and Daily Republican,* January 10, 1906.

[9] Hennessy, *History of North Dakota,* 626–627; Bruce, *Non-Partisan League,* 29.

[10] *Bismarck Tribune,* May 7, 1906.

[11] *Laws Passed by the Ninth Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1905,* Bismarck, 1905, 207–216.

[12] For clarity and consistency, I have used the term "Progressive" in a somewhat anachronistic and arbitrary fashion. Reformers within the Republican Party did not begin calling themselves "progressives" until after 1910. In the period under consideration, they were usually referred

make a major effort to control the next nominating convention. Late in the year, with Winship at its head, they organized the Republican Good Government League to give direction to the movement.

Early in 1906 they were presented with a superlative campaign document: a series of magazine articles by Rex Beach entitled "The Looting of Alaska."[13] In typically muckraking fashion, Beach exposed an involved bit of chicanery on the part of McKenzie at the turn of the century to obtain control of alien gold-claims in Alaska. Although McKenzie had spent time in jail as a result of the venture, little was known about it until the publication of the Beach articles. With "The Looting of Alaska" as their major argument against continued boss control, the Progressives waged a vigorous fight to control the nominating convention. But the machine, using its old techniques of favors and coercion, won easily. The Progressive leaders, convinced that they had been beaten unfairly through the machine's control of free railroad passes and particularly incensed by the nomination of an undistinguished spoilsman for judge of the supreme court, threw their support in the fall election to the Democratic candidates for this office and for governor. The election of John Burke as governor overturned the natural Republican persuasion of North Dakota and put a man pledged to carrying out the reform program of the Republican Progressives at the head of the state administration.

Again in 1910 and in 1912, Burke, who was careful always to tailor his program to the demands of the Progressives and to appoint them to key positions, was re-elected with the support of Republican voters. This, then, constituted the "Revolution of 1906," and during Burke's six years in office, North Dakotans lived under a state government dedicated to carrying out the principles of Progressivism as it was being practiced in many parts of the nation. It was a period of exciting political battles, vigorous law enforcement, and

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to as "independents" or simply "reformers." I have capitalized the word in an attempt to avoid its possible favorable connotations. The term "Progressive" as used here then does not necessarily mean a Republican reformer who joined the ranks of the Theodore Roosevelt Progressive or Bull Moose Party in 1912, since many "progressives" either remained loyal to Taft or supported Wilson in the election. Members of the conservative faction of the Republican Party, I have called "Regulars" or "Stalwarts," the terms employed during the period. They represent the group closely associated with the McKenzie organization. A similar problem has not occurred with the state Democratic Party, since for all practical purposes, Democrats were united behind the reform program in the state.

[13] Rex Beach, "The Looting of Alaska," *Appleton's Booklovers Magazine*, VII (January–May, 1906), 3–12, 131–140, 294–301, 540–547, 606–613.

enlightened administration. But the total impact of Progressivism on North Dakota proved to be slight.

The reason lies partly in the goals the reformers set for the movement. Aside from attacking railroad influence on government, never did they emphasize agricultural reforms. They directed their attack fundamentally against machine control of government and political dishonesty: "McKenzieism," "bossism," or "gang rule," as they called it. "Purity in politics" was the common motto of the local Good Government Leagues, which constituted the organizational basis for the Progressives' efforts. Winship, who more than any other leader supplied the ideology of the movement, defined its aims very simply in 1906:

> There is just one issue before the people of North Dakota this year; and that is whether the people are ready to take charge of their own government or will permit three or four bosses to manage in their own interest and according to their own caprice. . . . The people know that the political government of this state has been an atrocious scandal, and they are earnest in the desire for better things.[14]

Consequently, the major emphasis of the Progressive program was on the adoption of political devices which the reformers assumed would prevent men like McKenzie from regaining power in the state. The legislation passed during Burke's years in office extending direct democracy is comprehensive and impressive: the direct primary; the initiative, referendum, and recall, including the constitutional initiative; the Senatorial preference primary; and the Presidential preference primary. But as has been so frequently proved since the Progressive era, when they were accepted almost as panaceas by reformers, these devices are not guarantees in themselves of responsible government.

Although Burke was dependent on Republican support, he unquestionably shaped the character of North Dakota Progressivism. His career consequently throws considerable light on the movement he represented and suggests reasons for its essential failure. Born and reared on a farm near Keokuk, Iowa, and graduated from the law school of the State University of Iowa, he arrived penniless in Dakota Territory in 1888 at the age of twenty-nine after unsuccessful attempts to practice in Des Moines and in Minnesota. Working in the harvest fields during the summer, he accumulated twenty-two dollars and made his way to the village of St. John in the north-

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[14] *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, April 8, 1906.

eastern part of the territory, where he had heard he might find work. There he taught school, started a newspaper, and practiced law over the desk of the hotel where he lived. Later moving to neighboring Rolla and eventually to Devils Lake, he built a successful law practice and like most small town lawyers turned to politics.[15]

Burke served six years in the state legislature during the 1890's, at a time when the Farmers' Alliance was making its influence felt in state politics. In view of his later role as leader of the reform forces in North Dakota, it is instructive that he showed no sympathy with the demands of the agrarian group in the legislature. In fact, he was associated with the most conservative faction in the senate in opposing marketing and regulatory measures sponsored by the Alliance. In 1893 he was one of four senators to vote against the session's most important law, the appropriation of $100,000 for the construction of a terminal grain elevator at Duluth or Superior.[16] The same year he introduced a bill which would have eliminated the power of the State Board of Railroad Commissioners set up by the constitution.[17] Examination of his voting record reveals nearly complete consistency in opposition to Alliance measures. Nominated for attorney general in 1894, he was one of three Democratic candidates not supported by the Independent (Populist) Party in a period in North Dakota politics when farmer parties generally combined with the Democrats in the Fusion ticket.[18]

In spite of his conservative political philosophy, Burke was a good party man who accepted the issues as they were defined by the national Democratic leadership. An 1894 campaign speech is devoted entirely to an examination of the tariff, which he asserted was the "great issue of the present time."[19] Two years later he had enlisted in the Bryan crusade as the unsuccessful Democratic

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15 A collection of Burke Papers, which contains correspondence from the latter years of his career, speeches, miscellany, and considerable biographical material, is available in the Orin G. Libby Manuscript Collection, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.

16 *Journal of the Senate of the Third Legislative Assembly, 1893*, Bismarck, 1893, 530.

17 *Ibid.*, 272.

18 *Grand Forks Daily Plaindealer*, July 27, November 2, 1894. The politics of North Dakota during this period have not been thoroughly studied but from examination of the files of the *Plaindealer*, one of the few Democratic newspapers in the state, it seems clear that the hierarchy of the Democratic Party had little more sympathy with farmer demands than members of the McKenzie organization. The *Plaindealer* attacked the Alliance-sponsored marketing measures as class legislation. Fusion in the state between Democrats and independent farmer parties seems to have been much more a marriage of convenience than an union of principle.

19 *Ibid.*, October 13, 1894.

candidate for the United States House of Representatives. Because of the great influence of Bryan in the West, it was almost inevitable that any successful Democrat in North Dakota would have to talk in reform terms. As Republican domination of the state became complete after 1896, Burke had continued unrewarding service in the minority party. His nomination for governor in 1906, a year in which the discerning could see that Democrats again might have a chance, was expected.

A superb politician, Burke had built a reputation as a man whose character transcended party considerations. "He is a born statesman," a Republican newspaper had commented as early as 1896, "and the only fault we find with 'Honest John' is his political views, but they are a mere triviality beside his qualifications as a man."[20] This kind of non-partisan appeal was to continue throughout his long political career. Evidence of his political skill is the fact that in rural, Protestant North Dakota, the issue of Burke's Catholicism was never raised against him except in the veiled and not very serious charge that he had appointed only Irishmen to office. In fact, much of Burke's voting strength came from organized Protestant church groups, who supported his stand for vigorous enforcement of the prohibition laws.

Dressed in a thread-bare suit and a battered "sheepskin" coat, rough-hewn of feature with his hair left untrimmed, he could play to perfection the role of "Honest John" the simple man of the people. His unembellished, forcefully plain speeches convinced voters that here was a sincere man of honesty and integrity; comparisons with Lincoln were so frequent that Burke, himself, found them rather tedious.

Actually, as the most successful trial-lawyer in the state earning about $15,000 a year, Burke's appeal was not really to the farmer but to the small town business man, lawyer, editor and teacher. His program of honesty in government and rigorous law enforcement appealed to these urban groups who were rebelling against the unrepresentative, expensive, and generally unsavory character of the machine-dominated state government.

Burke's conception of reform was legalistic, and the seeming transition from the conservative of the early 1890's to the Progressive of 1906 is not paradoxical. Burke had a sincere belief in the efficacy of law as a means of regulating human affairs. To him

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[20] *Cando Herald,* quoted in *Grand Forks Daily Plaindealer,* August 25, 1896.

the problem of reform was a matter of instilling respect for the law and providing for its enforcement. In characteristic fashion, he told a Mandan audience in 1907:

> No matter whether we think it is unjust, no matter whether we believe in the principles of the law, it is our duty so long as it is the law to respect it and to use our influence to enforce it, because it is the law; because only by enforcing the law is your life, your liberty and your property safe.[21]

"Burke's theory of government is simple and commonplace," Winship wrote perceptively in 1910.

> It involves no fine-spun causistries, no quibbles, no evasions. It includes, chiefly, the elements of simple, common honesty, a recognition that the obligations of an official are to the people of the entire state, and industry and energy in the performance of duty.[22]

Typical was his stand on prohibition: although Burke was always an opponent of the law, much of the energy of his administrations was expended in a fruitless attempt to enforce it.

A great cry against railroads was part of the reform upsurge. Burke had gone along with it. "John Burke's political tune is pitched for the railroads," *Bismarck Tribune* asserted with some justice in 1906.

> That's the burden of his song. About all the ills the people are heir to, in Mr. Burke's opinion are railroads, and their influence through the bosses over the people.[23]

Yet here too his approach to the problem was legalistic. If railroads were not paying their just share of taxes, government had acted in the interests of a special group, and the abuse should be corrected. Free railroad passes could prevent an official from acting for the public good as he was pledged to do. But this did not necessarily lead to the view that the expansion of legislation regulating railroads was desirable. Burke's intense respect for property rights made any such effort somewhat suspect, and his position on the high freight rates prevailing in the state was not unequivocal. In his first inaugural message to the 1907 session of the legislature, for example, he pointed out that railroad rates were too high and should be reduced. But the method he left to the legislature. He suggested that perhaps the Board of Railroad Commissioners might

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21 *Bismarck Tribune*, June 6, 1907.
22 *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, October 21, 1910.
23 *Bismarck Tribune*, November 3, 1906.

be able to do it, if some means could be found to enable it to enforce its decisions. On the other hand, should the legislature decide to lower rates directly, he warned that great care must be taken to ensure a fair return to the railroad.[24] In general, whenever possible, Burke attempted to avoid any issue involving corporate regulation, preferring to direct his attention to the problems of honesty in government and better law enforcement.

The sources of Burke's voting strength also reveal the character of the movement. In all three of his elections, large majorities in the eastern, more populous counties carried him into office. It was overwhelming support in the larger towns, where local Good Government Leagues had been organized, that brought his victories. Voting patterns in the almost entirely rural western wheat-raising counties were left unchanged during the Burke era. Only in the North Dakota towns did the battle for honest government seem really important.[25]

The program enacted during the period—especially in 1911 when the alliance of Democrats and Progressive Republicans was able to organize both houses of the legislature—constitutes an important list of achievements. North Dakota's experiment in Progressivism came rather late; numerous models for reform legislation existed in other states; and the laws passed during the six year period read almost like a catalogue containing every political or social demand of a Progressive anywhere. In addition to the legislation already mentioned, laws were passed providing for the commission form of government in cities of over five hundred population, improving voter registration, and prohibiting various corrupt political practices including personal lobbying. Social measures included a comprehensive program of pure food and drug legislation passed under the direction of Edwin F. Ladd, a pioneer in the field; a juvenile court system based on the plan of the famous Denver juvenile authority, Judge Ben Lindsay; a child labor law; a state board of control for charitable, reformatory, and penal institutions; acts regulating the practice of medicine and surgery and providing inspection and safety standards for hotels; a public health laboratory; a library commission to institute a system of traveling libraries

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[24] *Journal of the House of the Tenth Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1907*, Bismarck, 1907, 61–70.

[25] North Dakota election statistics can be found in the bi-yearly *Legislative Manual* (Blue Book).

and to assist public libraries; a livestock Sanitary Board to control cattle disease; and several other similar measures.[26]

In short, the reformers were able to enact every major piece of social or political legislation that they had proposed. These measures were passed with little opposition from machine leaders. A large part of the program, for example, was enacted in 1907, while the Stalwart-Republican faction was still in control of the state senate. An anonymous political leader interviewed in the *Grand Forks Herald* during the campaign of 1906 predicted correctly the course that the McKenzie organization would take in relation to the reform movement. The machine, he stated has "no inflexible purpose and can tack. The moment that the leaders are convinced that there is something in the movement, they will get in front of it. . . ."[27] The McKenzie organization had consistently shown great ability to swim with the tide of public sentiment; during the Burke era, the platforms of the Stalwart faction often contained more demands for reform than those of the Progressives. If by conceding political and social demands, which were aimed only at the manifestations of deeper problems, the conservative leaders could protect the economic interests that they openly represented, they were willing to go along.

When Progressives tried to strike at the railroads, they achieved much less. The effort to enact the anti-pass bill, a keystone of the 1906 campaign, was unsuccessful until 1911; by then, with the adoption of the direct primary, the measure had lost much of its importance. The attempt to enact a two cent per mile rate bill for passenger fares met with bitter resistance by railroad legislators, who were able to raise it to two and a half cents, a figure the railroads were willing to accept. Burke and the Progressives made a major effort to activate the dormant railroad commission, which under machine control had not even bothered to fill out the reports required by law. They were able to enforce minor regulatory laws relating to railroads, but their attempts to lower freight rates on a few items were hampered by court fights and other obstructions.[28]

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[26] See the compilations of session laws: *Laws Passed at the Tenth Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1907*, Bismarck, 1907; *Laws Passed at the Eleventh Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1909*, Fargo, 1909; *Laws Passed at the Twelfth Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1911*, Fargo, 1911.

[27] *Grand Forks Daily Herald*, May 25, 1906.

[28] *Nineteenth and Twentieth Annual Reports of the Commissioners of Railroads to the Governor of North Dakota, 1909,1910*, Bismarck, 1910.

During Burke's second term, the rate of railroad taxation was raised to a level comparable with neighboring states.[29] By and large, however, the Progressives effected no substantial changes in general railroad practices. The fundamental railroad problem—the high rate the farmer paid to ship a bushel of grain—was left untouched.

In spite of the limited success of their railroad program—and it is not as limited as it may seem if the aims of the movement are considered—North Dakota Progressives at the end of Burke's six years in office could look with satisfaction on their achievements. They had rid the state administration of McKenzie and his supporters; they had enacted almost all their program; and they had provided North Dakota six years of vigorous and equitable law enforcement. Progressivism seemed the established ideal of government. Although Burke's successor, L. B. Hanna, was a member of the Stalwart faction of the Republican Party, Progressives had been elected for the remainder of the state offices. Hanna was not a McKenzie lieutenant nor a man to attempt to overthrow the Progressive legislative accomplishments. During his first term in office, the reform program was continued and even expanded.

Yet in 1915 the failure of the legislature to pass a constitutional amendment providing for a terminal elevator to be operated by the state, which had been approved overwhelmingly at the preceeding year's election, set off the "political prairie fire," that carried the Nonpartisan League to power.[30]

The attitude of the Progressives toward this crucial issue is important. The North Dakota constitution provided that an amendment had to be passed at two subsequent sessions of the legislature before being submitted to the voters for approval. Before becoming law, it had then to be ratified a third time by the legislature. Therefore, the question of building an elevator had developed during the Burke administrations. In 1909 and in 1911 the legislature had approved a measure permitting the state to build terminal elevators in either Wisconsin or Minnesota; in 1911 the first approval had been registered for a potential amendment to permit the state to construct one within North Dakota.[31]

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[29] *Proceedings of the State Board of Taxation Equalization, 1909,* Bismarck, 1909, 52–63.

[30] Morlan, *Political Prairie Fire,* 18–21, ff. recounts the events leading up to the League's rise to power.

[31] *Laws of the Session, 1909,* 333; *Laws of the Session, 1911,* 161, 165.

But these issues crept almost incidentally into the Progressive program and in no way were considered of major importance at the time. The demand for a change in marketing methods developed outside the political parties, in organizations such as the North Dakota Bankers' Association and the American Society of Equity. The latter, a national organization of farmers to advance cooperative marketing, had organized a chapter in North Dakota in February 1907 and had begun to agitate in the legislature for the establishment of farmer-owned grain elevators.[32] In the fervor of the crusade against "boss government," the events leading to the 1915 revolt passed almost without comment in the state's newspapers.

Nor did the building of an elevator become an issue in any of the campaigns. Burke avoided the question almost altogether. In 1909 he was required to submit to the legislature the report of the grain commission appointed to investigate the feasibility of acquiring a terminal elevator. He commented only that he thought a constitutional amendment would be necessary for the state to do so and added that he was submitting the report without recommendation.[33] In general, the attitude of Progressives toward the whole problem of marketing was one of indifference.

In the light of subsequent events, apparently few farmers in the state even realized that a change in the character of government had taken place during the Burke administrations. The Progressive interlude had neither produced nor even really attempted any changes in the economic conditions that the farmer faced. A child labor law, the commission form of government, and a non-partisan tax commission, after all, were not answers to the low price he received for a bushel of wheat. Consequently, after 1916 a new set of leaders took over the reins of government, and the Progressives were on the outside. Significant is the case of Treadwell Twichell, the leader of the Progressives in the senate. Although he was clearly a reformer in the Progressive sense and had served well in the cause, he became infamous in League circles as the reputed author of the remark to a group of farmers during the 1915 session of the legis-

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[32] Information on the early activities of the latter can be found in the *Grand Forks Daily Herald,* June 27, July 23, 1907, February 5, 7, March 26, 1909.

[33] *Journal of the House of the Eleventh Session of the Legislative Assembly, 1909,* Bismarck, 1909, 29–55.

lature to "go home and slop the hogs."[34] The new leadership in the state drew no distinction between Stalwart and Progressive and as often as not directed their attacks against the latter.

In spite of the non-agrarian character of the Progressive program, the reformers did indirectly assist the rise of the Nonpartisan League. Although the measure was not a part of their program nor an issue that absorbed any of their attentions, the movement for a terminal elevator did get under way during the Burke administration. The Progressives had provided a political climate in which such demands could find expression. Moreover, they had gone along with the initial steps in its establishment, and it was not they who sabotaged the measure in the 1915 legislature. Hanna had continued the Burke program during his first term, but in 1914, as the Progressive fervor slackened, the Stalwart faction had begun to reassert its control. Hanna was elected for a second term on program of economy; it was quite clear therefore that the elevator proposal might fail. Farm leaders began to take the first steps that were to bring the League to power.

Furthermore, the chief demand of the Progressives, the direct primary, proved to be the means by which Arthur C. Townley, the founder of the League, was able to organize an independent farmers' political movement. The supporters of the direct primary in North Dakota and elsewhere argued that it would take control away from political parties and put it in the hands of the voters themselves. This seldom turned out to be the case, but the rise of the League does provide a dramatic example of the use of the direct primary to meet its original purpose.

Why did Progressivism fail in North Dakota? As has been emphasized, the program of the reformers was primarily concerned with election reforms and other political devices that would ensure honest government in the state. To a large extent, it was modeled on the programs of reformers elsewhere, especially the Wisconsin experiment, and superimposed on an agricultural state, often with no relation to basic needs. The commission form of government, for example was not a response to a specific demand but merely a part of the general model the reformers followed in enacting a kind of ideal Progressive program.

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[34] Interviews cited by Morlan, *Political Prairie Fire*, 21, seems to indicate that either Twichell did not make the remark or that he meant it only jocularly, including himself as a farmer.

This program did not affect the average farmer, nor was he excited by the party battles of the period. Because of its late settlement, North Dakota had experienced only slightly the effects of the agrarian movements of the Nineteenth Century; the organizations capable of expressing agricultural demands politically had not developed and matured. Twenty-seven per cent of the state's population was foreign-born; about an equal number were first-generation Americans. Often settled in colonies where the ways of the homeland were preserved, these immigrant groups, unfamiliar with American political techniques, were subject to the same type of manipulation employed by the city bosses of the era. The McKenzie organization was particularly astute in choosing local leaders who could identify with the national characteristics of the dominant immigrant group of the community. It remained for Townley to break the organizational hold of the Republican oligarchy through high-pressure salesmanship and "grass roots" organization and to harness the farmer's unrest behind a program of agrarian reform in his own interests.

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Eugene Debs and the Socialist Campaign of 1912

Few Americans today remember a time when the Socialist party was a power of any proportion in American politics. They have forgotten or never knew that a scant two generations ago the Socialist Party of America was the third party of American politics; that it wielded considerable influence in the American labor movement; and that many of the "radical" policies which it advocated have become standard fixtures in the American political, social and economic system.

The presidential campaign of 1912 marked the high point of Socialist strength in America. This fact is all the more interesting inasmuch as the contest of that year offered not one but three candidates who were considered liberal—the Progressive Theodore Roosevelt, the Democrat Woodrow Wilson and the Socialist Eugene Debs. That the Socialist candidate polled nearly six per cent of the total vote in the face of opposition from such powerful vote getters as Roosevelt and Wilson is testimony to the extent of the Socialist party's influence on the eve of the World War.

Although the Socialist presidential candidate in 1908, Eugene Debs, had polled only 420,000 votes, two years later in the "off year" elections of 1910 the Socialists captured a surprising number of state, municipal and even federal offices. Victor Berger, venerable Socialist politician from Milwaukee, was sent to the House of Representatives, the first socialist ever to sit in Congress. In 1911, Socialist strength was again demonstrated by the election of George Lunn as socialist mayor of Schenectady, New York. His victory was expected to advertise socialism across the country.

These local victories were as gratifying to the Socialists as their few national successes, for they showed the party's growing grass roots strength. Emil Seidel was elected mayor of Milwaukee the year that Berger went to Congress and by 1912 the Socialists boasted that more than a thousand of their number occupied elective offices in thirty-three states and one hundred sixty municipalities across

the country.[1] The cities were the strongholds of socialism and it was in city elections that the Socialists registered their greatest successes with the voters. The eleven states of the Midwest accounted for seventy per cent of the Socialists in public office.[2]

Nothing succeeds in politics like success, and the party's membership increased in proportion to its victories at the polls. When the national convention met in May, 1912, a record breaking 117,984 people carried Socialist party cards,[3] with Pennsylvania, Ohio and Oklahoma reporting the greatest proportional gains in membership.[4] The increase in financial resources that accompanied this growing membership enabled the Socialists to expand their propaganda program. The party was even prosperous enough to pay train fares for the delegates to the national convention in 1912.

Noting that a million and a half Americans had voted for Socialist candidates in 1910 and 1911, many political analysts saw every reason to believe that the Socialist total would be much higher in 1912.[5] Although the Socialists could well rejoice at these successes, their enemies pointed out that their power was scattered and concentrated in minor offices. The Socialists elected to office were almost invariably "slowcialists"—as their more radical comrades dubbed them—those who were more interested in reform than revolution. They were ministers, lawyers, academics, and reform minded businessmen whose first thoughts were of honest government and few of whom were distinguishable, either in promise or performance, from their progressive opponents.[6]

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[1] The party categorized them as follows: 10 city auditors; 4 city attorneys; 145 aldermen; 61 assessors; 2 collectors, 18 city commissioners; 1 Congressman; 25 clerks; 1 court clerk; 7 coroners; 160 councilmen; 3 comptrollers; 57 constables; 1 director; 45 election officials; 2 city judges; 55 justices of the peace; 2 listers; 1 magistrate; 18 marshals; 56 mayors; 4 pound keepers; 22 police officials; 6 presidents of councils; 6 road overseers; 4 recorders; 2 deed registrars; 18 state legislators; 155 school officials; 2 surveyors; 2 state senators; 1 sheriff; 40 city, county and township supervisors; 1 assessment supervisor; 29 treasurers; 2 library trustees; 39 city and township trustees; 28 town officials; 1 vice-mayor. Socialist Party, *Socialist Campaign Book*, Chicago, 1912, 36.

[2] Robert Hoxie, "The Rising Tide of Socialism," *Journal of Political Economy*, 19 (October, 1911), 610. Over two-thirds of these officials were in cities with populations of less than ten thousand.

[3] Socialist Party, *Socialist Congressional Campaign Book*, Chicago, 1914, 17.

[4] Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement 1897–1912*, New York, 1952, 364.

[5] Cf. Samuel Orth, "Is Socialism Upon Us?" *World's Work*, 24, (August, 1912), 455.

[6] Hoxie, "The Rising Tide of Socialism," *loc. cit.*, 610, 611; Robert Hoxie, "The Socialist Party in the November Elections," *Ibid.*, 20 (March, 1912), 213–219.

There were several reasons for the increasing dominance of the conservatives within the party. In part, radical Socialists had only themselves to blame. Too often they concentrated their energies on local questions and after 1904 they tended to concentrate on converting organized labor to socialism. They flirted consistently with the IWW and syndicalism, thus furnishing grist for the conservative mill in attacks on the "impossibilist" and "revolutionary" positions. Though he could and did fight hard for his beliefs, the most famous radical Socialist, Eugene Debs, never sought the leadership which could have been his. He did not partly because of a genuine dislike of personal power, partly because he feared creating more factionalism, and partly because he preferred to agitate through direct contact with the people rather than through parliamentary manipulation with which he was unfamiliar.

But the conservative Socialists could look to their own success as well as the radicals' faults to explain their dominance within the party. As in most socialistic movements, intellectuals rather than workers quickly dominated the Socialist party of America. In this they were aided by better education and a more highly organized drive than was possessed by the workers. They generally made their livings as writers, professionals and newspapermen and in addition to being better educated than their radical counterparts, they were not adverse to using parliamentary tactics to oust opponents. Aside from Debs, few radical Socialists were well enough known among the party's rank and file to defeat such famous names as Victor Berger and Morris Hillquit. Furthermore, "slowcialism" had a genuine appeal to the educated middle class and the conservative Socialists were more and more successful in controlling the party machinery as their support increased. The revolutionaries and radicals scattered their strength in a multitude of causes and quarrels but the conservatives tended to draw theirs together in a concerted effort to dominate the party. Their success with reform programs in cities like Milwaukee, Butte and Berkeley and their willingness to cooperate with other reform elements gave the conservatives publicity as well as respectability. A sizeable portion of the Socialist press was theirs and they used it ruthlessly in waging war against the radical elements which they felt were frightening reform votes away from the party.

Both groups believed in political action but the conservatives were willing to ally themselves with other liberals in order to enact a set of "immediate demands." The radical Socialists

considered this a breach of faith and while they too entered electoral contests they did so as socialists and ran on avowedly socialist platforms. They tended to look upon election campaigns as propaganda efforts and the winning of office was not an end but rather a means with them.

Early in May, 1912, Socialists from all over the country converged on Indianapolis to hammer out a national platform, to listen to "red" rhetoric, to select a presidential candidate and to exhort each other to work for the coming revolution. The rising power of the conservatives was reflected in the delegates to be seen milling on the floor of the convention hall and engaging in earnest discussion during and after the sessions. Their predecessors had been labor agitators and radical writers; most of these men were professionals of one sort or another. Past Socialists had been anxious for swift change; these men seemed content with assured reform.[7]

Eugene Victor Debs, whose prominence in Socialist circles dated from before the turn of the century, did not attend the convention because it promised from the start to be a hot one. Debs, who had been the party's standard bearer in 1900, 1904 and 1908, never refrained from attacking his opponents, but he had no stomach for intra-party strife. In 1912 he preferred the lecture circuit to the pandemonium of the convention hall. The major bone of contention among the Socialists was the activities of the IWW Socialists. The conservative leadership was determined to censure the Wobblies for their syndicalism and the radical Socialists were equally determined that the Wobblies receive official party recognition and support. The radicals won an early victory by securing passage of a resolution favoring industrial unionism over craft unionism, but were finally defeated by the conservatives who secured passage of a constitutional amendment which expelled any party members who did not subscribe to political action and who advocated industrial violence. The action was not accomplished

[7] Every state except Tennessee was represented at the convention. Of the 293 delegates present, 32 were newspapermen, 21 were lecturers, 20 were lawyers, 12 were mayors and 11 were Socialist Party officials. Sixty of the delegates were doctors, dentists, ministers and small businessmen. Eleven white collar workers, 10 farmers and 7 housewives were present. The remainder were workers, only 30 of whom were employed in unskilled trades. More than a third of the delegates were over 45 years of age and only 31 were less than 30. This was in sharp contrast to the group that had founded the party in 1901, most of whom were less than 35. Nothing could have emphasized better the party's capture of a large number of middle class leaders than the members of this convention. *New York Call*, May 5, 1912.

without a free swinging floor fight in which more than words flew through the air. As a result many IWW Socialists left the party and wounds were inflicted which never fully healed.[8]

Debs himself was on the horns of a real dilemma. For years he had preached the virtues of strong and, if necessary, violent unionism. He had been one of the founders of the IWW and he admired Bill Haywood and other outspoken Wobblies. The truth of the matter was, however, that he had come to condemn the Wobblies' use of industrial violence and their lack of a sound political program. By 1912 he was disgusted with their incoherent program and could not bring himself to support their tactics, however much he admired their courage.

Debs was bitter at the outcome of the anti-sabotage amendment, however, for he felt that the delegates had been streamrollered by Berger and Hillquit. But he could not support the Wobblies. Even before the convention began he had voiced his opposition to industrial sabotage: "I am opposed to any tactics which involve stealth, secrecy, intrigue, and necessitate acts of individual violence for their execution."[9] Not because he supported capitalist laws but because he felt that such tactics were boomerangs against the Socialists did he oppose violence. The Wobblies were not socialists but anarchists because they worked outside an organized group; their Utopia was not the cooperative society envisaged by Eugene Debs.[10]

With the process of amending the party's constitution out of the way, the delegates turned to the selection of a presidential ticket. Berger, still hesitant about Debs and his radical followers, alluded to Debs' poor health and hinted that he might not run. The chairman of the day, Lewis Duncan of Montana, a strong Debs supporter, declared emphatically that Debs would run. Although Debs did not actively seek the nomination it was well known that he was available.[11] Two other names were placed before the convention, those of Emil Seidel of Milwaukee and Charles Edward Russell, prominent New York muckraker. The outcome was never

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[8] "The Compromises of the Socialist Convention," *Independent,* 67 (May 30, 1912), 1181–1182.

[9] Eugene V. Debs, "Sound Socialist Tactics," reprinted in *The Writings and speeches of Eugene V. Debs,* New York, 1948, 353.

[10] *Ibid.,* 352.

[11] Ray Ginger, in *The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs,* New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1949, 309–310, says that Debs pushed Fred Warren, acting editor of the popular *Appeal to Reason,* for the nomination. This may be so but Debs made no effort to prevent his name being presented to the convention and readily accepted the nomination.

seriously in doubt. The conservatives were unable to unite behind a single candidate and it is doubtful that they could have carried the day even if they had, so great was Debs' prestige with the Socialist rank and file. Someone started a chant for Debs and he received 156 votes to 56 for Seidel and 54 for Russell on the first ballot. Seidel was chosen for the vice-presidential spot.[12]

Debs accepted the nomination and the responsibilities of another gruelling campaign, his fourth, because he felt that the party leadership had passed into the hands of men who were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. However much he disliked violence, Debs had no use for platitudinous reformers. He and the radical Socialists based all their beliefs on two assumptions: that there was a class struggle in America between capital and labor and that capitalism was wholly evil and incapable of being reformed. Debs was anxious that laborers rise in the party ranks for he did not believe that ministers, lawyers and professors could adequately represent the needs and wishes of the workers who made up the bulk of the party membership. He did not feel that these men, however high their intentions, understood the problems that faced workers.

The convention adopted a familiar platform that called, among other things, for the cooperative organization of prisons; establishment of a national bureau of health and welfare; the election of judges for short terms; the abolition of the United States senate; the abolition of the President's veto power; and a long list of measures pointed toward the benefit of organized labor.[13] The convention then adjourned and the delegates headed home to lay the groundwork for the coming campaign.

Active campaigning was not scheduled to begin until late in the summer but the national campaign committee was busy during the spring and summer months. The Socialists spent $66,000 on the campaign. Donations from party members in the form of one day's pay totalled $23,000. The sale of admission tickets and contributions taken at rallies yielded another $15,000 and sales of literature added an additional $15,000.[14] As had been the case in

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[12] Socialist Party, *Proceedings of the National Convention 1912*, Chicago, 1912, 138–141.

[13] "The Socialist Platform and Candidates," *Outlook*, 101 (June 1, 1912), 235.

[14] Of the $66,000, the party spent $24,000 on literature; $17,000 on speakers; $21,000 on advertising; and $4,000 in grants to state organizations. Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement*, 365. Compared to the outlays of the major parties the sum was infinitesimal but was a considerable expenditure for the Socialists.

previous campaigns, local and state organizations were called upon to bear the brunt of the work. Thousands of party members and sympathizers volunteered their services as speakers, door bell ringers and office workers during the campaign.

If the campaign committee was successful in raising funds the same cannot be said for its choices of personnel to manage the campaign. J. Mahlon Barnes, who had managed Debs' campaign in 1908, was again chosen campaign manager largely through the efforts of conservative Socialists. The cooperation and friendliness which had characterized the Debs-Barnes relationship of 1908 was gone by 1912, however. Even before the campaign got underway many Socialists attacked Barnes for his loose morals. An investigation did little but air Socialist dirty linen in public, much to the delight of the opposition press. The whole affair served only to widen the breach between radicals and conservatives within the party and only highlighted their differences. Debs tried to have Barnes removed because he did not like his conservatism but Barnes remained at his post throughout the campaign, a testament to the conservatives' strength within the party.[15]

Debs originally planned to rest and write during the hot summer months in preparation for his national tour during the fall. Progressive rumblings within Republican ranks and the increasing liklihood that the Democrats would nominate a liberal candidate, however, alarmed him and he began early. Late in June he opened his campaign with a speech in St. Louis and began a slow tour across the country toward the Pacific coast. As in 1908, he preached his own brand of militant socialism, calling upon his audiences to oust capitalism by electing Socialists to office. From the beginning of the campaign he was afraid that the Democrats and Progressives would siphon off Socialist votes and he constantly ridiculed any idea that either of these two parties could reform capitalism. "The cause of [the present unrest] does not lie in a maladministration of present government but in the very structure of society as at present constituted," he told an audience in Phoenix, Arizona, early in the campaign. "And the remedy must be found in a reconstruction of all existing systems."[16]

Despite broiling heat and clouds of dust a large and enthusiastic crowd turned out in the copper mining city of Bisbee, Arizona, to

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15 For a complete discussion of the Barnes affair see David Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America,* New York, 1955, 73–77.

16 [Phoenix] *Arizona Republican,* September 8, 1912.

hear him lambast capitalism. Socialists and IWW organizers were not strangers to these copper miners and their families. While members of the crowd, many sporting red neckties and bandanas, munched on peanuts and popcorn, Debs elaborated on a theme that had occupied him before—the problem of leadership. To the end of his life Debs feared the power of leaders. Instead he trusted in the education of the masses in socialist doctrine to institute the Socialist program. "It would do no good for me to lead you to the promised land—Roosevelt would only come along and lead you out again."[17] Significantly, this was the traditional American answer to the need for reform. His reliance on self help and mass education and a desire to avoid violence stamped Debs as a reformer in the American tradition. He was first and foremost an American and the socialism he preached was tempered by American rather than by Marxian thoughts and ideals.

In Oakland, California, six thousand people heard him talk for more than an hour with all of his old fire and vigor. His fist smashing into his open palm, his lean figure crouched dramatically, he roared out his hatred and defiance of capitalism and the society it had built.[18] In Portland, Oregon, he spoke to eight thousand people who had patiently awaited his arrival and who vigorously applauded his words despite a heavy thunderstorm. More than a hundred dollars in addition to admission charges was collected from the crowd.[19] Further north he spoke to a large crowd in Everett, Washington. His train had abruptly changed schedules and the crowd waited more than five hours for his arrival, a fact which did not seem to dampen its ardor.[20] Everywhere in the West the story was the same. Debs had traveled this route before and he saw many familiar faces in the crowds. There were hundreds of hands to shake after every speech and countless times when he took down the names of needy comrades for future reference.

His western tour ended, Debs headed east. The greatest meeting of the campaign was held in Madison Square Garden. Fifteen thousand tickets, costing from fifteen cents to a dollar each, were sold weeks in advance and on the big night it was necessary to hold overflow meetings in several halls adjacent to the Garden to accommodate those who could not get in. Every seat in the huge

17 *Bisbee Daily Review*, September 9, 1912.
18 *San Francisco Call*, September 6, 1912.
19 *Appeal to Reason*, September 14, 1912.
20 *Ibid.*, September 26, 1912.

auditorium was filled and large crowds of people stood in the aisles and in the back of the room. Girls wearing red turbans, white aprons and red hair ribbons circulated in the crowd selling buttons, red flags and pamphlets.[21]

While waiting for the speakers the crowd sang the "Marseillaise" and "International," both Socialist favorites. Emil Seidel, the vice-presidential candidate, began the meeting with an appeal for labor's vote and cited recent Socialist victories as proof that the party was increasing in strength daily. "Only a year ago workingmen were throwing decayed vegetables and rotten eggs at us but now all is changed," he told the crowd. "Eggs are too high. There is a great giant growing up in this country that will someday take over the affairs of this nation. He is a little giant now but he is growing fast. The name of this little giant is socialism."[22]

The crowd cheered Seidel's words but that ovation was nothing compared to the bedlam that broke loose when Debs made his carefully timed appearance. The crowd stood up, cheered and waved red flags for nearly thirty minutes. Looking immensely pleased, Debs acknowledged the ovation, quieted the crowd and launched into a vigorous exposition of socialism. He insisted that only the Socialists represented labor; condemned "Injunction Bill" Taft; declared that Roosevelt was still a faker, even worse; that the Democrats, Progressives and Republicans alike were financed by the trusts. The only hope for America lay in adopting socialism.[23] There was little that was new in the speech but it was poured out with all the typical Debsian fireworks and the crowd loved it. Aside from his legendary reputation as a friend of labor, Debs' greatest contribution to the Socialist party was his free-swinging oratory. Despite the fact that his speeches required an admission fee, the money thus raised being used to defray campaign costs, he always spoke to capacity houses. Good politician that he was, he capitalized on every platform technique—voice, posture, vigor, and simple, colorful language—to capture the interest of his audiences.

Debs and the other Socialist candidates were greatly aided throughout the campaign by an active Socialist press. The regular press observed a conspiracy of silence on most events connected with

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[21] *New York Times*, September 22, 1912; "The Presidential Campaign," *Public*, 15 (October 4, 1912), 947.

[22] *New York Times*, September 30, 1912.

[23] *Ibid.*

the Socialists. Over the years the Socialists managed to build up a strong press which represented most shades of the red spectrum. In 1912, the party controlled 5 English and 8 foreign language daily newspapers; 262 English and 36 foreign language weeklies; and 10 English and 2 foreign language monthlies.[24] In addition, some 400 union and independent publications carried information and bulletins sent them by the Socialist national and state headquarters. In 1911, the party was even able to station a press representative in Washington, largely to publicize Berger's activities.[25] The *Appeal to Reason,* a perennial favorite, continued to serve hundreds of thousands of readers and its circulation rarely fell below the half million mark.[26] The activity of the Socialist press goes far toward explaining the high vote which Debs polled in 1912.

The campaign was a strenuous one for Debs. In Philadelphia, 18,000 people crowded into Convention Hall to hear him lambast the masters of capital. It was a motley crowd, composed of hoboes off the streets, professional politicians who had come to study the Debs technique, and plain curiosity seekers, in addition to those who were genuinely interested in what Debs had to say. Girls in red sashes and white aprons moved in the crowd selling buttons, ribbons and pamphlets. The cry "Only a nickel!" persuaded more than one spectator to buy a small red flag or a gaudy pamphlet describing the coming revolution.[27] Sales of literature added $300 to the money collected by the ushers, making a total of $2,700 collected that evening.[28]

Two thousand people greeted Debs' train in Muskogee, Oklahoma, and another five thousand met him in Indianapolis.[29] Despite a pouring rain an estimated ten thousand people paid admission to hear him speak in Pittsburg.[30] The pattern was the same in other eastern and midwestern cities and towns. Late in October he invaded New York's lower east side on behalf of Meyer London, who was running for Congress, and was greeted everywhere by large and enthusiastic crowds. All his speeches were sold out weeks in advance.[31]

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24 Socialist Party, *Socialist Campaign Book 1912,* 38.
25 Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement,* 247.
26 George England, *The Story of the Appeal,* Girard, Kansas, 1912, 282.
27 Ginger, *The Bending Cross,* 311.
28 *Appeal to Reason,* October 12, 1912.
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Ibid.,* November 9, 1912.
31 *Chicago Tribune,* October 22, 1912. London was defeated but won a House seat in 1914 and retained it for several years.

While Debs was criss-crossing the country, other Socialists were also at work. After failing to receive the presidential nomination, Charles Edward Russell ran for governor of New York. Early in November, a crowd of ten thousand gathered in New York City to hear him predict the coming triumph of socialism and the election of at least ten Socialist Congressmen on November 5.[32]

As he swung around the circle, Debs returned time and again to the theme that the Progressives and Democrats had stolen the conservative Socialist doctrine but lacked the courage to fashion a real socialist program. He commented acidly that for some at least the fluttering bandanas which greeted Theodore Roosevelt at the Bull Moose nominating convention had replaced the red flags of socialism.[33] Debs had nothing but unbounded contempt for Roosevelt and his new party. Charging that the Colonel had had himself photographed with a starving family from the Pennsylvania coal fields for purely political reasons, he denied that the Progressives were genuine reformers. Noting that the new party was financed by such trust magnates as George Perkins, he ridiculed any ideas of trust busting put forth by the Bull Moosers. If the Progressives were financed by the trusts, how could they oppose the trusts? The idea that Roosevelt's followers were socialists in disguise was dismissed out of hand by Debs. "When a spring chicken walks into your kitchen, lies on its back and begs to be picked and fried, then these plutocrats will be for the Socialist ticket."[34] The fact that Debs hammered at this theme so consistently showed that he did not trust the reformers converted to socialism by his conservative comrades and was fearful that they would switch their votes to a reform candidate.

Debs was also opposed to those labor unions which worked with management. He scorned the "go slow" policies of cooperation fostered by Samuel Gompers and the A. F. of L. and repeatedly insisted that labor would remain in servitude until it organized politically and supported candidates pledged to its cause. His opposition to the IWW was based in part on that organization's refusal to adopt political action and he continually urged labor to vote Socialist. This and unity within the labor movement would bring speedy triumph to the workingman. "For the first time in the world's history a subject class has it within its own power to

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[32] *New York Times*, November 3, 1912.
[33] *Ibid.*, August 14, 1912.
[34] *Bisbee Daily Review*, September 9, 1912.

accomplish its own emancipation without an appeal to brute force."[35] Always in his speeches there was this belief that violence was unnecessary, that mercy and justice would emerge from the struggle if only the people would pause to hear what he had to say.

While Debs was busy rousing the faithful and calling for a common front against the capitalists, Victor Berger was waging a cautious campaign to retain his seat in Congress. However much Debs sneered at Berger's hesitant progress toward a new society, Berger was admittedly in a difficult position in 1912. He held the highest post ever occupied by an American socialist and he felt that retaining his seat in Congress was the paramount objective of his campaign, not the establishment of a new heaven. Debs still proclaimed himself a radical, as when he insisted that he obeyed capitalist laws only because he had to, but to Berger it was a different matter. He had soundly condemned Debs' plans for confiscation of the trusts in 1908 and he continued to advocate an evolutionary rather than revolutionary brand of socialism.[36] Berger denied that triumphant socialism would mean the abolition of private property. Rather, his scheme, as outlined in a prominent magazine article, called for little more than the nationalization of certain basic industries. In such circumstances business would be operated "for use and not for profit." Such a program would evolve naturally out of the progressive movement. No violence would be necessary. "Our sole objective in state and nation for the next few years is to elect a respectable minority of Socialists."[37]

Berger spoke for the now dominant right wing of the party and if he spoke for Debs' benefit his words fell on deaf ears. Debs would have none of it. To him any Socialist program must be based first and last on the assumption that capitalism was evil; once it was removed progress could be made; until commonwealth replaced corporate wealth the capitalists would continue to own and operate the government. The conflicts between right and left within the party were outlined in the statements of these two men.

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35 Eugene V. Debs, "The Socialist Party's Appeal," *Independent*, 73 (October 24, 1912), 950.

36 During his presidential campaign of 1908, Debs told Lincoln Steffens that he himself would simply nationalize the trusts without compensation to the owners. Berger countered with a plan for compensation, which he ultimately introduced into Congress, that Debs ridiculed as a form of capitalism. Lincoln Steffens, "Eugene V. Debs On What the Matter is in America and What to do About It," *Everybody's Magazine*, 19 (October, 1908), 455–469.

37 Victor Berger, "Socialism, the Logical Outcome of Progressivism," *American Magazine*, 75 (November, 1912), 19–21.

Debs spoke as many as five or six times a day for sixty-eight consecutive days, often with little rest and less sleep.[38] There was always an immense correspondence that followed him around the country, made doubly burdensome by his aversion to typewriters; innumerable hands to shake; articles to write; old comrades to look up; and all the petty details that go with a political campaign. He bore up through it all despite poor health and wearing nerves. He was more determined than ever to show that militant socialism still had a wide audience.

Despite their growing respectability, Socialists were often viewed as distinct menaces. Consequently, though Debs himself was seldom bothered, many lesser Socialists were harassed. When Roosevelt was shot by a fanatic in Milwaukee, long a Socialist stronghold, the party's national headquarters issued a statement that the would-be assassin had never been a Socialist.[39] Following a riot in New York City involving an estimated 20,000 people and 200 policemen, the courts ruled that Socialists were entitled to use city parks for their meetings.[40] In Portland, Oregon, a group of Socialists was arrested for making "derogatory and libellous" remarks about Theodore Roosevelt and his family. The arrest of Socialists on similar charges elsewhere was fairly common.[41] After considerable controversy the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the Socialists were entitled to display the red flag since it was a legitimate party emblem.[42] All these incidents merely reflected the established order's growing concern over socialism's success with the voters. In reality every such arrest was a compliment to the influence the Socialists had built up since 1900.

In Los Angeles, whose city fathers shed few tears over Socialist problems, especially after the bombing of the *Times* plant in 1910, Socialists were forbidden the use of city sidewalks and street-corners for meetings.[43] Perhaps in spite, but more likely because the opportunity was too good to miss, the Socialists were ready for Governor Hiram Johnson of California, the Progressive vice-presi-

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38 Herbert Morais and William Cahn, *Gene Debs: the Story of a Fighting American,* New York, 1948, 87.

39 *New York Times,* October 15, 1912.

40 *Ibid.,* September 26, 1912. The estimate of the crowd is probably too high.

41 *Ibid.,* October 17, 1912; *Los Angeles Times,* October 18, 1912.

42 "Flying Red Flags," *Public,* 15 (September 20, 1912), 892.

43 *Los Angeles Times,* October 1, 1912.

dential nominee, when he came to speak in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The Governor had hardly begun his address when a local Socialist set up a stand at the edge of the crowd and heckled and disputed with Johnson throughout his speech.[44]

The crucial nature of the contest of 1912, the high point of the long progressive groundswell, was sensed by all who watched the developing campaign. It was not long before the consensus eliminated Taft and narrowed the field to Roosevelt and Wilson. Despite the heavy competition for liberal votes, most of which were conceded to the Progressives and Democrats, the Socialists were still viewed with alarm in certain quarters. The distinguished historian Albert Bushnell Hart warned that unless the Progressives were elected there would be a socialist administration in Washington in sixteen years.[45]

His tour finished, a weary and exhausted Debs returned home to await the results. He himself had been unable to register because he was away from Terre Haute during the registration period, so instead of going to the polls he stayed home to celebrate his fifty-seventh birthday.[46] No special wire service was set up by the Socialists. Instead, scouts in the major population areas telegraphed the results to the Debs home as soon as they became known.[47]

The final tally showed that Debs polled 897,011 votes of approximately 14,000,000 cast, an all time high for the Socialists to that date. The national campaign committee's confident prediction that Debs would receive two million votes and that twelve Socialist Congressmen would be elected[48] proved illusory, however, for even Berger lost his seat from the Milwaukee district where the opposition combined to beat him.[49]. There were brighter spots in the total picture, however. The Socialists outvoted the Republicans in Mississippi, which may not have been a major accomplishment considering the state of the GOP in that area. Eighteen new Socialist legislators were elected in various local contests across the country.[50] Many local offices, ranging from road inspector to mayor, were filled by Socialist candidates.

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44 *Ibid.*, October 23, 1912.
45 *New York Times*, September 30, 1912.
46 *Chicago Tribune*, November 6, 1912.
47 *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 1912.
48 *New York Call*, October 10, 1912.
49 "Election Results," *Public*, 15 (November 15, 1912), 1089.
50 "The Socialist Vote," *Literary Digest*, 45 (November 23, 1912), 943–944.

What strengths and weaknesses did the total returns indicate in the politics of American socialism? First of all, the center of Socialist strength remained situated in the broad area west of the Mississippi, mainly in the Mississippi Valley itself, the birthplace of so many radical movements in American history. The hard years of organizational work in that area consistently repaid the Socialists in higher votes. Ohio led her sister states in the Socialist column with 89,930 votes for Debs. She was followed by Pennsylvania, with 83,614; Illinois, with 81,249; California, with 79,201; and New York, with 63,381.[51] When the vote was broken down proportionally, however, these states appeared further down the list. Agrarian Oklahoma, where the Socialists had capitalized on poverty and general social unrest, tied with Nevada, each state giving Debs 16.61 per cent of its vote. They were followed by Montana, with 13.66; Arizona, with 13.33; Washington, with 12.43; and California, with 11.76.[52] It was in these far western states, scenes of so many labor troubles since 1900, that the Socialists registered their greatest proportional gains and where they showed their greatest grass roots strength. Socialist organizers in the mining and lumber camps of the Far West, not to forget cities like Seattle and Los Angeles, were eminently successful in making their influence felt in labor organizations and their work paid off in higher votes for Debs and local Socialists.

The returns also indicated that radical socialism seemed to be on the rise, for the areas dominated by the "slowcialists"—New York, Wisconsin and other parts of the Midwest—gained far less ground than the western areas where Debs' brand of socialism found many adherents. In Pennsylvania and West Virginia, where the Socialists had agitated among striking miners, the vote was up as much as 300 per cent over the 1908 figures. If Roosevelt and Wilson took Socialist votes they seem to have taken them from the "parlor socialists."[53]

Although the total vote was far below the two million forecast the significance of the party's showing should not be overlooked. The fact that the Socialists did so well in the face of overwhelming liberal opposition indicates that there was not only a hard core of faithful to whom they could appeal but also that there was a con-

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51 Socialist Party, *Socialist Congressional Campaign Book 1914*, 19–20.
52 *Ibid.*
53 Cf. the figures in *Ibid.*, 19–20; *American Labor Yearbook 1916*, 98–100.

siderable body of sympathetic Americans who would mark their ballots for Debs even when offered the liberalism of Wilson and Roosevelt. Unquestionably, Debs' candidacy was the greatest single factor in explaining the Socialist vote. For a whole generation he had stood as the champion of the workingman and under-privileged of all classes. His popularity extended far beyond the membership rolls of the Socialist party. While the Socialists never captured organized labor, many workers voted for Debs, another explanation for the Socialist vote of 1912. Since the election of 1912 was the culmination of the progressive urge it was only natural that the Socialists benefitted from political unrest. Americans who distrusted Roosevelt's progressivism and who were dissatisfied with Wilson cast their votes for Debs.

In addition, both radical and conservative Socialists could look with pride on their organizational work in explaining the vote. In such areas as Wisconsin and New York the conservatives had acquired respectability and with it a certain amount of public trust. Their desire for reform rather than revolution and their willingness to move beyond the Progressive or Democratic position impressed many voters. The radicals in turn had much of which to be proud. They had organized parades, taken advantage of strikes, preached, written, and organized among the workers and farmers and their hard labor brought results. The whole Socialist press had been very active throughout the campaign and reached countless voters it had not served before.

The election returns showed that the Socialists remained a force within American politics and that given time, funds and the proper climate of opinion they could make an impressive showing. The campaign also showed that however unorthodox their dogma, their campaign tactics differed little from those of their opponents. The whole Socialist campaign revealed a thorough understanding of mass psychology and the issues and tactics to which the American people were most susceptible. Colonel George Harvey, one of Wilson's early backers and a man not noted for snap political judgements, was impressed by the whole Socialist campaign. He estimated that without Roosevelt's competition, Debs would have received an additional half million votes.[54]

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[54] "The Socialist Vote in the United States," *Chautauquan*, 69 (January, 1913), 135–136.

But the Socialists were never able to do as well again. They never captured the vote of organized labor and their grass roots strength dwindled rather than broadened with the years. Debs ran for president once more, this time from jail in 1920. His total vote was higher than in 1912 but the percentage was cut in half. The World War and Russian revolution were destined to cast the final stone of stigma on the Socialists and to dye their works in deepest red as far as the average American was concerned. The stresses and strains introduced by the Russian revolution into the party structure already weakened by factions were the final straws that broke it. The Socialist victory celebrations of 1912 were not unjustified, however. The party membership had been increased; the party press was stimulated; Debs had made wider contacts than ever before. The returns indicated that there were areas where special efforts could be made. There was every hope within the Socialist ranks for even greater success in 1916 and 1920. Neither Debs nor his followers could have known that this was the harvest year, the summertime of American socialism and that only autumn lay ahead.

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The Rise of the Brazilian Military Class, 1870-1890

The victorious army, whose troops began returning to the cities, *fazendas* and *sertoes* of Brazil in 1870, was an army which felt justly proud of its feats on the battlefields during the six years of the war with Paraguay. Throughout the provinces of Brazil, the returning troops were welcomed as heroes. Not only the great military leaders, but all of the army, the national guard, and especially the *Voluntarios da Pátria,* were received with magnificent celebrations. The Brazilian legislature passed a resolution of congratulations and proposed that a statue of Dom Pedro II be erected to commemorate the victory. [1]

There was a discordant note in the welcome accorded to some of the returning regiments. The government of the province of Rio de Janeiro seemed particularly concerned about the $200,000,000 cost of the war and the rise of military fervor and when the *Voluntarios da Pátria* returned, they were dispersed quickly, without ceremony, their standards were put away and the bands were silent. This shocked their commander, the Conde d' Eu, son-in-law of Emperor Pedro II, who protested this "... betrayal of his companions in arms."[2]

This effort to temper enthusiasm for the military class soon became the prevailing trend. The politicians who controlled Brazil in the post-war years deliberately neglected the army. The neglect was so obvious that a contemporary wrote:

> A forgotten army existed in Brazil. This army was badly organized, poorly instructed and poorly paid; it was an army where there was one officer for thirteen soldiers; where the number of officers and the long period of peace made promotions difficult to obtain; where the poor soldier lived outside of regimental life, detached in small garrisons of twenty, ten, five and even two men in the towns of the interior, a situation which was unfavorable to the maintenance of discipline and was destructive in every respect.[3]

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[1] José Francisco da Rocha Pombo, *História do Brazil,* (10 vols.), (Parte supplementár, Documentos para a história do priméiro decennio da República), Rio de Janéiro, (N. D.), IX, 342.

[2] J. M. Pereira da Silva, *Memorias do meu tempo,* (2 vols.), Paris, 1896, II, 118.

[3] P. Raphael M. Galanti, S.J., *Compendio de História do Brasíl,* (5 vols.), São Paulo, 1910, V, 96.

The feeling of contempt for the *politicos* and of superiority over all civilians, which had been prevalent during the war, in the post-war years was bolstered by resentment and hatred for the politicians responsible for the neglect to which the army was subjected. The military leaders began to think that they "... were predestined to be the saviors of Brazil from the odious machinations of party leaders and politicians."[4]

The war with Paraguay had afforded Brazilian military leaders an opportunity to witness the political power and prestige enjoyed by the military leaders of the La Plata countries. The power and prestige of caudillos such as Rosas, Rivera and López was envied by Brazilian officers. One such officer, a man destined to become the second president of Brazil, Floriano Peixoto, in a letter to a friend, praised López and said of him: "... such a man as that is what we need in Brazil."[5]

To prevent the appearance of a Rosas, the politicians turned to the device of selecting respected, high ranking officers for prominent political positions. The Conservatives, after the Paraguayan War, cultivated the prestige of General Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, the Baron of Caxias, and the Liberals groomed General Manuel Luiz Osorio for the military leadership of their party. After the death of Caxias and Osorio, the Viscount of Pelotas was selected by the Liberals, and João Mauricio Wanderly, Baron of Cotegipe, the great pro-slavery Conservative leader, began to rouse the ambitions of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca so that in the future he would be "our Caxias." Deodoro as the Conservative military leader would be favored with distinguished positions, such as Senator, President of the Council of State, or Minister of War, where "... the valiant sword will have its hilt decorated with the arms of nobility."[6]

This attempt to integrate the military into political parties for purposes of party prestige and political strategy failed to heal the breach between the politicians and the military leaders. The military men continued to regard the politicos as effeminate and weak men who were badly conducting the affairs of the country.

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[4] Conselhéiro, Carlos H. B. Ottoni, *O Advento da República no Brasil*, (5 vols.), Rio de Janéiro, 1890, 82.

[5] Oliveira Lima, *O Império Brasiléiro, 1822–1889*, São Paulo, 1927, 144. See also Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, "The Tide of Government, From Colony to Constitutional Democracy," *The Atlantic*, CXCVII, 153. Rosas, Rivera and López—The reference is to Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina, Fructuoso Rivera of Uruguay and Francisco Solano López of Paraguay.

[6] Max Fleiuss, *História Administrativa do Brasil*, Segunda Edição, S. Paulo, 1922, 411.

The military leaders had not been politically ambitious before the *politicos* courted their favor. Generally, they were honest, poor and frugal. After the infiltration of the *politicos* into their ranks, the military no longer were without ambition and much of their poverty vanished. Only their quality of professional honor remained unblemished. And the failure of the generals to understand the absence of a sense of professional honor among the politicians was to become another source of the "Military Questions" whose appearance signalled the decline of the monarchy.[7]

By 1883 the abolitionist and Republican movements and the diffusion of the Positivist doctrine had produced compromising attitudes among many of the younger army officers. Membership in political parties frequently caused these officers to engage in heated debate with political opponents. In these conflicts, the spirit of the military class soon revealed itself and the personal nature of the contests took on the delicate character of a class question.

The first incidents demonstrating the friction between the military and the politicians occurred early in 1883. Carlos Affonso de Assis Figueredo, Minister of War, caused Colonel Frias Viller to be imprisoned as punishment for a breach of discipline.[8] The incident received little attention in the press, nor did the military class openly display its irritation. However, a bill introduced in the Senate drew loud and angry protests from the leaders of the military class. The proposed law provided for the payment of subsistence to retired soldiers or to their widows, but under certain conditions payments could be withheld. One provision of the measure stated that: "The government will no longer permit awards of pecuniary value to be made to its employees; and when the good of the public service demands it, they will be retired or dismissed."[9]

The opposition to the bill was led by Lieutenant Colonel Senna Madureira, commandant of the Militray School of Rio de Janéiro, who wrote a series of articles which was published in the *Jornál do Commercio.* Madureira called the proposed law a strong attack upon the military, who, he said, through it would be presented a Trojan horse. The opposition to the measure was successful, but the

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[7] Oliveira Vianna, "A Queda do Império, Contribuicoes para a biographia de Dom Pedro II," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geographico Brasiléiro,* Tomo Especial, 845.

[8] *Jornál do Commercio,* Edição Commorativa do 1° Centenário da Independéncia do Brasíl, Rio de Janéiro, September 7, 1922.

[9] Anfrisco Fialho, *História da Fundacão da Republica no Brasíl,* Rio de Janéiro, 1891, 48.

politicos immediately renewed the ministerial prohibition against discussion by army or naval officers of political or military affairs in the newspapers.[10]

During April, 1884, Lieutenant Colonel Madureira, then commandant of the Artillery School of Campo Grande, permitted the students to celebrate the arrival of an abolitionist *jangada* from Ceará, an imperial province which had freed most of its slaves. When the minister of war requested information concerning the celebration, Madureira asserted that the minister was not competent to inquire about the events which occurred within the school and stated that he was subordinate to the Conde d' Eu.[11] Madureira was dismissed from the command of the school and was reprimanded in an order of the day issued by the minister of war "... for the good of the discipline of the army."[12]

The following year, 1885, another incident aroused the wrath of the military class. An isolated infantry company was inspected by Colonel Cunha Mattos who recommended that a council be named to investigate the company and that the company commander, Captain Pedro José de Lima, be relieved of command. Four months later Captain Lima complained to the Minister of War that the colonel had made a hasty inspection and had failed to denounce his friends who were responsible for the conditions of the troops. Captain Lima was ordered to appear before a Council of War. Colonel Mattos was severely criticized by friends of Captain Lima. In response to this criticism, he asserted that the Minister of War had failed to interpret properly the information given him concerning Captain Lima.[13] Following the publication of the colonel's statement, the minister ordered Mattos confined to his regimental headquarters.

This personal conflict between the officers and the two politicians developed into a conflict between the military class and the bureaucrats of the government. The Viscount of Pelotas, senator from Rio Grande do Sul and a cavalry leader during the Paraguayan War, defended Cunha Mattos from the floor of the senate, stating that "... The officers of the army should see in that which their comrade has suffered an insult to all of them." When reminded of the regulations prohibiting army officers from criticizing the gov-

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10 Galanti, V, 97.
11 Rocha Pombo, X, 54.
12 Tobias Monteiro, *Pesquisas e Depoimentos para a história*, Rio de Janéiro, 1913, 125.
13 Fialho, 45.

ernment without permission in the newspapers, Pelotas replied, "I place my honor above everything."[14]

In 1887, when the military question entered its most acute stage, the Baron of Cotegipe, President of the Ministry, attributed to Pelotas the major responsibility for the conflict. "A seed produced a great tree, and the words of Pelotas have been the seed of the question."[15]

The Cunha Mattos incident led Senator Franco de Sa, former Minister of War, to make reference to the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Madureira as a result of the *jangada* incident of 1884. Madureira, commandant of the Artillery School of Rio Pardo in Rio Grande do Sul, vigorously defended himself and said that his dismissal had been the result of Franco de Sa's jealousy of him.[16] Since Madureira's statements appeared in the *Jornál do Commercio* and other newspapers of the empire, he was censured by the Minister of War, Alfredo Chaves.

The censure evoked further protest from Madureira, who in a newspaper article stated that "When a competent authority passes a law forbidding the military from defending themselves against members of parliament, who seemingly have exclusive privilege of inflicting insults, on that day, I shall leave the ranks of the army."[17]

Madureira's article quickly aroused the emotions of the military class. This was especially the case in Rio Grande do Sul, where Madureira was stationed. Its proximity to the Rio de la Plata republics permitted easy infiltration of caudillo ideas and the peoples of the province shared the republican sentiments of their neighbors across the borders. But support for Madureira's stand was not confined to Rio Grande do Sul, he received telegrams of support from all parts of the empire.

The acting president of the province, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, formally heard Madureira's case and then informed the adjutant general that Madureira had been right in defending himself against the accusations of Franco de Sa.[18] When the president of the ministry, Cotegipe, reminded the marshal of his duties as acting president of the province, Deodoro replied, "If I have duties

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14 Vianna, *loc. cit.*, 851.
15 Rocha Pombo, X, 56.
16 Monteiro, 180.
17 Fialho, 56.
18 Ernesto Senna, *Deodoro, Subsidios para a história*, Rio de Janéiro, 1896, 252.

as president . . . , I also have duties as a soldier who is offended by the ingratitude shown the military class."[19]

Deodoro was immediately removed from the position of acting president by Cotegipe, who referring to the attitude of Deodoro and his fellow officers, informed Deodoro that ". . . an army which protests against the acts of the minister of war . . . in time might protest against the government itself."[20]

In response to the letter of dismissal, Deodoro bitterly denounced the government. He declared that ". . . the military can not and should not be subjected to offenses and insults from the Francos de Sa and Simplicios. . . ." His letter made the names of the hated civilians plural so that Cotegipe could observe that his anger was directed against all who sought to curtail the pride and honor of the military class. The marshal also wrote that ". . . if fate determines the decline of the military class, on that day, I, despairing that I can not be superior to a commander of the national guard, a simple and special political figure, shall break my sword, and ashamed, seek as a means of livelihood, after the example of many others, the chair of deputy, so that I too, may insult whom I wish."[21]

Cotegipe and the Conservative Party leaders had been grooming Deodoro for the role of party military leader. However, this denunciation of government policy caused Cotegipe to fear possible armed rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul and he ordered Deodoro, Madureira, Oliveira and Vasques to report to the minister of war for assignment to new duties.[22]

The question of the legality of the *avisos* of the Minister of War was settled by an imperial decree which authorized military officers to express their opinions in the newspapers. Cunha Mattos and Senna Madureira immediately demanded that the censures against them be revoked. The ministry on its part announced that the censures would be rescinded if the officers requested that such action be taken. This the two men refused to do.

During the summer and fall months of 1886, the tension between the military leaders and the civilian politicians continued. Deodoro, the strong man around whom the military and their sympathizers rallied, scheduled a meeting of army officers in the

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19 Fialho, 65.
20 Fleiuss, 417.
21 Galanti, V, 99.
22 Antonio Joaquim Ribas, *Perfil biographico de Campos Salles*, Rio de Janéiro, 1896, 110.

Recreio Dramatica, February 2, 1887, wherein the complaints of the military were to be discussed. About two hundred officers were present at the meeting and Dedoro's arrival caused a tremendous round of applause. The officers at this meeting announced that they "... did not consider the conflict between them and the government honorably ended ... while the *avisos,* which were justly condemned by the imperial resolution of last November 3, remain in effect."[23] They appealed to Dom Pedro to use his influence to end the agitation over the question.

Deodoro, three days after this meeting in a letter to Dom Pedro, reminded the emperor that the imperial resolution of November 3, 1886, had been ignored by the ministry and asked "... in the name of the army, in the name of the military class, I beg Your Majesty to attend to the question and decide it with the complete justice which characterizes all of the acts of Your Imperial Majesty."[24]

Don Pedro, on receipt of the letter, remarked that he would take action. The action taken was directed against the marshal who was dismissed from the post of Quartermaster General. It is possible that the emperor and the ministry expected Deodoro to resign rather than submit, but if such were their hopes, Deodoro did not fulfill them.

On February 12, 1887, Deodoro wrote another letter to the emperor wherein he informed Pedro II that the military asked only that injustice be righted. "... I await justice from your majesty, that justice which your minister of war has denied us. ... On being denied the justice for which I beg, I shall be ashamed of the uniform which I wear."[25]

Soon after receiving this letter the emperor accepted the resignation of the minister of war. The new minister, Ribeiro Luz, did not order the censures revoked and the tension between the government and the military class continued.[26]

Following conferences with Quintino Bocayuva and other republican and military leaders, Deodoro decided that a last-resort appeal should be made to the Parliament for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The appeal, actually an ultimatum, was published, May 14, 1887. It reviewed the grievances of the military class and stated that the protest had to be delivered to the Parliament because the

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[23] Monteiro, 137.
[24] Fialho, 76.
[25] *Ibid.,* 76.
[26] Monteiro, 141.

military would maintain their resistance to the unconstitutional censures until they received full satisfaction.[27]

Cotegipe continued his refusal to have the centures revoked, despite having learned that Deodoro and Pelotas had the support of all of the garrisons in Brazil except the one at Pernambuco. However, when Silveira Martins and Affonso Celso, Viscount of Ouro Preto, offered to mediate the dispute, Cotegipe quickly accepted the offer. These men then persuaded the Senate to adopt a motion inviting the government to terminate the effect of the censures against the army officers. One Brazilian historian, Max Fleiuss, asserts that the republic was as good as established on the date of the passage of the above resolution.

Cotegipe, having tasted the steel of the military, immediately sought to neutralize the position which it had assumed in Brazilian politics. Many students were expelled from the military school. Officers, who because of their opposition to the ministry in Rio Grande do Sul had been ordered to report to the minister of war, were retained on duty in Rio de Janeiro or sent to remote provinces. This action caused no new outburst of indignation from the mititary class.

The provocation for such action came early in 1888, when Lieutenant Captain Leite Lobo of the Navy, a visitor in the home of a licentious woman, was arrested and severely beaten. An adjutant-general of the Navy, an Army officer and a relative of Lobo were scornfully dealt with before Lobo was released. The Naval Officers Club protested to the ministry against the treatment which had been accorded Lobo. After the Military Club of Rio de Janeiro informed the naval officers that they could be counted on for support, the Naval Club declared itself in permanent session until satisfaction was given for the offense which had been committed against Lobo.[28] The government seeking to comply, dismissed the police officer who had commanded the station wherein Lobo had been confined. But the Naval Club was not satisfied, it now demanded the dismissal of the chief of police. Meanwhile, there were near-riots in the streets of the city as a result of incidents between military and naval personnel and soldiers of the police. Consequently, the police were removed from the streets and their duties were taken over by the military.

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[27] Galanti, V, 191.
[28] Galanti, V, 103.

The Princess Regent, Isabella, who was occupying the throne in the absence of her father, yielded to the demands of the military and dismissed the chief of police. This new blow to the prestige of the ministry and the rising clamor for the abolition of slavery, led to the fall of the ministry.

On March 10, 1888, João Alfredo, Conservative, was invited to organize a new cabinet. The new ministry weathered the hostile waters of the fall and winter, but in November, 1888, a clash between soldiers of the police and troops of the Seventeenth Infantry Battalion in São Paulo led to a new crisis. The officers of that battalion asked the adjutant general, Severiano da Fonseca, to revoke the transfer order which had followed the incident in São Paulo. They also demanded the dismissal of the São Paulo chief of police. The ministry, fearing another military question, yielded to the demands of the military, but in the dismissal of police officer no mention was made of the circumstances surrounding his discharge. When the newspapers of São Paulo hinted that the officer had been dismissed at his own request and that the demand of the military had not been a factor, Severiano da Fonseca, protested that the ministry had failed to give justice to the military and threatened to resign his position. The ministry immediately changed its position and informed Fonseca that the police officer had been dismissed by a decree of December 1, 1888, not at his request, but for the convenience of the public service.[29]

João Alfredo therefore made a determined effort to end military interference in his government. Marshal Deodoro was transferred to Matto Grosso. A rumor was current in Rio de Janeiro that the ministery planned to destroy the prestige of the Fonseca brothers. Deodoro was the unofficial leader of the military class and Severiano, as adjutant general, was the official leader of the army. Perhaps in order to silence this rumor, the government awarded Severiano the honorary title of Baron of Alagoas.

Following the emancipation of the slaves, May 13, 1888, the Alfredo ministry, unable to unite the Conservative party, resigned and was succeeded to the ministry of Affonso Celso, Liberal. Celso, Viscount of Ouro Preto, sought to forestall the advent of a republic by demonstrating that the monarchy was flexible enough to satisfy all of the demands of the people.[30]

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[29] Rocha Pombo, X, 99.

[30] Visconde de Ouro Preto, "Advento da dictadura militar no Brasíl," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geographico Brasiléiro*, CL, 162.

When the House of Deputies refused to support Ouro Preto's program it was dissolved and new elections were scheduled for August 31, 1889. Meanwhile, Ouro Preto ordered an increase in the strength of the police of Rio de Janeiro and the organization of a National and a Civic Guard whose strength was expected to equal that of the army by December, 1889.

Marshal Deodoro returned to Rio de Janeiro, September 14, 1889, and received a gala welcome from his comrades-in-arms and from the students of the military school. That day Ouro Preto became involved in an incident which increased the tension between the government and the military class. The minister, thinking that Lieutenant Caroline, commander of the guard, had been sleeping when he should have been on duty, ordered the officer confined to the headquarters of his unit. The lieutenant resorted to the press as a means of defense.

The Caroline incident was soon followed by another. Ouro Preto, capital city of the province of Minas Geraes, was the scene of a clash between army officers and the police of that city. The ministry ordered the Twenty-third Infantry Battalion, to which Lieutenant Caroline had been assigned, transferred to Minas Geraes to replace the troops who had been involved in the incident with the police. The officers of the Twenty-third Infantry had taken a prominent part in the ovation accorded Deodoro when he returned to Rio de Janeiro.

While these incidents were occurring, men such as Captain Adolpho da Fontoura Menna Barreto and Quintino Bocayuva were poisoning the mind of Deodoro against the government by bemoaning the fate which had befallen the military class. They assured him that the majority of the army stood ready to die with him in defense of the military class. They also pointed out the increase in strength of the Civic and National Guards and spoke of the proposed reduction in the strength of the army.[31] Deodoro, after having listened to these reports exclaimed, "No, I shall not permit this. . . . I will draw up the artillery and carry the seven ministers to the public and deliver myself to the judgment of the people."[32]

On October 22, 1889, the most outspoken military disciple of

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31 Rocha Pombo, X, 112.
32 *Ibid.*, X, 112.

Republicanism, Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhaes,[33] in a speech at the Military School of Praia Vermelha and in the presence of the minister of war, Candido de Oliveira, protested against, "... the complaints of poor discipline, insubordination and disorder which the government parties constantly throw into the face of the military." Constant concluded his speech by insolently challenging the government through his claim that it was "... the undeniable right of the armed forces to depose the legitimate powers ... when the military feels that its honor requires that this be done, or judges it necessary and convenient for the good of the country."[34]

When Ouro Preto learned of this breach of discipline and discussed it with Dom Pedro, the emperor, displaying little concern, said, "Send him to me and I shall speak frankly to him and he will return to the right road."[35] But Benjamin Constant did not return to the right road and it was he who convinced Deodoro that the marshal should relent in his desire "to accompany the old one's casket," that a change of ministry had not solved the military's problem and that only the establishment of a republic would prevent the destruction of the military class.[36]

On November 9, 1889, Deodoro called a meeting of the Military Club to discuss the transfer of the Twenty-second Infantry Battalion to the distant province of Amazons. The officers of the Military Club decided to take no action for eight days and if after that period, justice had not been given the military class, a revolution would follow.

After the departure of the Twenty-second Infantry, Benjamin Constant renewed his pleas to Deodoro that the military take action. Deodoro, on November 10, yielded. At a meeting in Deodoro's home, November 11, plans for the revolution were completed. The military-republican revolution planned for November 20, because of rumors of the pending arrest of Deodoro and other army officers, began during the night of November 14. Early in the morning of November 15, after an almost bloodless revolution, Deodoro confronted the Ouro Preto ministry and informed it that

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[33] Benjamin Constant, the most steadfast positivist in the army, had for many years been professor of mathematics in the military schools of Brazil and as such had been able to indoctrinate many of the younger officers in the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte. See also General Bibiano Sergio Macado da Fontoura Costallot, "Exercito," *Livro de Centenario, 1500–1900*, Rio de Janéiro, 1901, II, 24.

[34] Galanti, V, 105 and Fleiuss, 425.

[35] Vienna, *loc. cit.*, 866.

[36] Monteiro, 206.

he had placed himself at the head of the army in order to avenge the great offenses and injustices which the government had committed against the military class.[37] The military leader then spoke at length about the service which his class had rendered the country. The courageous Ouro Preto answered Deodoro's statement of military sacrifice by saying that, "It is not only on the battlefield that one serves one's country and makes sacrifices for it. Being here and listening to the general at this moment is not of less value than passing some days and nights in a swamp."[38]

Having accomplished his primary objective: the overthrow of the ministry which had threatened to destroy the army, Deodoro was reluctant to demand the abdication of the emperor. After assuring himself that he had the support of the naval officers and of the people of Rio de Janeiro and after much persuasion from republican leaders, Deodoro ordered the proclamation of the establishment of the republic.[39] The general later declared, "I did not wish to proclaim the Republic, that was the work of Aristides, Benjamin and Quintino."[40] The work of Aristides, Benjamin and Quintino was effective. On November 16, 1889, Dom Pedro was informed by letter that he must leave Brazil within twenty-four hours.[41]

Marshal Deodoro accepted the leadership of the provisional government and the United States of Brazil joined the ranks of her fellow Latin American republics as nations wherein the politicians must keep a tactful finger upon the pulse of the military giant and guide their policies in such a way as not to arouse its ire, lest the politicians' political playhouse be destroyed.

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37 Ouro Preto, *loc. cit.*, 59.
38 Fleiuss, 432.
39 Oliveira Lima, "Sept ans de Republique au Brasíl," *La Nouvelle Revue*, CI, 514.
40 Fleiuss, 437.
41 Braz do Amaral, "O imperedore e o proclamação da República," "*Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geographico Brasiléiro*, CLII, 472.

Book Reviews

Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War. Iuka to Vicksburg, Vol. IV. By Kenneth P. Williams. Pp. xii, 616. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956. $7.50.

In this fourth volume of his monumental study of the Union side of the Civil War, Kenneth P. Williams deals with the war in the West over a twelve-month period that began with July, 1862, and ended with Grant's capture of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. Much of the book is concerned with movements not directly relating to the final, triumphant (for the Union) climax. There is the story of the long and tangled campaign in which Buell and Bragg groped for each other in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky like two blindfolded fighters, not coming to grips until they met at Perryville on October 8. (Even then, in fitting irony, Buell remained unaware for several hours that his army was engaged with the enemy.) There is the story of Rosecrans' operations before he superseded Buell, punctuated by the battles of Iuka in mid-September and Corinth in early October. There is the story of Rosecrans after he superseded Buell, culminating in the bloody battle of Stones River or Murfreesboro, on the last day of 1862 and the first days of the new year.

Simultaneously, Professor Williams deals with the opening moves in Grant's progress—or lack of it—toward Vicksburg: with Van Dorn's destruction of the Union supply depot at Holly Springs; with Sherman's disastrous assault on Chickasaw Bluffs, which proved that Vicksburg could not be approached from the Yazoo; with the futile operations in the bayous of the Mississippi. The narrative concludes with the audacious and brilliantly executed campaign that began with the running of the Vicksburg batteries and the crossing of the Mississippi, progressed with the movement north and east, entered its last stage with the envelopment of the river fortress, and ended in a great Union victory.

If this summary is confusing to the general reader so, it must be admitted, is much of Professor Williams' narrative. A section deals with Buell and Bragg, the next section with Rosecrans and Price, the next with a subordinate command or two, then back to Buell and Bragg, and so on until one finds continuity in the account of the Vicksburg campaign. Perhaps the book had to mirror the complexity of the operations themselves. If that be admitted, the fact that this volume makes greater demands upon the reader than its three predecessors remains a valid comment.

As always, Professor Williams relies mainly upon the *Official Records,* a method the merits and demerits of which have already been sufficiently argued. And as always, the author does not hesitate to pass a technical military judgment upon the individual actions and general capacities of the officers involved. This reviewer is not competent to appraise the soundness of these criticisms, although he cannot help wondering whether

an officer enveloped in the "fog of war" does not deserve a little more charity than Mr. Williams sometimes extends.

When an author undertakes as massive a venture into history as *Lincoln Finds a General,* he should be judged by the entire work rather than by a fraction of it. If "Iuka to Vicksburg" does not quite measure up—and that may be a fallacious judgment—the slipping-off is too slight to deter one from predicting that the book, when finished, will be one of the few truly great contributions to the literature of the Civil War.

PAUL M. ANGLE

Chicago Historical Society

A History of Chicago. The Rise of a Modern City, 1871–1893. Volume III. By Bessie Louise Pierce. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1957. Pp. 575, xxxvi. Illustrated. $8.50.

Exactly twenty years ago the first volume of the four volume work of Professor Pierce made its appearance and received its welcome as *A History of Chicago. The Beginning of a City, 1673–1848.* The second volume, *From Town to City, 1848–1871,* came out in 1940. Circumstances beyond the author's control have prevented the publication of the present volume until this year.

The book, done with a very workmanlike and professional touch, matches the pleasing style of its predecessors and sustains reader interest to the final page. It is a history of all Chicago people and their widely diversified activities, rather than a collection of sketches of the few prominent persons and institutions. This democratic, cosmopolitan approach to the history of the metropolis is most appropriately chosen and fortunately well followed from the first chapter, which describes the city in ashes in 1871, to the climactic chapter, "The White City," or, the Columbian Exposition city of 1892–1893. During the twenty years the growth of Chicago to its maturity offered Professor Pierce a breath-taking theme, and she has done exceptionally well in painting her portrait realistically with a fine eye to details of light and shadow.

The second chapter, "The Fabric of Society," describes the people who came to Chicago from the South, from mid-western farmlands, and from many foreign lands. These newcomers doubled the population, trebled the land area of the city, and established themselves in colonies, in which the customs, languages, and cultures of their motherlands were perpetuated. As in all cities, but more abundantly present in Chicago were the problems of the slums, sanitation, police and fire protection, graft, and other devilment. Despite the unfavorable realities there was definite and encouraging progress, especially in the vast amount of building of palatial homes, of middle class dwellings, apartments, flats, hotels, railroads, factories, and civic institutions.

The following four chapters, under the general heading: "The Economic Empire of Chicago," are devoted to the greater elements of Chicago's

livelihood and her contribution to national wealth. The topics traced are: The Grain Trade, The Lumber Trade, Livestock and Meat Packing, Manufacturing and Merchandising, Banking, Investments, and Finance. In each section the prime movers in the development are indicated and ample statistics are introduced in text and footnotes. Moreover, lesser but important contributors to the growth are given their due credit, as for instance publishers, railroads, organizations and clubs.

With capital and management thus carefully traced two chapters narrate the story of "Labor's Quest for Security." These are packed with information on the origins of labor problems still in the public eye. The next chapters are on "The Expanding Role of Government," and "The Profile of Politics." Anyone acquainted with Chicago's political life will know how difficult Mrs. Pierce's task was to assess objectively the actions of politicians and how difficult it is to obtain necessary documentation. However, she does so, and concludes that "No election was free from charges of fraud and corruption. Critics of political behavior with a depressing persistence bemoaned the state of morality of those engaged in carrying out the duties of their offices." (P. 380.) It is refreshing and encouraging to turn to the last chapters covering "The increase of knowledge," the schools, the arts, the culture, religion, humanitarianism, the amusements, games, publications, and clubs.

The selective bibliography will earn the praise of scholars, including as it does many blocks of manuscript materials and private collections of documents and reports, along with the customary books, pamphlets, newspapers, periodicals, and official papers. In an appendix there is a collection of thirty statistical tables pertinent to the text. Fifteen maps and illustrations, an excellent format and index complete the good book.

Jerome V. Jacobsen

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How the Merrimac Won. By Robert Welter Daly. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1957. Pp. xii, 212. $4.00.

Our Civil War brought a tremendous change in American military and naval concepts, and this chiefly with respect to close cooperation between land and sea forces operating conjointly both in grand strategy and local tactics. The campaigns along the Mississippi have hitherto claimed most attention in pointing this new departure. It was, however, the whirling conflicts before Washington and Richmond that stood foremost in the fears and in the struggles of the opposing forces. And in this area there is no more illuminating demonstration than the historic stand taken by the *Merrimac.*

Much has been written about the "epic" clash between the *Monitor* of Ericsson and the ironclad that came out of the brain of Mallory. Their predecessors in the Crimean War had first employed the supposedly absolute weapon for the destruction of land batteries and of wooden sailing ships.

Nine years later during the two months from March to May, 1862, the fundamental weapon was employed on the vital Virginia front where McClellan hoped to fulfill Lincoln's hopes and bring an early end to the war.

Professor Daly, in this monograph that is as entertaining as it is profound, offers an entirely new and—to a layman—a completely convincing idea of what happened at the mouth of the James in those brief sixty-four days. He lifts the action from that of a dual between two doughty warriors to the higher realm of strategy. The Confederate ship was designedly used to blunt the attack that would have captured the capital of the South and thus to prolong the warfare for another three years. There is no doubt that this result took place. If so, then the *Merrimac* holds a most honored place in the history of war and in the rich armory of American policy on the conduct of war.

In his favored position at the Annapolis Academy, Professor Daly and his students have given great attention not only to Russian naval history, but from this first interest they have gone on to imaginative exploitation of our operations on the sea. A happy insight inclined him to explore once more the legend current in our texts and military manuals on the "victory" of the *Monitor* as seen in the deliberate wrecking and burning of the *Merrimac* that morning of May 11, 1862. The range of his study can be seen in his appended list of twenty-seven books and sixty scholarly articles not consulted by the standard biographers of the *Merrimac* (Trexler) and the *Monitor* (McCordock). He has missed none of the available materials from the war offices of both contestants and from contemporaries in the field or in posts of civil importance.

The book quite naturally makes no effort to give undue space to the actual battles of the ironclads, beyond a very successful demolition of the myth of victory gained by one over the other. His attention is wholly focused on proving the strategic purpose shown in the building and employment of the mighty floating menace. How the *Merrimac* hurt McClennan and how she spread panic in Northern officialdom, is amply clarified, as is the stroke of genius whereby Lincoln ordered his professional fighters to capture Sewell's point from the rear and thus tumble Norfolk out of Johnson's hands. The study is bound to stir controversy, and understanding. It is exceptionally well supplied with maps, notes of explanation and citation, and a pleasing format.

W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

Notes and Comments

Guide to the Manuscripts of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin Supplement Number One has recently been published at Madison by the Society. The listing, calendaring, and editing have been capably taken care of by Josephine L. Harper, Manuscripts Librarian, and her research assistant, Sharon C. Smith. Moreover, they have prepared a very good, detailed index for the 790 items listed. The earlier *Guide* to which this is a supplement, described the manuscript collections of the State Historical Society, except the Draper collection, to 1940. The present volume describes the enormous accessions from that time to May, 1956, and promises new supplements from time to time. The numbering of the materials is continuous, so that the first *Guide* ended with item number 802, the *Supplement* begins with 803, and the projected supplement number two will begin with number 1594.

The compilers point out in a preface the similarity and dissimilarity between the first *Guide* and the *Supplement.* In the latter they include manuscripts, copies and microfilms of documents whose content and interest extend over the country rather than to the limited area of Wisconsin. Wisconsin state, county, and municipal records are excluded in view of the modern public records program, though some papers of Wisconsin governor's prior to 1943 are listed. Copies of some materials from federal archives are listed. Smaller accessions of one to ten pages, omitted from the *Guide,* are included in the *Supplement,* when they have more than very local interest. Many major accessions have been made by microfilming manuscripts in various libraries and archives. Manuscripts not yet processed and those whose use has been limited by donors are listed separately in the last ten pages of the compilation. Many entries are the fruit of two great projects for collecting materials, namely, the Labor History Project and the Medical History Project. The records of labor organizations gathered in the state are a noteworthy collection, and to these national labor records are being added. The Medical History Project, inaugurated in 1951, has brought together a wealth of entries on the history of medicine and dentistry in Wisconsin. The State Historical Society should be justly proud of the achievements in history which this volume represents, the achievement of collecting documents for

scholars and for posterity and the achievement of making the citizens of Wisconsin increasingly aware of their historical past.

* * * *

Handbook of Latin Amreican Studies: No. 19, edited by Francisco Aguilera and assistant editor Phyllis Carter, prepared by a number of scholars in the Hispanic Foundation in the Library of Congress, has been published by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. Besides a few changes in the list of contributing editors there is quite a modification in the chronological policy. Whereas *Handbook No. 18* included only publications issued during 1952, the present number includes essentially all of the books and articles published in 1953, 1954, 1955, and in the early part of 1956. These additions to the bibliography have brought the number of entries up to 4225 and have increased the size of the volume. The value of the *Handbook* is well known and appreciated by students of Latin American affairs.

* * * *

The attention of students of Latin American history may well be called to the *Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XII,* (1955), which has recently come in from Sevilla. It is published by the Escuela de Estudios Hispano–Americanos, Sección de Historia de America de la Universidad de Sevilla, and is volume 104 of the publications under the general auspices of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. This volume runs to about a thousand pages and contains twelve scholarly articles, a section on bibliography and historiography, and one of book reviews. The bibliographical lists are broken conveniently down according to countries. An unusual feature is the pagination, where the page numbers run consecutively at the foot and according to the article at the head of the page.

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The University of Chicago and the University of Virginia are sponsoring the publication of a new and complete edition of the papers of James Madison. The editors will appreciate information about the location of letters by or to James Madison or his wife, especially letters in private possession or among uncalendared manuscripts in the collections of public or private institutions. Please address The Papers of James Madison, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

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VOLUME XXXIX

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

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